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ABSTRACT

An abstract ofthe dissertation of Gerald Herman Williams, Jr. for the Doctor ofPhilosophy
in Systems Science: Engineering Management presented September 25, 2003.

Title:

An Evaluation of Public Construction Contracting Methods for the Public Building
Sector in Oregon using Data Envelopment Analysis

Since 1976 public agencies in Oregon have been allowed to select construction
contractors using a "qualification" based competition instead of the more typical lowest
responsible bid or Design-Bid-Build (DBB) basis. Since 1985, at least 136 such selections,
commonly known as CMlGC for Construction Manager/General Contractor, have been
made. The results ofthis policy have not previously been analyzed. This research compares
these selection methods, seeking to answer the following questions:
1. Does the CMlGC method result in projects that differ from DBB projects
regarding cost and schedule control?
2. Are CMlGC projects more efficient than DBB projects, where efficiency is
defined as the data envelopment analysis (DEA) technical efficiency score?
3. Does efficiency depend on an interaction between project type and the
selection method?
4. How do project stakeholders evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of the
two selection methods?

5. How do projects compare when the only apparent difference between them
is the selection nlethod?
To answer these questions, we identified 407 Oregon public building construction
projects and obtained a variety of data, including cost and schedule results, for 215 jobs
(111 CMlGC and 104 DBB). We analyzed the data several ways, including statistical

analysis, DEA, and various qualitative methods.
Results:
1. There was no statistically significant difference between the CMlGC and
DBB projects regarding cost and schedule control.
2. The DEA technical efficiency scores showed that CMlGC projects
outperfonned the DBB projects.
3. There was no interaction effect between project type and selection method.
4. Project stakeholders stated that reduction of risk is the principal benefit of
using CMlGC; however, architects and subcontractors are less enthusiastic
than owners and general contractors.
5. Data on two nearly identical projects indicated that the DBB project was
less costly than the comparable CMlGC project and also incurred less cost
growth; both projects were completed on time.
To sUlllmarize, this research fails to find support for the current Oregon law that

exempts certain projects from competitive bidding based on the presumption that CMlGC
will lead to substantial cost savings but does indicate that the CMlGC projects may be
better able to accommodate accelerated project schedules.
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Introduction and Scope of Research
This research was conducted in accordance with the rules established by the office

of Graduate Studies and Research, Portland State University, in order to satisfy
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in System Science: Engineering & Technology
Management. The scope of the research was approved by the dissertation committee with
minor deviations approved by the committee chainnan as allowed by the university. All
data used in the analysis and this research was "public infonnation" except opinions and
comments elicited from construction experts and project personnel regarding project
performance summarized in Chapter 5.

1.1

Purpose, Research Questions and Hypotheses
The principle purpose of this research is to detennine if the different project

delivery systems result in better projects and to detennine if the public policy that allows
public agencies in Oregon to use qualifications based selection processes for construction
contractors, instead ofthe traditional lowest responsible bidder method is justified.
The second objective is to determine if there are "best uses" of the different
contracting methods and establish a method for comparing construction project
perfonnance using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).

To meet the objectives five

research questions have been fonnulated:
1.

Do negotiated, performance based contractor selected projects outperfonn
the traditional competitively bid projects?

2.

Are negotiated projects more efficient than bid projects?
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3.

Are there best practices for the specific PDS's? That is, is one PDS better
for a specific project type than the other?

4.

What are the benefits and drawbacks of the two methods according to the
principal project stakeholders? Are all the stakeholders' views consistent
with each other, and supported by the data analysis? What insights into
how these policy decisions are made can be drawn from the stakeholders
and are these consistent with the data analysis?

5.

Are cases studies of projects and comparisons of similar projects that use
different contracting methods consistent with the data analysis?

In order to answer these questions, the following research hypotheses have been

formulated:

HA1 : Negotiated Procurement, Construction Manager/General
Contractor (CM/GC) method of Project Delivery System (PDS)
results in projects that outperform the traditional Design-Bid
Build (DBB) PDS method on cost and schedule control metrics.
H01 : There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB
projects with respect to cost and schedule control metrics.

HA2: CM/GC projects are more efficient than DBB projects,
where efficiency is defined by a DEA model that considers both
inputs and outputs from the construction process model.
H02 : There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB
projects with respect to efficiency scores where efficiency is
determined by a DEA model that considers both inputs and
outputs from the construction process model.
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HA 3: CM/GC PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
on similar types of projects.
When applied to corrections projects, CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3.1:

HA3.2: When applied to hospital projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.

When applied to institutional projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
H A3 .3 :

HA3.4: When applied to library projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.

HA3 .5: When applied to office building projects CM/GC
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
projects.
HA3.6: When applied to parking structure projects CM/GC
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
projects.

HA3 .7 : When applied to building remodel projects CM/GC
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
projects.
HA3.a: When applied to school projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3.9: When applied to sports facility projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.

CM/GC PDS does not result in projects that outperform
DBB PDS on similar types of projects.
H03:

(Note the sub-hypotheses of the null hypothesis
for brevity.)

H03

are omitted
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1.2

Research Design and Data Collection
How is "outperformed" determined? Or, more generally, how is performance

determined, what measures are used, and where does the required information come from?
Clearly, performance can be defined in a number ofways and use any number ofmetrics or
measures. Sanvido [182] Chua [47, 48] and others have laid some of the groundwork by
providing critical project success factors, while Knuf, [123] Harma, [104] Russell, [177]
and others have contributed benchmarking metrics. These can be thought of as inputs and
outputs to a construction project management model. However, the number of metrics and
measures provided in the literature is quite large, and therefore only the most important
measures must be separated out from those oflesser importance for this analysis.
The process undertaken in this research started with assembling a panel of
construction industry experts (referred to hereafter as the Expert Panel), which is detailed in
Chapter 3. Metrics were elicited from the Expert Panel consistent with methods described
by Ayyub [13], Chua [48] and Kocaoglu [124].
Data was obtained on a 407 public projects constructed in Oregon from 1986 to
2002 (the "Oregon database"). One hundred and ninety-two of the projects either did not
meet the criteria for the analysis or had significant missing data, which made them
unusable in the model. Two hundred and fifteen projects were used in the final DEA
model and analysis. These were nearly equally distributed between competitive lunlP sum

Design-Bid-Build (DBB) and negotiated Construction Manager/General Contractor
(CM/GC) Project Delivery Systems (PDS) at 104 and 111 respectively.
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Research Objective,
Metric Formulation,
Modeling, and
Data Collection

Figure 1: Research design

1.2.1 Research Objective
The research objective of this study is to detennine if the public policy, allowing
public agencies to select construction contractors on past perfonnance and proposal basis,
instead of lowest responsible competitive price basis, should be continued.
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1.2.2 Research Question 1; PDS Performance - Statistical Analysis of
Output
The first research question is to detennine if CMJGC projects outperfonn DBB
jobs. For this analysis we apply a simple statistical analysis on the output metrics, cost and
schedule control to test the hypothesis:

HA1 : Negotiated Procurement, Construction Manager/General
Contractor (CM/GC) method of Project Delivery System (PDS)
results in projects that outperform the traditional Design-Bid
Build (DBB) PDS method on cost and schedule control metrics.
H01 : There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB
projects with respect to cost and schedule control metrics.

1.2.3 Research Question 2; Project Efficiency - Nonparametric Statistical
Analysis
The second research question is to detennine if CMlGC projects are more
technically efficient than DBB jobs. Since DEA is a non-parametric method that results in
efficiency scores that are distinctly non-nonnally distributed, non-parametric statistical
analysis is the appropriate method to use in hypothesis testing of DEA model scores. DEA
models both inputs and outputs and results in an overall score of project technical
efficiency_ Here we test the hypothesis:
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HA2: CM/GC projects are more efficient than DBB projects,
where efficiency is defined by a DEA model that considers both
inputs and outputs from the construction process model.

H02: There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB
projects with respect to efficiency scores where efficiency is
determined by a DEA model that considers both inputs and
outputs from the construction process model.

1.2.4 Research Question 3: Benchmarking - Cluster & Statistical Analysis
Is there one type of project that is better suited to a particular PDS? A cluster
analysis on DEA weights is used to detennine if projects that use different PDS also use
different weighting schemes and test the hypotheses:

HA3 : CM/GC PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
on similar types of projects.
HA3 .1: When applied to corrections projects, CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3 .2 : When applied to hospital projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3.3: When applied to institutional projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.

When applied to library projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3.4:

HA3.S: When applied to office building projects CM/GC
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
projects.
HA3.6: When applied to parking structure projects CM/GC
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
projects.
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HA3 .7 : When applied to building remodel projects CM/GC
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
projects.
HA3 .8 : When applied to school projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3.9: When applied to sports facility projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.

CM/GC PDS does not result in projects that outperform DBB
PDS on similar types of projects.
H03:

(Note the sub-hypotheses of the null hypothesis H03 are omitted
for brevity.)
1.2.5 Research Question 4: Stakeholder Analysis
The fourth research question is an evaluation of the PDS's based on the opinions of
practitioners.

This evaluation is more complex than the previous research questions

because we seek to detemline why practitioners like or dislike the PDS' s, what justifies the
choice of PDS, and if there are significant differences between project stakeholders on
these issues?
Beierly, [23] Ayyub [13] and others have demonstrated the value of stakeholder
opinion. The stakeholder analysis was designed to find out how decisions were being
made by practitioners in the field with respect to the choice ofPDS. In particular, the intent
is to determine if different stakeholders hold different views on the processes and to
determine ifthe stakeholders' opinions support or contradict the data analysis.
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1.2.6 Research Question 5; Project Comparison Case Study
The fifth research question involves finding comparable projects that use different
PDS's. Then making qualitative and quantitative comparisons to confinn or refute the data
analysis. According to the stated public policy, CMlGC projects must result in substantial
savings to the public agency, therefore, if two projects were sufficiently similar, the
CMlGC project should always cost less than the DBB job.

Secondly, does the comparison lead to further insight about the use of different
PDS's in certain types ofprojects?
Case studies are widely used to help evaluate complex systems and interactions
such as strategies and management.

Construction projects are rarely repeated in a way

that allows for direct and specific con1parisons between projects, particularly with respect
to PDS. However, two school projects were identified during the data collection phase that
allow for just that particular case study comparison based on PDS.

1.3

Background and Motivation for the Research
In the public sector of the construction industry in Oregon, owners have the

opportunity to hire contractors with varying levels of project infonnation prior to pricing,
which is nearly unique among states in the US [55, 166]. Beginning in the mid 1980's,
public agencies in Oregon started to use alternative construction contractor selection
methods to hire finns on public projects. This process was authorized by law! as early as
1976, but little used prior to the mid to late 1980's, particularly in the building sector of the
I See Oregon Revised Statues: ORS 279.015 (as amended). The original statutory scheme was adopted
in the 1975 legislature under House Bill #2339, set forth by then Attorney General Lee Johnson, and
made effective January 1, 1976.
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construction industry. The common contractor selection method used since the public
bidding laws were enacted in the 1930's was by competitive lowest bid (commonly known
as Design-Bid-Build, DBB or Lump Sum Bid, LSB method). However, by the early
1980' s several public owners and construction contractors felt that the competitive lowest
bid method was a principal contributor to an ever increasing litigious market sector, delays
in completion, increasing insurance rates and bond costs and lower overall quality work. 2
4

As a remedy, first the Port ofPortland3 and next the Portland Development Commission

authorized negotiated procurements on their respective construction projects (called
. CMlGC jobs for Construction Manager / General Contractor method). In a little less than

twenty years, from the early 1980's to the year 2002, public agencies in Oregon
constructed more than five hundred public building projects; at least three hundred of those
cost in excess of a $1 million each5 in total representing nearly $5 billion in tax
expenditures.

At least 1366 of those projects were negotiated procurements where

contractor selection was based at least in part on prior performance of the firm on overall

It is interesting to note that about this same time, in 1987 Dunlop [82]wrote that owners were going
away from cost reimbursable contract forms and relying more on fixed price lump sum bid contracts in
order to establish better cost certainty.
3 The first known competitive negotiation selection for a construction contractor was the then K-Wing
of terminal south at the Portland International Airport. It is not known why this project received an
exemption from public bidding, no records of this project currently exist.
4 The second known competitive negotiation selection for a construction contractor was for the Yamhill
parking structure serving the Pioneer Place downtown development. The process was justified in that
project because the PDC had bad experiences in the past with projects that did not finish on time and
the parking structure had to finish prior to the opening of the mixed use development for holiday
season. Increasing liquidated damages to cover the risk of developer lost profits was thought to be an
uneconomical approach to ensuring the project opened on time.
5 Our study focused on projects costing more than $5 million, some smaller projects were included if
they met our project criteria for size and complexity.
6 There are 136 known negotiated procurements in the database, and another 80 projects that the
selection method is not known (whether lump sum bid or negotiated procurement). In addition, not
included in the database are several CM/GC projects that are currently underway or recently completed,
including high schools in Oregon City, Astoria, Salem and Beaverton totaling more than $100 MM.
2
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project quality, schedule, and safety perfonnance metrics.

While there have been some

attempts to analyze or audit specific negotiated projects, there have been no prior attempts
to evaluate a large set of these projects and compare their collective perfonnance against
the more widely used competitive bid project delivery system (PDS) and evaluate the
public policy in Oregon.

1.4

Project Delivery Systems (PDS)
The Construction Industry Institute (ClI) defines a project delivery system (PDS) in

[183] as:

A project delivery system defines the relationships, roles and
responsibilities of project team members and the sequence of activities
required to provide a facility_ Several systems have evolved over the
years. Construction management at risk, design-build and design-bid
build are three principal project delivery systems used in the U.S. today.

More commonly, the PDS is considered the manner in which the owner hires a
contractor for construction work, structures the contractual relationships and risks, and
manages the project to completion. There are three principal PDS' s: the traditional method
Design-Bid-Build (DBB) , a negotiated procurement method known as Construction
Management/General Contractor (CM/GC) and Design-Build (DB).7 The Oregon Public
Contracting Coalition (PCC) [56]8 defines the different Project Delivery Systems
commonly used in the public construction today as:

7
8

DB projects can result from a negotiated or lump sum bid procurement method.
See also [11, 102, 121, 139] for similar definitions.
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CM/GC Construction Manager/General Contractor:

CM/GC augments the traditional scope of work of the general
contractor with that of a construction manager under a single contract
with the owner. At an early point in the de~ign phase, the owner, using
a competitive selection process, selects a contractor to provide
construction management and general contracting services. By joining
the project team during design, the CM/GC firm can collaborate with the
architect/engineer (AlE) on the development of the design and
preparation of the design documents. Once the design has progressed
to an acceptable level, the CM/GC firm submits a guaranteed maximum
price (GMP) for the project to the owner. After agreement on a GMP is
reached, the GM/GC firm undertakes the construction of the facility.
The CM/GC firm procures subcontracts with trade contractors using
multiple bid packages to construct the project, and manages the
construction process on behalf of the owner. General conditions work is
typically self-performed by the CM/GC firm and, in some cases, the
CM/GC firm may be allowed to self-perform portions of the trade work.
Design-Bid-Build
The design-bid-build process is the traditional approach to delivering
public improvement projects. In this approach, the owner typically
contracts with a design professional to design the project and develop
construction plans and specifications. Construction documents are
prepared and advertised for bids. Interested contractors review the
construction documents and submit bids for the construction work.
Selection of a contractor is deterrriined based on a competitive bidding
process. While the design professional usually will either employ an
independent cost estimator or prepare its own cost estimates, the
actual cost of the project is solely determined by the bidding contractors
during the bidding process. Following receipt and review of the bids,
and confirmation by the owner that sufficient funding exists, the contract
is awarded to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder. The
contractor then proceeds to construct the project according to the plans
and specifications. During construction, the design professional
observes the work to ensure that it conforms to the design plans and
specifications.
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Design-Build
Design-Build is an alternative contracting method used for delivery of
both the design and construction services under one contract. This
contract provides a single point of responsibility to the owner, namely

the design-build firm. Many variations of this method exist, but all have
"single point of responsibility" as a common element. Design-build can
be undertaken when a performance specification is developed and the
entire package of design and construction services is competitively bid.
More commonly, the design-build firm is selected based on a
combination of qualifications, technical approach, and price.
Occasionally, the selection is made primarily on the basis of a design
competition. By combining design and construction services under one
contract, an opportunity exists to totally integrate the work of the
contractor and the design consultant. This allows the selected firm to
work with the owner during the design process to provide design, value
engineering, constructability review, scheduling, estimating, and other
related services. It also allows construction to start before the design is
entirely complete. Though many variations exist, compensation for the
design-build firm is typically based on a fixed price or, similar to the
CM/GC process, a GMP.

For the purposes ofthis research, the tenn CMlGC will be used to describe both the
PDS and also the party perfonning the work, such as the "CMlGC." Generally when an
entity is referred to as "contractor" or "general contractor" the reference is to a DBB PDS,
unless stated as the CMlGC contractor or as in the stakeholder analysis, where the context
is clear.
The Design-Build or DB method will be discussed at length, but only in the context
of the

cn reports

comparing the different PDS's found in the Appendix E. DB is not

widely used in the Oregon public building sector, although it is beginning to be used in the
highway building sector by the Oregon Department of Transportation. There were only
two DB projects in the original Oregon database ofprojects~ however, those projects, both
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parking garages, were discarded before the [mal analysis. In any case, since the crr goes to
great length to include DB in its analyses of the different PDS's, it is discussed here also.
Chapter 3 details the data collection process that resulted in the Oregon database of
projects. The Oregon database contains 407 projects; 510 were originally identified, but
103 of those projects were discarded as not meeting the project size or type requirements
for this research. Of these 407 projects, 215 were actually used in the DEA and statistical
analyses; we were unable to obtain enough information on the other 193 projects, many of
which had been built nearly 20 years ago, and the final project records for the jobs had
been either lost or destroyed. We were able to use all 407 projects in the Oregon database
for some ofthe "project characteristics" that is included here. For example, we know what
the original project bid or GMP cost of nearly all 407 projects was, therefore we can
estimate with fairly high confidence the total dollar val~e of the Oregon database and the
distribution between DBB and CMlGC projects.

1.5

Legal Construct
Public procurements are closely scrutinized for sound reasons, the public taxpayer

must be assured that the money spent by public agencies for public projects is not wasted
or spent for corrupt purposes. The federal government and most states, including Oregon,
require competitive open public bidding as a means of assuring "fairness" in the awarding
of public construction contracts [55]. Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) makes this explicit
in Chapter 279 stating:
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"279.005 Policy of competition in public contracts. (1) It is the policy
of the State of Oregon to encourage public contracting competition that
supports openness and impartiality to the maximum extent possible."
"279.015 Competitive bidding; exceptions; exemptions. (1) Subject

to the policies and provisions of ORS 279.005 and 279.007, all public
contracts shall be based upon competitive bids or proposals ... ,,9

The law in Oregon allows for alternative forms of procuring construction services
through the "exemption" clause in ORS 279.015(2) subject to a number of conditions that
are discussed in detail in following chapters and Appendix C. More importantly, it is clear
that the state favors open public bidding over any other form of construction procurement,
which justifies the "challenger - defender" mechanism that is used in the data analysis of
this research. That is, the defender is the "traditional" DBB method described above, and
the CMlGC PDS form is the challenger. Under the state prescribed scheme of exemptions,
the challenger "alternate" PDS must show that it is superior to the defender, or traditional
DBB method. In Chapter 4 of this research, we use this legal construct to help set up and
analyze the data, giving the defender every benefit of the doubt in terms of use of available
information and performance ofthe work.

1.6

Validation
The sample of projects used in this research is not a "statistical sample" of all

projects constructed during the research time frame; it is however, a large "convenient
sample." We were able to identify 407 projects that generally met the research criteria for
size and type of construction that were constructed in Oregon starting construction after
9

The entire exemption statute, Chapter ORS 279.015 is included in Appendix C.
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1986 and completed prior to 2002. It is unlikely that there were many more than these 407
projects constructed in Oregon during the research period that met the research criteria.
Any projects that were missed are more than likely, projects that started and completed in
the 1986 to 1994 time frame. This is because the DJC records going back nearly 20 years
are not as good as those in the period since 1994 when they started keeping records on
line. Also, several public agencies, in particular Oregon Health & Science University
(OHSU) and Multnomah County, archived their records, some of which either cannot be
found or were destroyed.
To validate the data in the study, we compared the results of our data with that in
the only other known similar studies; those performed by the Cll and a report from the state
of Washington. These comparisons are discussed in Section 4.1.2 and presented in Table
15.
The Oregon database presents the largest number of building projects studied to
date, and it is clear from the comparisons that the differences between the Oregon database
and the other study results are not significant.

There is only one comparison where the

difference exceeds 5%, which occurs in the comparison between schedule growth in the
Cll Benchmarking Study [51] and the Oregon database where all projects are combined.
However, the standard error of the means of these populations is 4.7%, which is really
quite large and means that the difference in the means (5.08%) is not significant.
Since the Oregon database results are consistent with the other studies on these
metrics, we conclude that the data collected for this research is valid.
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1.7

Results
1.

Based on the statistical analysis of the output metrics cost and schedule
control (in absence of inputs) the hypothesis that the CMlGC projects
perfonnance is superior to that ofDBB projects is rejected. Group statistics
indicate that there is no significant difference between the cost and
schedule control outputs from CMlGC and DBB projects. Therefore we
reject the hypothesis that CMlGC PDS results in projects that outperfonn
DBB projects on cost and schedule control metrics.

2.

Based on the DEA model and non-parametric statistical analysis, the null
hypothesis that CMlGC do not outperfonn DBB projects with respect to
overall efficiency (based on the DEA model) is rejected, and the alternate
hypothesis, that CMlGC PDS results in projects with a higher mean
technical efficiency scores than DBB projects cannot be rejected, and the
difference is statistically significant.

3.

Interaction analysis of the weights and slacks from the DEA model found
no evidence of interaction between project type, perfonnance and PDS. In
addition, we found no evidence of clustering by PDS with respect to
specific metrics, which indicates that there is no significantly different
strategy employed by managers when using CMlGC or DBB PDS.

4.

The stakeholder analysis indicates that the principal perceived benefits of
choosing CMlGC over DBB is a reduction in project risk and reducing the
adversarial relationship between the project management parties.

The
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perception of reduced risk is not supported by the data analysis, which
shows no difference in cost or schedule control metrics between the two
PDS's. Since project risk is generally the risk of going over budget or
beyond the schedule, CMlGC does not reduce those project risks. The
perception that the adversarial nature of the relationship between the owner
and the CMlGC, as compared with the owner-DBB contractor relationship
is reduced was not testable given the data we collected. Based on the
earlier work by Goldblatt and Septelka [99] and this research, we observed
that owners and CMlGC contractors that are involved in the work have a
higher regard for the benefits of CMlGC PDS than do the design
consultants and the subcontractors.
5.

The case study comparison of two nearly identical schools built for the
same owner, designed by the same architect, and constructed within one
year of another, where one used DBB and the other CMlGC PDS, showed
that the DBB project was built for significantly less total dollars and
experienced lower cost growth. Furthermore the DBB project was less
costly in virtually all cost categories. However, the CMlGC project was
fast-tracked and the DBB project was perfonned under nonnal construction
time constraints.

The analysis adds more confidence to the

recommendation that exemptions should be based primarily on schedule
and not cost issues.
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1.8

Contributions
The contributions ofthis research are as follows:
1.

This research demonstrates that the current public policy used in Oregon to
exempt public building projects from open competitive public bidding on
the presumption of "substantial cost savings" to the public is not supported
by the research.

The research suggests that exemptions should focus

primarily on schedule requirements. This research demonstrates CMlGC
projects are more efficient than DBB projects when fast-tracking is
required because the public pays no additional price in tenns of cost and
schedule control for starting the job with less than complete information.
2.

This research raises questions about earlier research in the field that found
CMlGC PDS superior to DBB on nearly all projects based on project
outcomes.

3.

The Oregon database compiled for this research includes 407 projects, 215
of which were used in the DEA model. This is the largest published
database ofpublic building construction projects in the literature.

4.

This research fills several gaps in the construction management and DEA
literature, including proposing the use of DEA as a benchmarking tool for
construction project performance, which had not been done before.

1.9 Limitations
Most all research has limitations and the same is true here. The first and probably
most obvious limitation is that the study is limited to building projects in Oregon. This
19

means perhaps that the study cannot be generalized to the broader construction industry
and to other states (although the state of Washington is discussed). Second, much of the
data came from biased sources: owners and contractors, who support the continuation of
the public policy for their own reasons. (However, half of the data was obtained directly
from project files kept by owners.) Tbird, the Expert Panel members contributed much of
the data used in this study. This was done on purpose because it was felt that, particularly
construction industry members, would be more willing to participate in the research if they
had a hand in helping to develop the metrics. FurthelIDore, the elicitation and derivation of
the metrics process would serve as part "study education" that would streamline the data
collection process.

Finally, the projects are not a random statistical sample of the

population of all projects, instead they represent all the projects that we could obtain data
on. The Oregon database represents a convenient sample of the building construction
projects in Oregon during the study period, but it is a rather large convenient sample. It is
possible that the 193 projects in the Oregon database that were not used in the model could
affect the outcome ofthe analysis. However, it should be noted that the group statistics for
the Oregon database were substantially similar to those found in prior studies.
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2

Literature Review
This chapter is an examination of the previously published literature that forms the

basis for this investigation. The chapter includes prior research in construction, bidding
selections, negotiated procurements, DEA and includes references to prior studies in the
area, which are found in the Appendix E.

2.1

Overview
There exists a great body of literature in the areas ofvendor selection, multi-criteria

decision making, bidding theory, construction contracting and Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA). Here, the focus of the discussion is on the application ofdifferent techniques to the
problem of public-sector construction contractor selection and post project evaluation.
Until 1976 the public-sector in Oregon, like much of the country, had only one method for
choosing a construction contractor on a public building project: lowest lump sum bid (LSB
method) [37, 55, 79, 166]. Therefore, the discussion here will begin with a review of the
literature on the construction industry and in particular auctions and competitive bidding
theory as it applies to construction contractor selection. Some details such as an example
ofbidder mark-up calculations are presented in the Appendix D.

In recent years, in Oregon, the public-sector has experimented with "alternative
contracting methods" such as competitive negotiation as a method of construction vendor
selection as documented by Douthwaite [79] and substantially similar to the process
described by Skitmore and Marsden [193]. This method requires the application of multi
criteria techniques or scoring models.
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A great effort has been made to obtain all of the prior reports of similar work
prefonned by other researchers as well as project evaluation reports and audits by state and
local auditors for specific projects.

The Construction Industry Institute (ClI) at the

University of Texas at Austin has been the most active single institution in perfonning
these types of comparisons. A brief critical review of the crr work is found in this chapter
with a more in-depth presentation found in the Appendix E. A comparison of the data
analysis and results from the crr studies and this work is found in Chapter 4.
Finally, project evaluation or "Benchmarking" and the application of Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to this problem are covered. DEA is a widely used tool for
benchmarking and efficiency analysis, specifically in public sector applications. However,
to date this tool has not been applied to the evaluation of construction contractor selections.
In his book, History o/Government Contracting, Nagle [154] states:

"Much of this country's contracting history has been spent trying to find
the best combination of three factors: the right contracting apparatus,
the right government-contractor relationship, and the correct contract
form itself."

This study touches on all three of factors. In this chapter of the study, a review of
the literature concerning the different fonns and contracting methods is reviewed.

2.2

Taxonomy of Literature and Relevant Gaps

Project benchmarking, project perfonnance, management and vendor selections are
among the overlapping topics in the DEA and construction industry literature. However,
while these are common themes in the literature, there is little crossover in the two

22

disciplines (meaning that DEA has rarely used to analyze construction industry
performance). This overlapping of topics is graphically depicted in Figure 2 below. Five
major gaps have been identified, labeled "A" through "E." This is not a complete list of
the literature in either field, merely some of the main points discussed here (in fact both the
DEA construction literature fields are quite voluminous with entire journals dedicated to
construction and project management, as well as several journals that focus on DEA and
the applications ofthe methodology).
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The gaps identified here are termed "relevant" gaps; there are numerous gaps in the
DEA and construction literature intersection that are of no consequence or concern of this
research.
The gaps in the literature that are noted in Figure 2 are as follows:
A.

While DEA has been used as a tool to help make selections, such as R&D
project and investment selections among other things, its application to
construction project selection has been limited to one unpublished report on
roadway' construction and maintenance projects. 10 While Cook et al. [60]
(also found in [41]) evaluated highway maintenance crews using DEA,
there is no application in the DEA literature that purports to evaluate
construction project performance or selection of construction contractors or
construction project delivery systems.

B.

There are many papers in the construction literature that discuss critical
success factors and benclnnarking metrics, and there are literally hundreds
ofDEA applications using input and output metrics. However, there are no
papers in the DEA literature that actually give researchers guidance on how
to derive metrics for DEA models.

The application from [60] uses a

formula that the authors derived, but no documentation is given why they
used the metrics they used, except the fact that the data was available.

10 This project was presented at the Fall 2000 INFORMS in San Antonio, Texas, by Dr. Timothy R.
Anderson and this author.
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C.

DEA is a widely used benchmarking tool; however, there are no papers in
the DEA literature on benchmarking in the construction industry generally,
construction project performance or the wider general uses of bidding and
negotiated procurements.

Furthermore, only one previous study by

Sanvido and Konchar [183] compares proj ect performance based on PDS.
D.

There are no benchmarking studies in the DEA literature on construction
project delivery systems.

E.

There are no case studies in the literature that compare two nearly identical
projects that used different project delivery systems in order to evaluate the
efficiency ofthe delivery systems.

F.

The DEA literature includes many methods to deal with scale differences
and imprecise input and output data.

However, currently there is no

guidance given in the literature of how to deal with extremely non-linear
and missing data that resides on one side of the DEA model. Nor has there
been any pervious evaluation of the proper DEA formulation to evaluate
the performance of construction projects or inelastic information has been
made.

In addition to these gaps, there is very little in the construction literature that
directly compares project delivery systems by outcomes. That work is basically limited to
a group of studies performed by the Cll, Design-Build Research Team. It

11

Also, reportedly funded by the Design-Build Institute.
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2.3

Construction Industry
The construction industry is often referred to as the largest single economic sector

other than government, and consequently the body of literature on the construction industry
and construction bidding is quite large. It is generally found in the professional journals of
the American Society of Civil Engineers and others.

However, some of the earliest

analysis of bidding is found in the areas of operations research, management science,
economics and engineering management.
Carty [37], Clough and Sears [54] and Halpin [102] provide very good overviews
of the construction industry: its history and development, role in society as well as
describing the major contracting methods evaluated in this study. Nagle [154] provides a
history of Federal Government contracting, which focuses on arms procurement and mail
contracts. A history of the Oregon construction industry, as it relates to the carpenter labor
union, is presented by Wollner [222]. The construction industry legal structure is reviewed
in the authoritative references prepared by Cibinic and Nash l2 [49] and Bednar, Braude and
Cibinic [22]. Construction industry bidding law is documented by Cushman and Doyle
[70] and updated by Rhodes [166]. In addition there are several texts on Construction Law,
including bidding, both nationally [32, 71] and pertaining specifically to Oregon [31].
Carty [37] describes the different types of construction contracts as: lump sum, unit
price, guaranteed nlaximum price (GMP), construction management (CM) and design

12 Professors Nash and Cibinc have written several authoritative works on contracting in the Federal
Government system. They are both with George Washington University Law School in Washington
D.C., where the Federal Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit, The Federal Court of Claims, and all of
the Boards of Contract Appeals are located. The Public Contract Law Journal is also published at the
George Washington University Law School for the same reasons.
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construct (also known as "design-build"). Gordon [101] and others [56] provide guidance
on selecting contracting methods; however, in the public-sector in Oregon, only three of
these methods are currently being used on a regular basis: lump sum, unit price and
negotiated GMP I3 [79, 80]. Myers [152] evaluates design-build approaches elsewhere in
COlUltry,

but Design-Build has not been used extensively in Oregon. Also, it should be

noted that unit price contracts are typically awarded on a lump sum basis (equal to the unit
price multiplied by the estimated number of units) and are generally limited to
transportation and utility construction contracts (such as: roads, sewers, waterlines and so
forth). Here, the discussion is limited to "building" contracts. Building contracts differ
from transportation and utility contracts in that they generally require the contractor to
provide many specific items of work (often times several hundred) for one complete bid
price. Transportation and utility contracts typically require fewer specific items to be
provided by the contractor, but they require many more "units" of each item. In addition,
the exact number of "units" of any specific item the contractor is required to furnish and
install is typically defined to plus or n1inus a certain percentage of an estimated amount. 14
This requires the bidder to bid many individual unit prices and sum the product of the unit
prices and estimated number of units to determine the total bid. There is a great deal of
complexity associated with both lump Sun1 and unit price bidding. The fact that this study

13 Design-Build, either negotiated DB or bid DB are not frequently used in Oregon, but have been used
on at least two public projects, a parking garage and a maintenance facility, both for Tri-Met, a local
transportation district, those projects, together with some DB highway projects have been executed
since [80] was published.
14 Contractors are generally required to prepare a bid on the estimated quantity, knowing that the actual
pay quantity (unit price * number of units) may vary by some amount (or percentage) prescribed in the
contract. Unit price bidding has the effect of shifting the risk for quantity assessment from the
contractor to the owner, meaning that the owner takes the risk of additional quantities of work actually
installed.
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focuses on lump sum building contract types is not to imply that they are more or less
complex than unit price bids.

2.4

Construction Industry and Bidding

2.4.1

Bidding and Auction Theory
Construction contractors have traditionally been selected on the basis of the lowest

responsible competitive bid [101, 149]. Bidding theory is a rich source of published
research dating back to the 1950's. The majority of this work was published in the 1970's
and 1980's; however, a steady stream of auction and bidding research continues to this day
(for example: [66, 118, 173, 206] were all published in the past three years). There have
been several bibliographies and surveys of competitive bidding published since this area of
interest within the economics and operations research communities was developed; some
of the more complete surveys include Wilson [220], McAfee and McMillan [146],
Milgrom [147], Milgrom and Weber [148], Engelbrecht-Wiggans [87], Rothkopf [173]
and a recent book by Kagel and Levin [118]. More compact reviews can be found in
Rothkopf and Harstad [174]. Though dated now, Stark and Rothkopf [197] and Stark
[196] have published extensive bibliographies in the field.

In the literature, competitive bidding theory is synonymous with, or considered a
subset of, auction theory. An auction is an economic institution designed for the exchange
of goods or services, where the exact selling or purchase price of the good or service is
unknown prior to the auction [173]. The price of the exchange is established by bidding
among parties wishing to either purchase or sell the good or service. Types of auctions are
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distinguished by the rules detennined by the auctioneer (who could be either a third party
or the principal buyer or seller). The various auction types in general use can be classified
by following characteristics: highest or lowest bid, first or second price, private or common
value, in combination with open (often oral) or closed (typically sealed) bidding.

I5

The

principal concern here is with the most common form of bidding used in the construction
industry, lowest bid, first price, common value, closed bidding auctions [174, 224].

2.4.2 Friedman's Basic Model
While auctions have been around for centuries, a theory of auctions and
competitive bidding was only established in the last fifty years. Most researchers 16 credit
Lawrence Friedman [91] for first analyzing the general bidding problem and formulating
an expected value model for optimal bidding strategy.

At about the same time as

Friedman's work, Percus and Quinto [161] applied linear programming to the problem of
"Competitive Bond Bidding," specifically, government bonded debt.

However, most

subsequent researchers use Friedman's model as the point of departure for future work.
Friedman derived the expected value model:

E(x) = p(x)*{x-C,)

(2.1)

15 By closed here we mean the bid itself is not disclosed prior to bid opening, not that the bidding itself
is closed to a certain set ofbidders, which mayor may not be the case.
16 One exception is Ibbs, [112] who cites a 1944 Columbia University thesis analysis of Competitive
Bidding for Corporate Securities.
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Where E(x) is the expected value of winning, P(x) is the probability of a bid ''x''
will be the winning bid and "C" is the estimated cost corrected for bias. Friedman's
original work has been extended in many ways by many researchers. Hanssmann and
Rivett [105] were among the first, extending Friedman's model to estimating the
probability of winning and devising a method for analyzing simultaneous bids on several
objects sought. Simmons [192], Wilson [219,221], and Rothkopf [171, 172] all followed,
with Crowley [66] continuing the discussion regarding the different probabilities derived in
the Friedman and Gates models.

2.4.3 Bidder's Mark-up or Fee
Mark-up or contractors' fee is an important part of any discussion of construction
contract bidding as discussed in Curtis and Maines [68, 69] and Fuerst [92, 93]. The mark
up is often considered to be the principal strategic component ofthe construction bid, and a
considerable amount of work has been done to calculate the theoretical optimum mark-up
in order to maximize the expected profit of any given bid [21, 35, 91, 132, 145, 153, 159,
181, 201, 218]. These works consider several factors such as number of opposing bidders
and variance in the value of the good sought.

With respect to construction contract

bidding, these sometimes simple analyses significantly understate the complexity in
determining construction bids as demonstrated by Akinci and Fischer [5]. Beyond these
theoretical developments, the determination of fee or expected profit from a project is
obviously a principal concern to both the prospective contractors and those who pay the
bill, since contractors must make enough to stay in business and owners and the general
public don't want to pay too much in the form of exorbitant profits. Contractors generally
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consider risk, market and return on investnlent when calculating mark-up and fee; an
example ofconstruction company mark-up and fee calculation is presented in Appendix D.

2.4.4 Auction Classifications
Auctions are often classified by type, otherwise known as design or format by
which the selling takes place. There are basically two types of auctions that are executed in
a number of different formats. These are Common Value and Private Value Auctions or
bidding. Private Value Auctions occur when the bidders have a different private value for
item sought, such as the value of artwork. Common Value Auctions occur when the value
of the item, once won, is common to all of the bidders. These models include bidding on
items for resale (such as the Dutch flower auctions), and as in the case of this research,
construction project revenues. l7 Auctions can be executed in the open, oral form, or as in
construction bidding, typically the closed, sealed bid form. The only auction type and form
of interest here are closed sealed bid common value auctions as discussed by Kagel and
Levin [118].
"Construction contract bidding is usually treated as a common value auction,"
according to Kagel [118]; this is because, theoretically, all of the bidders will experience
the same cost basis to perform on the contract, but each bidder has a different estimate of
what those costs are. The most optimistic or lowest estimator ofthose costs (or perhaps the
most aggressive bidder) will submit the lowest price bid. Since the cost of production

17 In short, that is what construction project bidding is all about, the contractor provides a bid for the
revenues required to pay for the services purchased, often through subcontractors or his own labor and
materials. These services are generally considered to cost all bidders the same amount, so the
contractor that provides the lowest bid is in essence bidding the least expected difference between
revenue and cost or bid amount and cost, which is the same thing.
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remains relatively constant I 8, regardless of the bid price, the possibility for negative profits
exists. This is generally referred to as the ''winner's curse."

2.4.5 The Winner's Curse
To paraphrase Landsburg [131] from his book The Armchair Economist on the
subject ofwinners curse in a chapter entitled, "Cursed Winners and Glum Losers:"

"Economic theory predicts that you're probably not liking this
[dissertation] as much as you thought you would [when you agreed to
read it]."

Although he was being somewhat whimsical in his introduction to the subject, he
does summarize much of the important characteristics of the winner's curse phenomenon,
particularly as it applies to the construction industry. The idea was first brought into the
literature by Capen, Clapp and Campbell [36] in their review of high risk outer continental
shelf oil and gas lease auctions. They conclude that, "[i]n conlpetitive bidding, the winner
tends to be the player who most over estimates true tract value." They go on to show that
the "law of averages" simply doesn't apply in common value competitive bidding, because
with a sufficient number of bidders, any bidder only wins ifhe or she over-values the item
sought and in every bidding situation, some bidder will over-value the item. Which
implies that competitive bidding must, over the long run, result in substantial financial

18 This is particularly true in public construction where prevailing wages for workers are set by the state
in Oregon. However, there may be slight differences in cost ofproduction for example if one of the
bidders has developed a better, cheaper way to perform the work.
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losses in those industries where it is practiced. However, Wood [224] gives an alternate
interpretation:

"The winner's curse is perhaps better defined not by the existence of
negative average profits to the winning bidder, but rather Milgrom's
necessary reassessment of value after winning, or by the observation
that optimal bidding behavior in affiliated value situations generally calls
for less aggressive bidding as the number of opponents or the bidder's
own estimating uncertainty increases."

Another interpretation common in the construction industry is to attribute the
winning low bid to a "mistake" and deem the winner the bidder who made the biggest
mistake.
Winner's curse has spawned significant research in recent years, first in analyzing
its existence [36] and predicting its magnitude in order to calculate an optimal mark-up to
cover the anticipated costs or loss in revenue [83, 129, 192]. Harstad and Rothkopf [107]
and Simmons [192] give methods to guard against winner's curse by allowing
withdrawable bids and better estimating techniques. Cox [65] disputes the very existence
of a winner's curse, or states that "if a winner's curse is a behavioral reality, then bidders
are not generally using ex ante optimal strategies."

Thiel [204] studied highway

construction bidding in 33 states and detennined that the winner's curse is not a
"significant problem in the highway construction industry." Although Thiel "believes that
the winner's curse is at most a slight problem in [the highway construction] industry" he
states that, "the data [may allow for] other interpretations."

Thiel's conclusions are

admittedly somewhat suspect, in that he incorporated the owner's estimate of the costs in
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his determination of the magnitude of the curse, but that is a common technique also used
in an Oregon highway construction audit by Lattimer [135].
Kagel and Levin [117] found that "in auctions involving a limited number of
bidders (3-4), average profits are consistently positive and closer to the Nash equilibrium
bidding outcome than the winner's curse hypothesis." However, with a larger average
number of bidders (5-6) they find a "reemergence of the winner's curse, with bar.akruptcies
and negative profits." They supported these findings in later studies [119, 138].
Winner's curse is of particular concern in the public sector of the construction
industry where most owners continue to use DBB as their primary PDS. Kagel [118] and
others have studied common value auctions and the winner's curse in the construction
industry and concluded that while experienced construction bidders are subject to winner's
curse affects, the construction market attempts to correct for the curse by employing three
strategies: 19 withdrawal of a low bid due to error, subcontractor buyout, and by overpricing
change orders.

Kagel also points out that there is a significant amount of "private

information" in the bidding environment that is not accounted for by the plans and
specifications, some of which can be characterized as "experience" of the bidders and
reliance on "rules-of-thumb" in bidding.

In Kagel's brief review of the construction industry for his research, he concludes
that contractors rely primarily on the plans and specifications as the primary infonnation as

19

Although, not necessarily by these names.
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a basis for their bid. In fact, that proposition is solidly embedded in both federal and
Oregon contract law.

2o

2.4.6 Mistake
In any discussion of construction bidding, considering the complexity of the
market, there is some an appreciable probability of a mistake in the bid. A mistake is not
an error in judgment, such as choosing the wrong labor production rate or the wrong
equipment to do the job [71]. A mistake is a clear objective omission. It is a generally
accepted rule that a contractor may be allowed to rescind a bid if there is a mathematical
error or omission that is "material" [29]. (Harstad and Rothkopf touch on bid rescission in
light of a mistake as "winner's curse insurance" [107], although that was not the main point
of their paper.)

There is less consistency on whether or not a rescinded bid will

automatically result in forfeiture of any bid security (a bond or cash).

Different

government agencies have developed different policies in this regard, although the legal
standard appears to be more certain [70, 71, 166].
While bid withdrawal may protect a bidder from a certain class of problems,
specifically leaving out some major item of work or making a substantial mathematical
error, it does not protect the contractor from similar but smaller mistakes that go undetected
until the project is well underway. Another class of mistakes involves the subcontractors
chosen for the project. At bid time, the estimators choose the low subcontractor bids to
cover all sections of work specified in the contract documents. However, subcontractor
20 See In United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132,39 S.Ct. 59,63 L. Ed. 166 (1918), and Oregon, A.H.
Barbour & Sons, Inc. v. State Highway COnmllssion, 248 Or. 247,433 P.2d 847 (1967); General
Construction Company v. Oregon State Fish COnmllssion, 26 Or. App. 577, 554 P2d 185 (1976).
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bids often include exclusions of one item or another within a specification section bid, and
this can cause "holes" (items of work that get left out) and in some cases a "double-up"
(where two subcontractor's include a specified item of work in their price). Holes in the
bid reduce the general contractor bidder's profit, while the double-up serves to increase it.
These types of problen1s (and the probability of mistake generally) are heightened in the
DBB method because general contractors receive the majority of subcontractor bids in the
final hours (someti~es final minutes) before the total bid from the general contractor is due
by the owner. Bids that are received late, after the prescribed ''bid time," are rejected as a
matter of law on public projects in Oregon, so there is a natural rush to finalize the number
before bid time, which leads to a higher likelihood of mistake. In the CMlGC PDS, the
CMlGC has the opportunity to take as much time as needed to both review the bids of

subcontractors and perhaps more importantly, define the scope of work for the
subcontractors, thereby reducing the probability of "holes" in the bid.

2.5

Non-Bid Negotiated Contractor Selection Methods
From 1935 until 1975, public agencies in the State of Oregon had little choice but

use a lowest, lump-sum bid selection process. In 1975, the State Legislature passed an
exemption to the public bidding law for "certain projects" or "certain types of projects."
The use of bid exemptions to select construction contractors exploded in the period from
1985 to 1996, accounting for more than $1.6 billion in public construction spending on
more than seventy projects during that period. By 2002, when this study concluded its data
collection efforts, more than $2.9 billion in public construction spending on more than 136
projects had been exempted from the public bidding requirements. However, there is very
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little in the construction project management or construction industry literature regarding
non-bid negotiated procurements with the exception of guides for choosing method and
how to use them effectively by the

cn,

OSU's Construction Engineering Management

Program and others [56, 76, 101], and the cn Design-Build Research Team work authored
by Sanvido and Koncher [127, 183] that provides the only prior analysis of PDS
performance.
The actual selection process used under the exemptions clause of the public
bidding law has evolved from "no direction" at all in the early years to requiring the
identification of selection criteria and weighting (or relative priority).

Additionally, the

1997 legislature placed further restrictions on the use of non-bid methods by requiring
public agencies to hold public hearings to make public findings and provide a follow-up
report of the actual project outcomes with respect to the original findings report. At the
same time, however, the legislature exempted the Oregon University System and the
Oregon Health and Science University from all public bidding requirements under Chapter
279.

2.6

ORS Chapter 279 Public Bidding and Exclusions
Jervis and Levin [114] note that "in this country, competitive bidding is required by

law on virtually all construction contracts that involve public funds. The competitive
bidding requirement serves two primary purposes: conserving tax dollars and promoting
fairness." The underlying assumption is ''that the lowest possible price will be received if
the contract is awarded on the basis of open competition" involving a sufficient number of
competitors. Secondly, as "strong as the need to conserve tax dollars is, the promotion of
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fairness is an even more imperative purpose of the competitive bidding system, there is
broad consensus in our society that public contracts should be awarded on the basis of the
contractor's ability and willingness to offer the low price. Graft and local favoritism, must
not playa role in the selection of contractors." Such concepts have given rise to the "rigid,
formalistic structure of competitive bidding ...[which is] designed to avoid not only
impropriety but even the appearance of possible impropriety. In order to maintain public
confidence ... [and] the integrity ofthe competitive bidding system" [114].

2.6.1 ORS Chapter 279 and Public Bidding
Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) Chapter 279 is the State public bidding law. It
came into being during the 1935 legislative session and remained virtually without
amendment for nearly 40 years until 1975, when the section 279.015 was added by House
Bill #2339, which took effect January 1, 1976.21 The original law required nearly all
spending for public goods and services, not limited to construction projects, to be put out
for competitive sealed bids.
The sealed bidding process maintains objectivity and the integrity of public
spending and is preferred by statute; however, mandated sealed bidding lacks flexibility.
This lack of flexibility is particularly acute in times of emergency and economic isolation.22
The fundamental requirement of sealed bidding is that the Owner must be capable of
specifying minimum performance for the public project. In an emergency situation, this is

21 It should be noted that another major rewrite ofORS Chapter 279 began in 2002 in order to address
the differences in procurement for "supplies," and that required of "services."
22By "economic isolation" I am referring to a condition where an Owner has few, if any contractors to
choose from to do the work. In these situations, it is highly likely that the Owner will pay more than the
normal value or "goring rate" for the contractor's work.
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clearly impossible. Arguably, it may also be impossible to specify minimum perfonnance
in extremely complex projects and certainly those with significant design-build or fast
track elements.

2.6.2 ORS Chapter 279 and Non-Bid Procurement
In 1975, the state legislature took action to rectify Chapter 279's lack of flexibility
and adopted an exemption clause by authorizing HB #2339 and making it a subsection of
the public bidding law: ORS 279.015. TIlls clause sets forth as a condition for granting any
exemption from public bidding upon a finding that, "[i]t is unlikely that such exemption
will encourage favoritism in the awarding of public contracts or substantially diminish
competition for such contracts" and results in "substantial cost savings" to the public
contracting agency and, by extension, the taxpayers.
The use of bid exemptions was minimal and primarily limited to emergency
situations and continuation of original supplier and maintenance contracts (such as
elevators and mechanical controls) and on one occasion to extend a project bid deadline. 23
By the mid-1980's public agencies had begun using the bid exemption provision to exempt
certain new major public construction contracts from competitive lump sum bidding. The
use spread rapidly, and by 1996, public agencies had used this provision to exempt more
than forty new major construction projects totaling nearly $1.6 billion in public spending.
By 2002 the total exceeded $2.9 billion, as shown in Table 1.

.23

See Oregon Attorney General Opinion Requests: OP-6063, 6234, 5873, 8161 and 7992
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Project Type
Housing
Library
Major Remodel of Existing Bldg
Mixed New and Remodel
New Corrections, Jailor Prison
New Hospital or Medical Building
New Industrial
New Institutional
New Office Building
New School Building
Other
Parking
Sports Facilities
Grand Total

CM/GC

DBB

15,504,677.72
81,481,218.05
174,304,811.42
596,077,946.22
717,594,701.20
94,143,069.84
146,928,199.73
278,374,899.29
163,418,208.19
404,738,846.46
115,718,781.36
26,328,393.32
103,882,821.46

22,396,317.47
108,105,178.31
62,863,526.83
118,040,458.01
42,720,921.68
92,002,502.14
39,284,451.18
285,382,671.99
29,972,630.20
778,249,827.19
4,229,853.82
62,106,850.50
21,318,840.07

2,918,496,574.27

1,666,674,029.39

Table 1: Dollar Volume of Projects in the Oregon Database in 2002 dollars adjusted using the
ENR index for Building Construction

While several researchers have commented that the DBB method increases the
adversarial relationship between the owner and contractor [45, 46, 94, 101], the only issue
considered in exempting a project from competitive bidding is cost, specifically that the
exemption will result in substantial cost savings to the public. The relevant sections of
Chapter 279 are as follows:

279.015 Competitive bidding; exceptions; exemptions. (1 ) Subject
to the policies and provisions of ORS 279.005 and 279.007, all public
contracts shall be based upon competitive bids or proposals except:
... A public contract exempt under subsection (2) of this section.
(2) Subject to subsection (6)(b) of this section, the Director of the
Oregon Department of Adrninistrative Services or a local contract
review board may exempt certain public contracts or classes of public
contracts from the competitive bidding requirements of subsection (1) of
this section upon approval of the following findings submitted by the
public contracting agency seeking the exemption:
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(a) It is unlikely that such exemption will encourage favoritism in the
awarding of public contracts or substantially diminish competition for
public contracts; and
(b) The awarding of public contracts pursuant to the exemption will
result in sUbstantial cost savings to the public contracting agency. In
making such finding, the director or board may consider the type, cost,
amount of the contract, number of persons available to bid and such
other factors as may be deemed appropriate.
(The entire statute is presented in Appendix C.)

2.6.3 Litigation Concerning ORS 279.015
A search of West Group publications,24 using the Lexis® computerized search
engine in September 2003, netted surprisingly few (only eleven in fact) documents related
to ORS 279.015 bidding exemptions. Of these, four (4) are Attorney General Opinions
(Numbers 7476, 7546, 7648, and 7992) on specific questions related to the bidding
requirements asked by public agencies.

250ther questions presented to the Attorney

General involved the impact of ORS Chapter 279 provisions on the sale of surplus property
and Federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act; none of these directly dealt with the
construction sector, but show the broad application ofthe public bidding law and the policy
intent ofthe state as it relates to purchasing through the competitive bid process.
'Three of the court cases that referenced ORS 279.015 were not related to public
construction contracts. Double Eagle Golf, Inc. v. the City of Portland involves the award
concession contract to operate public golf courses in Portland. Photo-Art Commercial

West Group is the official publisher of legal court documents and recorded cases in Oregon.
For example, the Oregon Military Departments asked the Attorney General if "food concession
contracts must be obtained through the Department of General Services?" (The answer was: "yes.")

24
25
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Studios, Inc. v. E.S. Hunter, Deputy State Highway Engineer, involved a contract between
the State Department of Transportation (ODOT), and a film producer and Dale v. Meyers
and Sizemore v. Meyers, was a ballot measure dispute, involving contracting out
government services to private entities.
In the four construction cases in which the court was required to make a ruling

regarding ORS 279.015, two, Taggart, Inc., v. Douglas County and Platt Electric v. JC
Northwest and Polk County Housing Authority, do not present any issues related
specifically to the exemption clause, but rather dealt with bonding issues.
The two construction cases that required the court to rule on the exemption
provision of Chapter 279.015, were: Morse Bros. Prestress v. City of Lake Oswego [1] and
ABC v. Tri-Met [2]. In Morse Bros., the court held that the defendant, City of Lake
Oswego Board:

made findings and recited them in the preamble to the resolution adopting
the regulations. The findings are phrased in the words of the statute and,
although general in nature, are sufficient to support the regulations.

This means that the "findings" requirement in the statute does not need to be
supported by anything other than a recitation of the wording in the statute - a finding that
other courts have subsequently relied on.
The Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC), an association of nonunion
construction contractors, brought suit against the Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation
District (Tri-Met) and the Tri-Met Contract Review Board to ask the court to set aside the
exemption of certain contracts for a light rail extension to the Portland Airport. Tri-Met
had exempted the contract from public bidding in part to comply with the tenns of a
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development agreement between Tri-Met and Bechtel, the developer builder. In short,
Bechtel was awarded the contract to build the light rail line in absence of public bidding,
pursuant to the specified findings under ORS 279.015.

Bechtel in tum required all

contractors working on the light rail project to be "union" or to sign project labor
agreements (PLA) with the union. ABC and its non-union mernbers objected to the PLA
requirement on a public project and challenged the exemption under the statute. The court
held that:

(1) [The] trade association had standing to challenge board's exemption
decision;
(2) [The] district was not required to use alternative contracting
practices in exempting contract form competitive bidding;
(3) [The] board was not required to consider [the] effect that awarding
contract would have had on competition among subcontractors for
work on the light-rail project; and
(4) [The] board's findings were sufficient as to form and were supported
by substantial evidence.

In summary the court ruled, among other things, that the requirement in the statute

to make a finding that the exemption would not "encourage favoritism" or "substantially
diminish competition" was relevant only to the contracting parties that have privity: the
agency and their contractor, and does not extend down to the subcontractors. ABC v. TriMet is the most significant challenge to the exemption clause to date, and in that case, the
court sided solidly with the public agency's right to exempt construction contracts from
public bidding, following the statutory "findings" without giving any consideration to the
non-contracting parties, the subcontractors. This is important because many agencies that
have exempted contracts from bidding use as a basis for their finding that "the exemption
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will not diminish competition" or "encourage favoritism," the fact that they will bid out the
subcontract portions ofwork. This ruling renders those considerations moot.

2.7

Alternative Selection Models Considered
Most of the CMlGC selections to date have used some form of scoring model

where points were awarded to proposers based on their response to the established criteria
[80].
Several alternative scoring models are discussed in the management SCIence
literature [53, 198]. The selection of an appropriate model for the particular application
depends primarily on the level of project complexity and rigor of the decision required.
One ofthe more complex and rigorous applications is the Analytic Hierarchy Process using
pair-wise comparisons [125, 178-180], which in fact has been used on a at least three
occasions to select construction contractors. Less complex models include: Simple Rank
Ordering, Simple and Probabilistic Scoring Models and Queue Sorting. DEA has been
suggested as a possible multi-criteria decision model [81]; however, to date that application
has not been made in the construction industry and is not considered here. An advanced
analysis of multi-criteria methods is given by [208]; however, here again, the complexity
and rigor ofthe decision required heretofore has not required such advanced techniques.

2.7.1

CM/GC Selections, As Practiced:

A survey of 19 CMlGC projects shows that public managers generally use simple
ordinal scoring models to evaluate proposals for construction contractor selection. The
study found that the selection models used were substantially similar to one another, with
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the majority of evaluations considering similar common selection criteria [10]. For the 19
projects surveyed, a total of 29 different selection criteria were used. The following Table
lists various criteria found conunon to several projects:

Criteria:

0/0 Projects Used

Ave. Weight 0/0

95
79
74
63
47
42

19.2
14.9
19
12.9
24.3
9.5

Qualifications of Key Personnel
Proposed Work Plan
Company Experience
CM/GC Fee
Ability to Perform
Value Engineering Capabilities
Table 2: CM/GC selection criteria used

While most projects used similar selection criteria, the study was unable to find a
significant correlation between project type and criteria used for contractor selection,
meaning that the selections appeared not to reflect the particular challenges of the specific
project, but were more generally looking for a "good" contractor. One of the problems
with this approach is that it sets fixed weights in the determination of a "good" contractor
and how a project should be managed. (For instance, if a specific weight is given to safety,
the model is prescribing a certain amount of management attention be given to safety as
opposed to quality ofwork or reducing costs.)
For some projects the actual judges scoring sheets were obtained, comparing
specific contractors. An analysis of the scoring showed that various criteria scores were
highly correlated. A high score on "key personnel," for instance, was found to predict a
high score on "ability to perform". Likewise, a high score on "experience" predicted a
high score on "proposed work plan". In addition, and more disturbingly, some judges
scoring sheets appeared to reflect biases for or against particular contractors. This was
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evidenced in one instance where a judge gave one contractor extremely low scores (on a
zero to five scale) for all criteria under consideration while every other judge rated the
specific contractor the best of the competition. This in effect vetoed the contractor from the
competition.

2.7.2 ORS·279.103 Reports and Secretary of State Audits
In 1997 the Oregon legislature enacted ORS 279.103, which reads as follows:

279.103 Evaluation of certain public improvement projects not
contracted by competitive bidding. (1) Upon completion of and final
payment for any public improvement contract in excess of $100,000 for
which the public agency did not use the competitive bidding process,
the public agency shall prepare and deliver to the Director of the
Oregon Department of Administrative Services or the local contract
review board an evaluation of the public improvement project.
(2) The evaluation shall include but not be limited to the following
matters:
(a) The actual project cost as compared with original project estimates.
(b) The amount of any guaranteed maximum price.
(c) The number of project change orders issued by the public agency.
(d) A narrative description of successes and failures during the design,
engineering and construction of the project.

(e) An objective assessment of the use of the alternative contracting
process as compared to the findings required by ORS 279.015.
(3) Evaluations required by this section shall be made available for
public inspection.
(4) The evaluations required by this section must be completed within
30 days of the date that the public agency accepts the public
improvement project.
46

An evaluation of all known evaluation reports is included in Appendix F. It is clear
from our review of the existing reports that public agencies largely ignore both the spirit
and intent of the statute. While at least 65 CMlGC projects have been completed since
1997, the total number of reports is fewer than ten. ill fact, while the statute directs public
agencies to deliver the report to the Oregon Department of Administrative Services (DAS),
no one in DAS, including the director, knew who was supposed to collect these reports and
where they may be filed. ill fact, no one is specifically tasked to oversee and handle the
reports. Consequently, few reports are being done, and those that are being done do not
meet the requirement that they be an "objective assessment" of the project. One done by
Central Oregon Community College (COCC) barely meets the requirements of the statute
by simply repeating verbatim the language in the exemption order in the affirmative.
The Oregon Secretary of States' Audit Division has audited several CMlGC
projects, including the major prison projects and the library at Oregon State University
(OSU).

One audit found that the CMlGC contractor had over charged the state and or

misspent millions of dollars on their project. None of these facts were included in the
Department of Corrections (DOC) evaluation reports, which raise questions about the
objectivity of these assessments.
There is no evaluation report on the OSU library project to compare to the state's
audit because the Oregon University System (OUS) and its member institutions have since
become exempt from n10st parts of Chapter 279, including section 103.
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2.8

Prior PDS Research
Sanvido and Koncher [183], working for the Construction Industry Institute (ClI),

perfonned what appears to be the only comprehensive studies that compare project
outcomes on the basis ofPDS. Their study was based on data from crr members and was
heavily weighted toward private industry with very few building projects, and fewer still
public building projects. The data used in [183] was also used in [126] and [75] (in fact
[183] is a summary report of [75]), and Vanden Bosch's presentation at the fall 1999
Northwest Construction Consumer Council [210] appears also to be based on the same

dat~.
These reports all concluded that Design-Build (DB) was superior to CMlGC
(which they call CM@ Risk, CM@R and CMR at different times) and both are superior to
Design-Bid-Build (DBB). But these conclusions are based on weak analytical foundations.
The principal statistical comparisons for cost and schedule growth are not statistically
significant. Their "Construction Speed" and "Delivery Speed" statistics are significant but
have little meaning in this context because speed is related to fast-tracking, and DBB
projects are by definition not fast-tracked. The comparison is akin to comparing marathon
runners against milers and then both against sprinters on the basis of how long their races
take to run and finding sprinters superior because they finish in a shorter amount of time
than either milers or marathoners! Furthennore, no data is presented and the statistical
analysis does not include the variance or standard deviations of the data. In the Cost and
Schedule Growth comparisons the reports compare medians because that method reduces
the effect of outliers, but they fail to point out that the DB projects appear to have greatest

48

range of outcomes, both over and under budget, which presents the greatest total risk. In
addition, they also fail to point out that 75% of both the CMlGC and DB projects
experienced cost growth; yet they make a point of stating that 900/0 of the DBB projects
experienced cost growth.
Sanvido and Konchar [183] also compared the PDSs' on the basis of "Quality"
perhaps in part because DB projects have historically been thought of as delivering lower
quality results. They conclude that:

"It is clear from these results that design-build projects achieved equal
if not better quality results than other projects studied. In particular,
design-build offered significantly better quality results than design-bid
build in all categories except that of interior space and layout. Oesign
build significantly outperformed construction management at risk in only
one area, operation and maintenance cost."

But in fact the differences were quite small and there is no statistical data to show
that the differences were statistically significant, in spite of the statement above. More
importantly, however, is what Sanvido and Knochar [183] actually measured. Instead of
using an objective measure, such as the "number of punch list items" or "dollar volume of
warranty work," they asked owners to rate the quality on a relative scale: "perceived actual
quality" compared with the "level of quality expected." This meant that if the owner had a
low expectation of project quality and the project turned out only half as bad as expected,
he'd rate it quite high. However, if the project was expected to be the highest possible
quality, the highest score that the proj ect could achieve is "as expected" (a 5 on the 10 point
scale used) and from there, the scores can only go down. The conclusion that the DB

49

projects deliver higher quality based on this test is misleading because they simply did not
measure "Quality."
Gordon [101] and the Construction Engineering Management Program at OSU
[56] have provided guides on how to select a PDS and Mulvey [150] has provided "A
Contractor's Assessment" of project delivery trends, but there are no other analytical
comparisons of PDS' s based on project perfonnance in the literature.

The

crr

has

perfonned benchmarking studies [207], but the most recent study [51] did not include any
reference to PDS.
In another study, Henry and Brothers [108] compared DBB projects with indefinite
delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts used by the US Air Force under a system
I

called SABER. However, these projects were all under $1 million and generally were in
the $10,000 to $100,000 range, and often were small repair projects like Repair Latrine,
Repair Showers and so on. Results from [108] are not comparable to this research.

2.9 Benchmarking
Benchmarking is a relatively new discipline, having been fonnalized at the Xerox
Corporation by Robert C. Camp in the early 1980's and only brought into the academic
literature in the late 1980's and early 1990's [194, 213]. Since that time, the field has
grown rapidly and touched nearly every industry, including the construction industry.
Organizations like the Associated General Contractors and American Building Contractors,
routinely offer courses in Total Quality Management in construction that include
benchmarking. The Construction Industry Institute located at the University of Texas,
Austin, has made benchmarking one of their major areas of interest [207]. Jackson,
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Stafford and Swart [113] provide a bibliography of benchmarking books and papers, with a
particular emphasis on the construction industry. Various others have used benchmarking
techniques to analyze client satisfaction [4], the effectiveness ofpre-project planning [103]
and other applications [89, 130, 151].
The most intensive attempt to apply benchmarking in the construction industry has
come from the Construction Industry Institute. Their study was of 203 projects from 22
owner companies and 25 contractor companies, for a total construction volume of
approximately $11.5 billion [207]. This study focused on

es~blishing

"Best Practices" in

the industry, such as "team building," "constructability," "safety," and "pre-project
planning." The analysis in the regression model used project scores (on 'these metrics) as
the dependent variable and "cost growth," "schedule performance," and "safety
performance" metric scores. Unfortunately, many of these regressions account for a small
portion of the variance in the data, with adjusted R2 rarely greater 'than 25%, and in several
cases, in the range of 10%-14% and lower. In some fields Adjusted R 2 ,s of this magnitude
are acceptable; however, in the public policy making environment on construction
spending, where billions of taxpayer dollars are at stake, a decision based on a course of
action that only accounts for 10% ofthe variance ofthe outcomes maybe hard to justify.

2.10

Benchmarking in the Construction Industry
Benchmarking in the construction industry began in the early 1990's as an adjunct

to Total Quality Management programs [89], and as one means to improve the contractor's
standing with their principal customer, owners [44]. The Associated General Contractors
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ofAmerica (AGC), the construction industries' trade association, defined Benchmarking in
a 1992 educational report as follows [3]:

Formal benchmarking is the relatively new practice of identifying other
companies, which have mastered a process and are world-class
performers worthy of imitation. It has been described as "finding and
implementing best practices." This business concept simply suggests
that you look around and find success stories and learn from others.
In one report by AGe [3], they stated that the construction industry "has lagged
behind other industries in implementing TQM." However, they continued, "part of that is
the perception that TQM is for manufacturing only." Other authors [34, 160] have seen the
situation in more dire terms, noting that, "the construction industry is still characterized by
low productivity, fragmentation, divided responsibility, and conflicting objectives." Since
then, several researchers have proposed models and nletrics for evaluating and improving
construction project performance.
Fisher [89] proposed quality management in the construction industry using the
following measures to be benchmarked in the construction process:

Actual versus authorized costs
Schedule: actual versus estimated
Scope changes
Engineering rework
Construction labor: actual versus estimated
Field rework
Worker-hours per drawing
Project cost distribution
Field defects
Percent of rejected welds

The metrics used in the

cn Benclnnarking study by Tucker [207]

included the

following "critical few metrics:"
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Cost Perfornlance
Budget factor
Cost growth
Phase cost factor
Schedule Performance
Schedule factor
Schedule growth
Phase duration factor
Safety Performance
Recordable Incident Rate (RIR)
Lost Workday Case Incident Rate (LWCIR)
In more recent versions by the ClI, including the 2001 Benchmarking Report [51],
the organization has focused on the basic cost and schedule growth performance metrics
and is no longer providing the regression analysis that was part oftheir 1997 study.
Ahmed and Kangari [4] list the following factors in their benchmarking study of
"Client-Satisfaction Factors in the Construction Industry:"

Time
CI ient orientation
Communication
Cost
Response to complaints
Quality

Tam and Harris [199] propose a model for assessing past building contractor
performance and predicting future performance using mUltiple regression techniques. This
model was quite complex and included the following factors:
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Internal Factors
Staff training program
Plant ownership policy
Size of the company
Quality of the management team - professional qualifications
Quality performance of the project manager
Past performance of the project manager
Contractor's experience in the type of job
. Contractor's workload
Contractors past performance or image
Number of years in business
Origin of the company (domestic or foreign)
Amount of directly employed labor
Listed on the stock market
Decision making centralized in head office of de-centralized to the site
Contractor is client's subsidiary firm
External Factors
The architect/engineer
Architects of client's supervision and control of the quality of the work
progress
Punctuality of payment by the client
Complexity of the project
Profita bility

Jackson, Safford and Swart [113] provide a bibliography of "Current
Benchmarking Literature," which appeared in a construction industry journal; however, it
had no specific emphasis on the construction industry. Lema [137] gives a background
perspective of benchmarking in the construction industry. Other construction industry
applications include Kumaraswamy's [130] evaluation of mega-project performance,
Hamilton's [103] benchmarking evaluation of pre-project planning and Munns and
Ahmed's [4, 151] evaluations of project stakeholder relationships. Finally, Edwards [86]
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presents a guide to evaluating contractors past performance on federal projects, which is
also considered by Nash and Cibinic [50, 155].
Chua et ai. [48] studied critical success factors for construction projects, which
built on the earlier and broader strategic factors considered by Sanvido et ai. [182] and
conceptual project management success factors of Pinto and Selvin [162]. Chua et al. [48]
used a three level Analytic Hierarchy Process model that included 67 separate "success
related factors" in four broad "project aspects" that included: project characteristics,
contractual arrangements, project participants and interactive processes. These four project
aspects contributed to: budget performance, schedule performance, and quality
performance. Ultimately these three measures contribute to project success. Cheng, Li and
Love provide "Objective Measures of Partnering Outcomes" in [46] that include:

Cost-effectiveness
Quality
Schedule
Scope of work
Profit
Construction process (which includes safety and rework)
And, Others (which includes litigation)
ill a separate benchmarking study, Brunso, et al. [33] used benchmarks: cost

growth, schedule growth, and performance evaluations (quality) to benchmark project
performance.
Gordon evaluates success factors differently in [101] by considering different

"project drivers," such as the need for fast-tracking and allocations of risk, to select an
appropriate project delivery system.
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These benchmarking metrics, project success factors, and project drivers provide a
starting point for our analysis ofconstruction project performance. However, it is clear that
with the large number of attributes in some studies, and sn1all number in others, that there
is not universal agreement on how to measure construction project performance nor is there
agreement on which are the most important. Separating out the most important metrics and
factors from those ofless importance will be an important aspect ofthe research at hand.

2.11

The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Methodology
DEA is widely used as a benchmarking tool in practice [19]. Its use is owed to the

fact that DEA was developed as a tool to compare the efficiencies based on multiple inputs
and outputs. The principal result of a DEA study yields efficiency scores, performance
targets and criteria weighting schemes that are ideal for use in analyzing performance of
specific operating units (defined in DEA as ,DMUs for Decision Making Units [42] - in the
present research, construction "projects" are'the DMVs).

2.11.1 Development of DEA
Charnes et al. [42] originally devised DEA as a method to derive relative
efficiencies of different organizations or activities using multiple inputs and multiple
outputs.

The focus on comparative efficiency using multiple inputs and outputs was

generated by the desire to measure factors other than financial performance. Early on, the
methodology was thought to be particularly valuable in measuring public sector
performance and other non-money-generating activities, since DEA can readily compare
financial as well as non-fmancial data [42] (and combinations thereof [41 , 200]).
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Chames, Cooper and Rhodes' original work [42], and Rhodes' dissertation research
in the education field26 , were extensions of earlier single-input, single-output analysis by
Farrell [88], and other methodological developments by Debreu [72], Koopmans [128] and
others, including Chames [38]. Seiford [186, 187], in tracing the evolution of DEA, found
methodological formulations greatly similar to modem DEA, as far back as 1966.27
According to Seiford, the intent ofthese earlier papers was to:

"(1) Summarize Farrell's ideas; (2) provide LP formulations and efficient
computational procedures for a variety of problems in technical
efficiency including the multiple-output case; and give illustrative
applications to (3) steam-electric generating plants and (4) aggregate
census data."

However, from 1966 until 1978, the field of multiple attribute efficiency analysis,
what is now DEA, went into a dormant phase until, Chames, Cooper and Rhodes [42]
brought the term Data Envelopment Analysis or D EA into the literature. In addition, they
introduced another common DEA term: Decision Making Unit or DMU, to describe the
different entities in the analysis. DMUs are the basic itenl being compared in the DEA
model and have included: schools, banks, hospitals, and even professional baseball players.
(However, before the current research, construction projects have not been used as DMUs
in aDEA study.)

The basis for which was laid in [43], as reported in [186, 187].
Seiford references the "Proceedings ofthe 3f1h Annual Meeting ofthe Western Farm Economics
Association, " where four papers recalling "Farrell's approach" to measuring technical efficiency were
presented.
26
27
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2.11.2 History and Background
The history and development of DEA has been documented by both Seiford [187]
and Tavares [200], with bibliographies now stretching in excess of 3,200 citations. In
brief, however, the five-year period following [42] witnessed a rapid expansion in the use
of DEA to evaluate efficiency. This work was predominately in the education field [24-28,
40, 43, 164, 165, 195], medical field [14, 156, 190, 191] and other public sector and nonincome producing activities [30, 39, 40, 52, 74, 140]. These early applications fostered a
broad acceptance of DEA as an Operations ResearchiManagement Science tool in the
academic community.

2.11.3 Mathematical Development of DEA
The original fonnulation of DEA proposed to measure the efficiency of any
Decision Making Unit or DMU, "as the maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to
weighted inputs subject to the condition that the similar ratios for every DMU be less than
or equal to unity." This "Ratio" model is expressed mathematically, in the fonn of:
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In the model, the xij, Ytj, are the known inputs and outputs of the jth DMU and the
ur's and

Vi'S

are the variable (or criteria) weights to be determined by the solution of the

linear program. That is, DEA allows each DMUo, the specific DMU under consideration,
to pick the weighting scheme that maximizes its efficiency score relative to all other
DMUs, subject to the constraint that any other DMU, with an identical weighting scheme,
cannot achieve an efficiency score greater than 1.
This formulation is non-linear; the linearization occurs by multiplying out the
denominator of each inequality constraint and by adding a normalizing constraint (equation
2.3 below) to eliminate the ratio in the objective fimction. For details see [8].

m
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This formulation has been shown to be the linear programming "Dual" of what has
become known as the input oriented CCR envelopment model formulation:
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Its complement, the output oriented CCR fonnulation, is given by:
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The variable A in these fonnulations is the vector of linear combinations of efficient
DMUs used to construct the ''virtual'' efficient DMU for an inefficient DMUo under
consideration.
The virtual targets resulting from DEA reveal pathways for improvement of the
DMU under consideration to reach relative efficiency (i.e., reach the efficiency frontier).
Figure 3 below depicts a one input two output, two-dimensional model. In this case the
outputs are identified as only "Output Y 1" and "Output Y2," and for the purposes of this
example all of the inputs are assumed to be 1.0. Note the line denoted as the "Efficiency
Frontier," which in this example is created by two DMUs. The DMU under consideration,
DMUo, is not on the efficiency frontier, therefore DMUo is technically inefficient. The
"virtual target" for DMUo or "virtual DMU" is where DMUo would intersect the efficiency
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frontier using its current strategy of producing outputs in tenns of the ratio of output X to
output Y. This can be visualized in a two output DEA model shown below in Figure 3:

Efficiency Frontier
o
o

---.......----- Virtual for DMU o

N

>

Output Y1
Figure 3: Example of a Virtual DMU in a two-dimensional DEA model

The A vector for DMUo is made up of the linear combination of the only two
efficient DMUs in this example. The efficiency of DMUo in the above example can be
calculated as the ratio of the distance from the origin to DMUo, to the distance from the
origin to the virtual DMU located on the efficiency frontier.

In a constant returns to scale (CRS) DEA model, both input and output oriented
models will give the same results (however, they will be reciprocals of one another). This
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is not true with all other DEA models such as Banker, Chames and Cooper's [17] variable
returns to scale (VRS) method.

2.11.4 Extensions of DEA
The original DEA model has been extended to allow for scale differences, to
incorporate judgment, and recently to accommodate missing and imprecise data. Banker et

al. [14, 17] first provided a method for comparing DMUs that were on vastly different
scales (such as comparing a large "box" store like Home Depot or Costco in the same set
as a small convenience store like a 7-11). The method, termed BCC (for Banker, Chames
and Cooper, the authors) results in a variable returns to scale or VRS model.
The next major contribution was the incorporation of judgment in the form of
weight restrictions. That is, restricting the amount of weight, the magnitude of ur's and vi's
in the model. This was originally brought into the DEA literature by Dyson et al. [84].
Roll et al. [167], Golany [98], Cook et al. [57-59], Ali et al. [6] and others provided
extensions to this work that included the incorporation of weak and strong ordinal
relationships. Thompson et al. [205] added the concept of "Assurance Regions" through
multiplier bounds, and Wong and Beasley [223] formulated relative upper and lower
bounds for inputs and outputs. Finally Allen et al. [7] provided a method for overcoming
the problem of weakly efficient DMU by the addition of non-observed DMUs in the data
set.
The preceding methods essentially limit or place boundaries on the basic DEA
model. One of the reasons for implementing these methods is that the data or information
may in fact be imprecise. Cooper et al. [62] was the first to publish a study with the term
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"imprecise" in the title; however, Golany [97] and others [61, 111, 141, 158] have studied
"chance constrained" and "stochastic information" models since 1985. Cooper et al. 's [62]
work expanded on the earlier methods, generalizing them for bounded imprecise inputs and
outputs in the presence of assurance regions or AR-IDEA (Assurance Region

hnprecise

Data Envelopment Analysis). The basic problem Cooper et al. [62] addressed is the fact
that the underlying assumption in DEA that all the data are in the form of specific
numerical values is simply not always true. Some data may only be known to be bounded
within some range, while other data may be ordinal: good, better, best, for example, where
we know that best> better> good, but we don't know how much difference there is. Still
other data may be known only to exist between certain bounds, such as: USDOT gas
mileage evaluations for certain types of automobiles: city driving the auto should get
between 15 mpg and 18 mpg, and freeway driving the same auto is expected to get
between 20 mpg and 24 mpg. Cooper et al. [62] used scale transformations and variable
alterations to linearize the resulting IDEA model in the presence of ordinal and bounded
information. This work was expanded in [63] using a dummy variable, the Column
Maximum DMU or CMD.
Zhu [225] maintained that when weight restrictions are present, the reSUlting model
in [62] remains non-linear. "Consequently, some of the efficiency results ... need to be
revised." (This observation was in fact acknowledged in [62] and again by the same
authors in [63].) In [225] Zhu gives a different method for incorporating imprecise method
by converting bounded, weak ordinal, strong ordinal and ratio bounded data into exact
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data.

Finally, Zhu shows that certain weight restrictions are "redundant and can be

removed" in his transformed model.
These methods allow a researcher to incorporate data that may only be known
within a certain range and both weak and strong ordinal preference structures. However,
the fact that data may only be known to exist within certain bounds, such as the USDOT
gas mileage estimates, in reality, a specific automobile will achieve a specific rating.
Another method for evaluating bounded imprecise data, proposed by Anderson and
Williams [9], is to evaluate DMUs for their worst and best possible efficiency ratings by
simply comparing each individual DMU under four alternative formulations:

Max DMU o

Max DMU j V i ¢O

Optimistic Structure

Max DMU o

Min DMU j V i ¢O

Benevolent Structure (yields.highest
rating)

Min DMU o

Max DMUj V i ¢O

Malevolent Structure (yields lowest
rating)

Min DMU o

Min DMUj V i ¢O

Pessimistic Structure

Table 3: Imprecise Formulations by Anderson and Williams [9]

The terms Max DMUo and i and Min DMUoand i are rules to maximize and minimize
the DMU data where missing data are present. For example, in the case of Max DMUO, if
DMUo is missing an output datum, the missing datum would be replaced with the
maximum amount found in the peer group. If DMUo is missing an input datum, the
missing datum would be replaced with the minimum amount found in the peer group,
thereby maximizing the DEA score for DMUo.

In the "Optimistic" formulation, all DMUs are given the benefit of the doubt, and
when data is missing, the missing metric is replaced with the best data for that metric (the
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largest nun1ber output and minimum number of input) for each found in the peer data set.
This fonnulation assumes that all DMUs do the best possible in all missing data metrics.

In the "Benevolent" fonnulation, DMUo, the DMU under consideration is given the
"Optimistic" data for all missing data metrics, whereas the comparator DMUs are all given
the opposite or minimum data for each missing data metric. This fonnulation will result in
the highest possible score for DMUo because while it assumes DMUo has the maximum
value for each missing data metric, the comparator DMUs all score the worst possible in
the missing data metrics. In the Malevolent fonnulation, DMUo is given the minimum data
for each missing data metric, whereas the comparator DMUs are given the maximum.
This will give the lowest possible score for DMUo and is essentially the opposite of the
"Benevolent" fonnulation. Finally, the "Pessimistic" fonnulation assumes that when data
is n1issing, the DMU is assigned the largest possible inputs and the lowest possible output
data (including zero output.)

In the case of this research we know from the architect members of the Expert
Panel that the boundaries of the imprecise inputs are roughly as follows:

Conceptual Design

10%

to

40%

Schematic Design

300/0

to

700/0

Preliminary Design

600/0
90%

to

900/0
100%

Final Design

to

Table 4: Experts Design Classification Ranges

Which can be represented graphically as in Figure 4 below.

65

10

20

30

40

60

70

80

90

100

Percent Complete of Plans and Specifications
Figure 4 Design Stages in Percent Complete of Plans and Specifications

We can now perfonn a simple one-input one-output example uSIng of the
imprecise data fonnulation given above, using the data obtained from the Expert Panel and
assuming a single output of 1.00. Since there is only one input and one output there is no
need to use the DEA computer model, we simply need to calculate the high and low input
scores for each DMU under the different conditions (noting that the outputs remain the
same) as given in Table 5.

MODEL INPUTS
DMU

Design
Completion

A

Conceptual

B

Schematic

C

Preliminary

0

Final

Low Input

High Input

Output

0.10
0.30
0.60
0.90

0.40
0.70
0.90
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Table 5: Example of input-output data for the imprecise model described above

Next, calculate the efficiency scores by dividing each DMU by the highest DMU
score .for the specific fonnulation.

The benevolent and malevolent fonnulation DEA

scores for each ofthe DMUs in the example above are given in Table 6:

66

DMU

Design
Completion

A

Conceptual

B

Schematic

C

Preliminary

0

Final

Best
Score

Lowest
Score

O/llow
10.0

011 high
2.50
1.43
1.11
1.00

3.33
1.67
1.11

Benevolent
Efficiency
Score

Malevolent
Efficiency
Score

1.00
1.00
0.67
0.44

0.75
0.14
0.11
0.10

Table 6: DEA scores for DMUs presented above

We learn from this example that the fonnulation given by Anderson and Williams
[9] is sensitive to the range of the imprecise data. In this research, the output data is
constrained to a range of plus or minus eight to ten percent, an imprecise input must have a
smaller range in order for this model to have much meaning. Since this is not the case with
the construction building data, the fonnulation above cannot be used here.
In addition, the model presented above prescribes a method for comparing DMUs

when one or more data types is missing entirely. The proposed fonnulation compares
DMUo which has some missing Xi'S or yr's against the set ofDMUj's also missing the same
Xi'S

or yr's. This is another fonn of the "Benevolent" fonnulation where DMUo is given

the benefit of the doubt, and whatever the missing

Xi'S

or yr's may represent, the

comparator's perfornlance on those metrics are not used against DMUo. Other variations
suggested by Anderson and Williams [9] include replacing the missing

Xi'S

or yr's with

either the minimum or maximum values of those xi's or yr's in the data set. These are
"Optimistic Benevolent," and "Pessimistic Malevolent" fonnulations consistent with the
plan are presented in Table 3 above.
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2.12

DEA Compared to Regression Models
In discussing confidence intervals for efficiency estimates comparing DEA with

statistical methods like regression, Horrace and Schmidt [110] state that "deterministic
approaches (e.g., DEA) produce efficiency measures, while statistical approaches produce
efficiency estimates." By this, they mean that DEA produces a measure of technical
efficiency that is measured against a virtual target, or efficient producer, that lies on the
linear production frontier and utilizes the same weighting strategy as the DMU under
consideration.

However, unlike stochastic methods, DEA does not. directly yield an

estimate of the accuracy of the measurement in terms of confidence limits, which was
addressed by Horrace and Schmidt [110]. More importantly, the idea of measurement
accuracy versus statistical estimate is a key difference in benchmarking approaches using
DEA versus Regression and other statistical methods.
The virtual targets resulting from DEA reveal pathways for improvement of the
DMU under consideration to reach relative efficiency (i.e., reach the efficiency frontier).
Figure 3 above depicted a one input two output, two-dimensional model. In that example
the outputs are identified as only "Output Y I " and "Output Y2," and all of the inputs are
assumed to be 1.0.
The virtual DMU tells the analyst what DMUo needs to do to improve the
efficiency frontier. The distance from DMUo to the efficiency frontier at the virtual DMU
is also used to calculate the efficiency of DMUo (here DMUo's efficiency is calculated as
the distance from the origin to DMUo divided by the distance from the origin to the Virtual
DMU).
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Figure 3 also illustrates an important difference between D EA and statistical
methods like regression in that the virtual target is determined by strategy employed by
DMUo, which may be quite different from the strategy employed by any other DMU. In
addition, from DEA we can evaluate different strategies that may allow us to reach the
efficiency frontier. In Figure 3, for instance, DMUo may decide that instead of pursuing
the current strategy, perhaps he should simply concentrate on increasing one or the other
outputs (X's or Y's).
In a construction setting, the project or company manager may determine that she

should shift her strategy, for example: to pay more attention to quality or safety, perhaps
even at the expense of cost or schedule performance, .in order to reach the efficiency
frontier.
Benchmarking is defined as the "search for industry best practices ..." [137], and
some of the drawbacks to regression analysis for benchmarking are that: while the factor
weights are derived from the data, as in DEA, the resulting regression model prescribes
only one ''best practice." The regression model results in a single linear extrapolation ofall
the data points, which is used in comparing the performance of individual entities in the
analysis.
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Percent Design Complete vs. Cost Growth
Respondent Class: Owner and Contractor
Cost Categories: All
Industry Group: Hvy. Ind.
Project Type: Chem. Mfg. & Oil Ref.
Project Nature: All
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Figure 5: Regression of Cost Growth v. %Complete Design (207]

In Figure 5, the benchmark model for Percent Design Complete vs. Cost Growth
prescribes only a single trade-off between the two metrics (Cost Growth % = 10.9 - 0.25 x
Percent Design Complete) that all projects are compared against. DEA allows for a wider
range of trade-offs between input and output variables, reflecting the wide range of
strategies practiced by individual organizations.
Secondly, the ''best practice" linear extrapolation includes in its derivation both the
best and the worst producers, whereas DEA compares all producers against only the best.
By including poor perfonners so intimately in the model, the benchmark is inherently
weaker. To say that a project performed above the benchmark line in Figure 5 is merely
saying that the project beat out half its competitor's! In DEA, the statement that the project
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perfonns at or near an efficiency of 1.0 means that the projects is clearly perfonning at the
top or near the top of all competitors in the analysis. These are vastly different statements
about project perfonnance.
Finally, as seen in Figure 5 below, from a

crr benchmarking study [207],

these

methods fail to account for a significant differences in perfonnance. That is, the adjusted

R2 in several cases was very low, on the order of 13% as shown in Figure 5, with a wide
and unexplained variation in data points. According to Givens [95] this problem is a great
concern of the Construction Industry Institute and has caused them to rethink their
benchmarking approach.

2.12.1 DEA Compared with other Production Efficiency Measuring Methods
Linear regression models are not the only methods used to evaluate efficiency; they
are perhaps the most widely used, and particularly in construction industry benchmarking
studies in the literature [3,4, 199,207]. The second most commonly used methodology for
benchmarking in the construction industry involves presentation of simple statistics of the
base data such as histograms [89] and box plots [103]. Others have used fixed weight
functions [130], correlation analysis [12], and ANOVA [4] to further analyze construction
industry data. However, each of these methods has drawbacks with respect to the goals of
benchmarking and estimating production efficiency, the principal drawback being that the
poor perfonners have the same influence on the models as the best perfonners do. DEA on
the other hand does not suffer from this problem, nor is DEA susceptible to problems with
covariant metrics in the model because they have no effect on a DMU's technical
efficiency score.
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As noted above, since benchmarking is the "search for industry best practices ..."
[137], the best way to do so is to compare the entity under consideration against the best
performer [89]. By contrast, statistical methods generally include all performers, the best
as well as the worst, in the analysis as discussed in 2.12 above. This inclusion of poor
performers in the analysis is likely to cause the model to underestimate the production
efficiency of high performers and overestimate the efficiency of low performers. Also,
Thanassoulis [202] found that DBA did a better job of estimating production efficiency
than regression models; however, he also found that "regression analysis offers greater
stability of accuracy."
As a method for estimating relative production efficiency among different
producers, DBA has been found to be superior to other multi-variate techniques [16, 18].
These studies utilized simulated data from underlying stochastic production fimctions and
tested DBA against Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) analysis for different
sample sizes and five different production functions. They found that "DBA performs
better for all non-classical inefficiency estimates, even with relative high measurement
errors" and "DBA provides sutprisingly accurate estimates for the snlall sample sizes for
all cases in the experiment" [18]. DBA was further compared against more common Ratio
Analysis tools for performance measures (such as financial ratios) and DBA was found to.
be superior for setting targets for improving performance of operating units [203], which is
in essence what benchmarking concerns itself with.
Simulation was used as a data generating process for testing relative performance
of DBA and regression techniques by Banker et al. in two separate studies [16, 18].
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Simulation is a technique that could be used in benchmarking studies if the underlying
production functions were well understood. Unfortunately, the process of management
decision making on construction projects is not known in the rich detail required for
simulation. Furthermore, the structure of the contract or contracting method, the specific
nature of the project and the demands of the owner will influence the behavior of the
managers and decision-makers, making the process extremely difficult to model. DEA, by
contrast, evaluates the ex-post decision-making and management processes.

2.12.2 Current DEA Application Areas
As noted earlier, Seiford [186] and Tavares [200] have traced the evolution ofDEA
and provided comprehensive bibliographies of DEA papers. Tavares [200], which is the
more recent and includes papers presented at conferences as well as research publications,
books and dissertations, contains more than 3,200 individual entries. In addition, [200]
includes both author and key word statistics. The keyword section documents the DEA
applications in the various industries, organizations and economic sectors.

The

construction and building industry applications are limited to just a handful of citations
including building sector research [184], road construction vehicle management [109, 157]
and nuclear power plant construction times [189]. None of these applications proposes to
evaluate construction contractor efficiency or performance benclunarking. None of the
references in [200] appear to be applications of construction contractor performance
evaluation. Only one paper is listed with the key word "competitive bidding" (a paper that
deals with electrical utility contracts in Japan) and another under ''bidding'' (a paper
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entitled "Bidding Efficiencies for rights to car ownership in Singapore"), neither of which
are construction related studies.
This study is the first application of DEA to construction project perfOlmance.
Furthermore, while the vendor selection references cited above do present certain
similarities to this proposed study, [214] is situated in the JIT manufacturing environment
and [122] is an application of technology selection in the high-technology sector.
However, it is interesting to note that in one application by Weber [214] on vendor
selection in manufacturing, the principal factors considered in the study were price, quality
and delivery time, which are consistent with those used to measure construction project
performance in several studies, as noted above.

2.13

Statistical Methods Using DEA
Statistical validation and hypothesis tests using DEA efficiency scores has been an

area of interest within the DEA literature for some time [15]. This is perhaps an obvious
concern, given that efficiency scores (in the input oriented case) vary from 0 to 1.0 and
therefore cannot be normally distributed and in fact have been found to be "significantly
non-normal" [188]. Some, like Gong and Sickles (100], have even labeled DEA to be
"non-statistica1."

However, [15] surveys the literature concerning the evolution of

statistical methods in DEA and develops an inefficiency estimator that can be used to
construct statistical tests.

Other researchers have simply accepted the fact that DEA

produces non-normal distributions and apply ordinary least square (OLS) regression
methods to the data using a dummy variable [188].
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2.14 Non-parametric Comparison Methods
Since DEA is a non-parametric method that produces results that are not normally
distributed, this research will use non-parametric methods to compare the DEA model
efficiency score results.
Non-parametric methods were devised to provide statistical tests for non-normally
distributed and more generally, distribution-free populations [77].
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum method tests if two random samples taken
from populations that are not normally distributed could have come from populations with
the same median [78]. The Kruskall-Wallis rank sum method tests ifK random samples
could have come from K populations with the same median. These methods could be used
to test hypotheses that the two sets of projects are drawn from different populations by
using the mean ofone group to test the other.
The Speannan rank correlation test

a method used "to investigate the

IS

significance of the correlation between two series of observations obtained in pairs" [120].

In this method, observations obtained in pairs,

Xi

and yi, are assigned rank numbers 1,2, ...

n in order of increasing magnitude. The differences in the rank numbers of the pairs are
then used to produce a test statistic (either Z for n

~

10 or r, otherwise) that can be used to

determine the significance ofthe correlation between the two groups. The limitation to this
method is that it also assumes that the groups are drawn from continuous distributions and
that the observations are taken in pairs. These limitations also hold true for the Kendall
rank correlation test (paired observations) [120].

75

The limitation that the groups of observations are drawn from continuous
populations is not necessarily a fatal flaw that voids their potential use; in fact, DEA does
produce continuous population results that are bounded by 0 and 1. Several researchers
have used statistical methods with much stronger assumptions of normality in DEA
analysis as noted in Section 2.13 above. The important point is that we need to understand
and deal with the effect of discarding the continuous and non-normality assumptions.
These effects are generally that the confidence intervals will differ from the nominal levels
specified in the analysis [77]. We acknowledge this to be the case and may have to set
higher than normal confidence limits in order to justify rejecting hypotheses based on these
tests.

2.15 Multiple Perspectives and Stakeholder Analysis
Section 2.12.1, states that the construction management decision making process is
not known in rich and sufficient detail to allow us to simulate the production process or
prescribe a production function (or set of production functions) to evaluate project
efficiency. However, this is not an uncommon problem as Linstone [142] points out:

Decision making inherently involves organizations and individuals,
whose perspectives are very different from those of "rational" system
analysts.

In order to understand the decision making process, Linstone recommends going
beyond the technical perspective that our quantitative models help us to understand and
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evaluate also personal and organizational influences that weight in the management and
decision-making processes.
Jones [116] states that the essential premises stakeholder theory is as follows:
•

the [public contracting agency] has relationships with many constituent
groups ("stakeholders") that affect and are affected by its decisions;

•

the theory is concemed with the nature of these relationships in of both
process and outcomes for the [agency] and its stakeholders;

•

the interests of all (legitimate) stakeholders have intrinsic value, and
one set of interests is assumed to dominate the others;

•

the theory focuses on managerial decision makin.g.

Construction projects affect and are affected by a number of stakeholders both
directly and indirectly. These include contractors, subcontractors, designers, politicians,
bureaucrats, and the public taxpayer to name a few. The managerial choice of which PDS
to use on a specific project, while guided by statute, is a managerial decision that has
consequences for the stakeholders.

The attitudes and opinions expressed by the

stakeholders (by effective lobbying) can impact the agencies' decisions, and regardless,
their interests as they see them "have intrinsic value," especially when reconciling the data
analysis with the actual decisions made.
It is clear that the choice ofPDS may be influenced by personal preferences as well

as organizational and stakeholder pressures and in spite of the fact that the statutory
construction requires cost to be the major (essentially only) decision factor. For example, a
construction manager for a public agency might have significant organizational pressure to
avoid conflicts or litigation, and therefore may choose CMlGC rather than a DBB on the
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belief that it will result in fewer claims. Also, it is possible that personal attitudes and
biases can affect contractor selection method choice, in particular, the desire to hire or veto
participation by one or more specific contractors.
Eliciting honest perspectives from the project players is difficult [13], particUlarly
in this situation because public managers may have reasonable fears that disgruntled
contractors would use any information about a selection process to discredit the official and
overturn a selection decision or even sue the official under Oregon law. Furthermore, one
Expert actually stated that his company's main concern was making sure that the option to
use CM/GC as a PDS on public projects remain available to public agencies, pretty much
regardless of the data indicates, because they believed in the process and believed that it
resulted in better projects, regardless of what the data analysis shows. Another stakeholder
noted that the principal benefit of negotiated procurements is that they don't have to work
with people they don't like.
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Research Design and Data Collection

3

In this chapter we discuss the research design and data collection required to
address the principal research questions: is one PDS superior to the other, and if so, under
what circumstances. We document the many steps and many of the challenges that were
encountered both internally. and externally while trying to extract the proper information
for that part of our analysis. The data collection for the stakeholder and project comparison
research questions is contained in their respective chapters.

3.1

Research Models
The first order of business is to agree on a basic model that can be constructed to

test the research questions. DEA was chosen as the methodology for this study because
DEA allows for a wide variety of inputs and outputs of a system and assumes no specific
method for transforming inputs into outputs. Therefore, the model for construction project
management is a process of taking inputs or resources and managing them to produce
outputs. Chua [47] proposes a similar model for management decision making in the
construction bid market, where the inputs are both external and internal factors, and the
output is the bid markup_ Chua [47] lists 51 possible input factors in his model

some of

which were selected by the Expert Panel in the model proposed used in this research.

3.1.1 Contract Information Model
The diagram in Figure 6 shows inputs on the left side and outputs on the right.
Inputs can include a number of things such as resources and information. The public

79

construction industry uses a legal construct that assumes that all the infonnation necessary
to bid a project is contained in the plans and specifications supplied by the owner [175] at
page 11-32 (along with common general knowledge of the project site, the owner, the
designer, and weather patterns during the course of the project).

The applicable

competitive bidding theory assumes that the various bidders have the same infonnation
upon which to base their bids, and that the actual true project costs will likewise be
equivalent.

It is generally assumed for the purposes of theoretical analysis that this

infonnation is generally symmetric, that is that all bidders have access to the same
infonnation prior to bidding, but this is only partly true. Some bidders will know the owner
agency and its management style better, while others may have personal experience with
the site or the designer. In any case, for the purposes ofthis discussion, we assume that the
infonnation presented to a contractor at the time of developing his contract price for the
different PDSs can be thought ofas depicted below.

DEA Model Input

Figure 6: DEA Construction Project Management Sequence Diagram

Figure 7 thorough Figure 10 depict different theoretical sets of infonnation in the
public construction contracting environment.
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COMPLETE INFORMATION
Figure 7: Complete Information for a Prospective Project

Information provided by the Owner

STATE OF
NATURE

Theoretical Contract Model
Figure 8: Theoretical Information Models as a basis for Contract Price

Information provided by the Owner

STA-rE OF
NATURE

Competitive Bid Contract Model
Figure 9: Competitive Bid Model as Experienced in Practice

Information provided by
the Owner

STATE OF
NATURE

Negotiated Procurement Contract Model
Figure 10: Negotiated Procurement Contract Model
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The amount ofinformation available to a construction contractor at the time pricing
or selection is required is never complete. Figure 7 indicates complete information, which
includes knowledge of future states of nature as well as no errors in interpretation of the
data by the contractor; clearly, this ideal is never achieved.
Figure 8 depicts the theoretical DBB competitive bid model of information upon
which virtually all contracts and construction law are based. It provides that the basis for
all competitive contracts or scope of work for all competitive contracts is based solely on
information provided by the owner (typically by and through their consultant architects and
engineers) and the State of Nature (SON). The SON concept is based on an acceptable or
typical performance of the SON, usually meaning the ''weather'' but also includes such
things as normally expected underground and hidden conditions.

The amount of

information regarding the SON can be increased by expending time, effort and funds to
make better predictions about the SON, such as paying for the consultants to perform
underground soils investigations. This will reduce the size of the SON arrow since is
reduces the unknown portion of the SON with known "information." But some SON's, in
particular the weather far off in the future, are outside the bounds ofinvestigation, which in
particular affects long term projects that are the subject of this study. The standard in the
construction industry is to use the "average" SON as a benchmark for what the bidders
should expect to encounter. Only if the actual SON of the weather is abnormally adverse
will there be an amendment to the contract.
Figure 9, the "Competitive Bid Contract Model," more accurately reflects the
actual state of information in the competitive contract method, where the actual
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information provided at the time of pricing is less than complete information, by both the
SON and "Errors and Omissions" in the information provided by the owner. This leads to
the contractual provisions in most construction contracts that allow for amendments to the
contract based on errors or omissions.
Figure lOis the CMlGC model where the amount of information presented at the
time of selection or pricing is admittedly less than complete than that which is provided in
the DBB model. This model recognizes the construction contractor's ability to exercise
judgment and requires him to fill in the gaps between the amount of information given and
what is required to derive a contract price. The owner is able to reduce the amount of
information required at the time the price is agreed on directly proportional to the increase
in information supplied by the CMlGC contractor. However, in order to obtain Building
Permits and Certificates of Occupancy from local building officials, the plans and
specifications for the building under this model must still meet the rigorous standards set
by the building code officials. This means that the owner will very likely spend just about
the same amount of money for the design work, and perhaps even more, than he would
under the DBB PDS, but the DBB PDS requires that the plans and specifications be
complete prior to selection ofthe contractor [56].

3.2

Survey Instrument
The first major challenge was to design a survey instrument that would be accepted

by the sources, easy to use and fill out, and provide all ofthe information that was sought in
the study.
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3.2.1 Expert Panel Work - Defining Success Measures & Constraints
As we had proposed to do, we recruited a panel of industry experts to help define,
"what makes a good project good?" "How is it measured?" And ''what challenges must a
contractor overcome in order to produce a good project?" The underlying process was
similar to a Delphi method [13, 143], modified to two rounds, with an initial set ofpossible
attributes to consider. In the second round, the initial responses were aggregated into like
groups by the author and the Experts were asked to confirm or reject these synthesized
attributes in a process described by [13] at page 247 and [48].
The Expert Panel consisted of roughly ten architect/engineers, ten owners, and ten
construction contractor representatives (see Appendix B). All of the project participants
were senior level management personnel, project managers, attorneys, partners, company
owners and two elected officials. The members were selected and recruited because they
represent a large segment of the industry that has a lot of experience in both DBB and

CMlac project delivery methods. In addition, we recruited construction contractors to
participate in this part of the study in order to help educate them and make them a part of
the data collection phase. Our intent was clear: if we could get a few very influential
construction firms to give us this information, we could probably leverage their support to
obtain the support from others in the state.
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3.2.2 Initial Measures Data Collection
On September 22nd, 1998 a package was sent to each of the Expert Panel
member's.28 This package contained a cover letter thanking each member for their
participation and explaining the study goals and what data we sought from them at this
point; a detailed 24-page explanation of Data Envelopment Analysis and benchmarking in
the construction industry, drawn from the literature review; and two data collection sheets
and return envelope. The data collection at this point was relatively straightforward; we
asked them to indicate what they considered to be "Construction Project Outputs or
Success Measures" and "How Best to Measure the Project Output" on one sheet and what
are the "Construction Project Inputs or Project Resources or Constraints" and "How Best to
Measure the Project Input" on the other.
The Experts were advised that they need not fill out the entire table often rows, but
to "only include the attributes you feel are important in measuring a construction project's
efficiency." In addition, check-off boxes at the bottom of the page entitled "Contractor,"
"Consultant," and "Owner" were included to evaluate the responses on a stakeholder basis
(but no other identifying marks were requested or taken, so that the responses would be
anonymous).
Of the thirty packets that were sent out, fifteen were returned by mail, two were
hand delivered and four participants sent email versions of the request back. Three other
packets were returned because they did not have the correct address, two of these three
were corrected and sent out but not returned. The other final packet, which was to have

28

See Appendix B for a complete list of Expert Panel Members
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gone to a Seattle based national contractor's vice president of estimating and purchasing
was returned too late to be re-sent.
An analysis of these initial responses produced a mildly surprising set of results:
there was no significant difference between the different stakeholder groups
(architects/engineers, owners and contractors) as to the measures of performance, and only
very little difference as measures of resources and constraints. One of the more unusual
consistencies was that all groups felt contractor profit and minority contractor participation
were both positively correlated with project performance and efficiency. It is not intuitive
that owners and architects would care much about contractor profit on a project, since
neither would benefit from that increased profit.

Likewise, it is not intuitive that

contractor's unanimously felt minority participation was an important output to measure,
given that social policy is typically outside their business considerations.
We do not nlean to imply that every response from every participant was the same,
however, and so the next step was to focus the Expert Panel on refining the metrics and
agreeing on how to measure each metric.

3.2.3 Second Expert Panel Survey
The following table reflects the second step in referring the metrics work with the
Expert Panel.
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Construction Project Outputs
Metric

Measure

Include?

% over/under Budget
% profits

Yes
Yes

No
No

Original Planned / Actual
Schedule
Original Planned / Actual
Performance

Yes

No

Yes

No

Number of Punch List Items
Amount of Warranty Work
Rating on 1 - 10 Scale

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No

% Participation / % Goal

Yes

No

Ask to Rate
Ask to Rate

Yes
Yes

No
No

Ask to Rate

Yes

No

Rank

Financial Performance

•
•

Budget Performance
Project Profitability

Schedule Performance
• Project Completion

•

Milestone Completion

Quality of Work
• Workmanship
Materials & Equipment
Met Performance
Criteria

•
•

Minority Participation
• Met Project Goals
Satisfaction of Project
Participants
• Owner Satisfaction
Consultant Team
Satisfaction
• Contractor Satisfaction

•

Other:

Table 7: Second Output Metric Data Form

A second sheet, in a sintilar fonnat for Construction Project Inputs, and a third
sheet, which is shown below and is an example of a completed fonn, was included in this
survey.
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EXAMPLE OF COMPLETED METRIC RATING FORM (FYI)
Measure

Include?

Rank

% over/under Budget
% Profit

Yes

I

Original Planned / Actual Schedule

Yes

2

Number of Punch List Items.

Yes

3

% Participation I % Goal

Yes

5

Plsl. ie R:ale

No

0

# of Accidents or Claims

Yes

4

Metric
Financial Performance

•

·
·
·

Budget Perfonnance
Add: Profit Performance

Schedule Performance
Project Completion

Quality of Work

Met Proiect Goals

Satisfaetiefl ef Prej eet Parti eip8flts
A.

~

.n

Safety Performance

·

Safety Perfonnance
Other Items not listed above that you
feel are important:

•
•
•

PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE

•

•
•
•
•

·

·

I·

Workmanship

Minority Participation

·

•

·
·
·
·•
··
··
•
··
•

AlA AWARDS, % OCCUPIED

YES

6

Figure 11 Picture of an example of a completed data collection sheet

Note that the rankings were initially intended to be used to restrict weights of the
inputs and outputs; however, this approach proved unsuccessful and was not used in the
final modeL
A smaller proportion of these forms were returned compared to the first survey,
and a further step of taking the form directly to Expert Panel members over lunch was
necessary to better define the metrics, the measures. From these one-on-one meetings,
ideas emerged regarding how to deal with the sensitive profit and safety data discussed
below. Following this step, we had a pretty clear picture of what the initial DEA model
would look like, and what our data collection survey instrument would have to include.
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3.3

Project Data Collection

3.3.1 Projects Sample
It was the intent ofthis research to obtain data on as many projects as possible, with
an ultimate goal of identifying all proj ects built in Oregon during the study period and
obtaining data on each. It was never the intent of this study to obtain a statistical sample of
the population of all projects, and that is a limitation of the research. However, 407
projects meeting the study requirements were identified (215 were actually used in the
model) which, for a small state like Oregon, probably represents the majority of public
building projects constructed during that period. While it's quite difficult to determine with
certainty the exact number of projects built during the study period, we were able to
perform a number of checks to confirm the rationale for our assumption that the Orego,n
database does in fact represent the majority of large public building projects during the
study period. These include the following:
•

We sought data from every building contractor in Oregon whose bonding
capacity and public sector work history would suggest that they could and
would perform the type and size ofprojects ofconcern in this research.

•

We sought data from every city, school district and public agency in Oregon
that would normally have the ability to fund projects of the size concerned with
this research.29

29 It should be noted that Oregon's population is concentrated in ten of its 36 counties and 50% of the
population resides in the tri-county metropolitan area of Portland. Of the ten largest cities in Oregon,
only two are located outside the Willamette valley, and both of those cities and their respective school
districts were contacted for this study.
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•

A cross-check was made between the Oregon database, that was obtained as
described above and the state of Oregon's bonded capitol improvements
program funds authorized by the Legislature for the 1989 biennium through the
2001 biennium and all 14 of the 14 funded projects were accounted for in the
Oregon database.

•

Finally, for this study to have missed a large proportion or majority of the
projects of similar size and type used in the study, we would have had to have
missed more than a billion dollars in public construction3o , in a state that only
received tax revenues of $4.66 billion in total for 2001 (exclusive of property
taxes), with the largest proportion of these funds going toward K-12 Education,
Human Services, and Public Safety [216].

Based one these observations we conclude that we have in fact obtained the
majority oflarge public building projects constructed in Oregon during the research period.

3.3.2 Types of Data to be Obtained
Nearly all of the data that was sought could be considered "Public Information"
and likely could be subject to the Oregon Freedom of Information Act (ORS Chapter 192),
but it was clear that we would meet with resistance from the contractors on certain
questions about the amount of profit earned on the project and project safety, which was
not public information. While both profit and safety metrics were unanimously considered
important project outputs from all Expert Panel members these are obviously sensitive

30 The smallest projects in the database were about $2.5 million and missing 400 projects would be $1
billion in public spending.
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questions for businesses to answer, especially if they thought the infonnation would be
used against them by their competitors in the future. And while we may have been able to
obtain inside company records through the Oregon Secretary of State's office (by invoking
the audit clause included in most if not all public construction contracts) or by filing a
request under ORS Chapter 192, that kind of aggressive approach would have been time
consuming, costly and would likely have evaporated any support the study would have in
the construction community, therefore we dismissed it as a possible strategy.
In order to obtain sensitive infonnation from the contractors, our strategy was first

to recruit several senior management from construction finns to serve on the Expert Panel.
This would allow them to tell us how to collect the infonnation in a way that would be
most palatable to them. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, we offered complete
confidentiality of all project infonnation we received, and furthennore that all the project
identification would be randomized so that no person or organization outside our research
team would be able to decipher the data associated with a specific project. Finally,
working with the contractor Expert Panel members, we devised a way to portray the
infonnation without asking revealing sensitive infonnation. This was done by asking
contractors to give us final profit numbers relative to expected profit at the time the contract
price was established.
The same approach was followed with cost and schedule control metrics, asking
what was the original total budget divided by the final amount actually paid to the
contractor (cost control) and what was the original project time divided by the actual
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performance period (schedule control).31

In general, this worked fairly well; however,

some contractors did not fill in all of the information, and it was clear from they way they
did answer the questions that they were confused.

Some answered by giving us the

original and actual performance periods, for example: original: 1011196 to 1211197, actual:

1111/96 to 2/15/98. That information allowed us to calculate the correct metric. Others
answered by stating simply: On Time (which yields a metric of 1.0); or by stating some
amount of time late or early, which made the calculation more difficult without additional
information.

31 In the case of costs we actually asked what the original and final costs were. We did this for two
reasons, first as a check on the source's math and second because we would later use the final cost
figure to calculate cost per square foot measures. On the schedule control metric, we later found that
we would probably have been better off simply asking the questions: what was the original contract
period and what was the actual performance period - we received the information in that form from
several contractors and it provides better information to us in any case. In fact, when we performed the
data collect by going to owners' archives and searching the files ourselves, we collected the data in that
form.
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Proiect:«Project Name»

Year:

Architect:«Architect»

«Year»

Project J:Yl!e (check all that apply)
New School Building
~()ffice Building
New Industrial
New Hospital or Medical Bldg
New Institutional
New Corrections: Jailor Prison
Did the Owner hire a separate Construction Manager: Yes
sf Original Budget: $
Project Size:
or

Contract Type: Lump Sum Bid

Metric

1

Measure

Major Remodel of Existing Bldg
Mixed: New and Remodel
Other
No
Final total billing: $
Negotiated Procurement (CM/GC)

How to Calculate

% over/under Budget

(Original Budget or Bid)frotal Final Billings

% profits

(Qrigil!al Budg'-l or Bid Profit)/~

Schedule Performance
Project Completion
Quality of Work & Management
Workmanship
Disputes
Finalizing Construction

Original Planned / Actual
Schedule

Original # of~ I Actual Project Da~

Completion

FinaIPa~~

Minority Participation
Met Project Goals
Satisfaction of Project Participants
Owner Satisfaction
Contractor Team Satisfaction
Community Satisfaction

% Participation

$ Value ofMinorily Contracts/Total Value of the

Financial Performance
Budget Performance
Project Profitability

··
·
···

·
···
·

Project Safety
Safety Performance

Amount of Dispute Items

Actual # of Items on the Architect's punch list at
SU2ijtantiai !:;o!!J!letion
Total $ Value of Claims at Project End, ifany.

# days, Substantial to Final

Actual # of Proiect Days from Substantial CO!!J!letion to

Number of Punch List ltems

Response

Contract Work
Letter of Recommendation,
Repeat work

Did the OwneT provide a letteT ofrecommendation or
did the Owner give the Contractor repeat work?

Yes or

No

Peer Rating/Advancement in
Company

Yes or

No

Complaints from Project
Neighbors

Did the Contractor's project manager receive a ~
internal review andlor advancement within the
Company?
Did project neighbors make any fOllllal written
complaints about the construction work or project?

Yes or

No

# Lost time or Recordable time

Actual number, regardless oflength of time.

Accidents
$ Value of Accident

Total $'s paid out by the Contractor or the Contractor's
insurance carrier for accident claims

Figure 12 Picture of Project Output Data Collection Form

The actual Project Output Data Collection fonn given to contractors is presented in
Figure 12above, and the Project Input Data Collection fonn is presented in Figure 13 on
page Error! Bookmark not dermed. below.

3.3.3 Output Metric Definition
The next step in this project was to focus on defining the input and output metrics
in a way that could be obtained, would make sense within the context, and could easily be
calculated.
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The three most common measures of construction project performance are: Cost,
Time and Quality_ As discussed above, the financial and schedule measures, cost control,
profit and schedule control would be proportional figures, a ratio of the planned and actual
performance. Both cost and schedule control are calculated as Planned!Actual, and the
Profit is calculated as ActuallPlanned.

The reason for these differences is probably

obvious, but for the sake of discussion, the schedule and cost control metrics are measures
of control, meaning that the contractor's ability to cut costs and beat the schedule are
positive perfonnance characteristics. Since it is important for an output to increase in value
relative to the desired outcome, our metrics had to increase with the decrease in cost and
time perfonnance characteristics, therefore we chose cost and schedule control, calculated
as the Planned!Actual perfonnance.
Profit, on the other hand, was calculated as ActuallPlanned because the contractor's
ability to increase profit was positively correlated with perfonnance.
"Quality of Work" and "Project Management" perfonnance metrics had to reflect
the contractor's work perfonnance in some objective manner.32 Volpe [211] defines a
Punch List as a "list of uncompleted or corrective items ofwork to be done to complete the
contract. These lists are prepared by the architect after an inspection of the project at
substantial completion?3" One measure of the contractor's perfonnance is the number of
items on the architect's Punch List. However, since the number of punch list items would
increase with the size of a project, the metric would eventually have to be made relative to

Note the discussion in Appendix F regarding the ell metrics for quality of performance.
Substantial completion is "the point of completion at which the owner may beneficially occupy the
project" or in other words, when the project is completed and ready for its intended use [211].
32

33
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project square footage. For the data collection instrument, the data that was needed was
fairly straightforward: Number of Punch List Items at time of Substantial Completion.
Also, our Expert Panel chose: Total dollar value of Disputes or Claims at the Project End,
if any; and, the Number of days from Substantial Completion to Final Payment as
measures of project quality. The dollar value of disputes or claims is probably an obvious
measure of quality of management, or at least of the relationship between the project
parties; if there are a lot of claims
between the parties is poor.

or

large claims and disputed items, the relationship

Alternatively, if the parties are able to work out their

differences during the project and settle all disputes and claims, then the relationship
between the parties is very likely to be working fairly well.
Finally, the contractor's efforts to close out the contract and finalize all work were
considered a positive measure of performance. None of the parties in a construction
project wants the project completion to drag out for long periods of time. Contractors lose
money because they have to manage the completion process and that takes away from time
their project manager could be devoting to profitable ventures; architects have to spend
their time, some times un-reimbursed, to inspect and re-inspect the contractor's work; and
owners have to put up with a less than complete building. None of these are popular or
positive prospects.

Therefore, the amount of time the contractor spends from the

substantial completion to the point in time where the punch list is competed and the final
paymene4 is made is an important measure.

Final payment is most likely the release of retainage, the money withheld from progress payments to
insure the work is actually completed to the Owner's and Architect's satisfaction.

34
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In addition to the cost, profit, schedule, and quality metrics, it was important to

obtain other information about the project, such as the type of project and its size in square
feet. 35 For the most part, it was felt that these data would be less sensitive than the financial
(in particular Profit) data requested, with the possible exception of "Claims" because no
business likes to be thought of as "Claim Oriented." But, that data is public information on
these Public Projects, and not entirely the fault of the Contractor.

Nevertheless, the

"Claims" question was generally ignored except to state: ''None'' in most cases.
Minority Participation, which was identified by all Stakeholder Groups in the
Expert Panel as being an important measure of project success, was asked as a proportion
of the total contract value. This is also the way it is generally required under most public
contracts/ 6 however, it must be pointed out that these rules are constantly changing with
court rulings on both the State and Federal levels.
The Satisfaction of the project participants was identified as a project success
measure yet how "satisfaction" should be measured was not precisely defined by the
Expert Panel members. A subjective rating scale measure could be used; however, where
possible it was thought that objective measures should be obtained. The Expert Panel

Here size in square feet is only concerned with the square footage of the building itself, or the portion
ofthe building, in the case of major remodel projects, that is actually being worked on. A lot of
projects, especially school projects, are built on large sites. This fact also makes it difficult to compare
the cost per square foot of projects since neither contractors nor owners precisely break out those costs
from an overall lump sum or GMP. It may be possible, especially with GMP's to break out the building
costs, but then some kind of assumption would have to be made regarding the proportion of overhead
and profit was associated with the site and building work.
35

36 In a succession of US Supreme Court cases beginning with J.A. Crosson v. Richmond, and
concluding recently with Adarand v. Minetta the US Supreme Court has struck down most race based
minority set aside or preference programs. Oregon has adopted a "Good Faith Effort" standard under
several Agency Administrative Rules (or OAR's) and the Model Contract Rules promulgated by the
Department of Justice.
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suggested that project satisfaction could be obtained by noting whether or not the
contractor received a letter of recommendation or commendation from the project owner,
whether or not the project received any architectural awards and if the project team
members received commendation or promotion within their organizations. Finally, the
Panel suggested a measure relating to the community or proj ect neighbors; whether or not
any complaints were received by the project neighbors.
We decided that that these measures could be n1easured satisfactorily with YeslNo
measures. (Rating on a 1-5 or 1-10 scale would be difficult and possibly embarrassing to
the project team.)

Furthermore, rating an owner's letter of recommendation or

commendation would be highly subjective and probably would tend to be very high (all
tens for example, because what possible reason could be given for a low rated letter of
recommendation?). Architectural and Engineering Awards were rejected because very few
projects actually receive awards, and some awards are substantially more prestigious than
others.

Also, any award mayor may not have anything to do with the contractor's

performance

architectural design awards, for example, are given for the architect's

performance, not the contractor's. The point of this research is to evaluate the different
outcomes of project performance based on PDS, and a design award may not have any
relationship to the PDS used.
''Project Safety" was the final project performance measure suggested by the
Expert Panel. However, the contractor panel members pointed out that various contractors
may measure safety performance in different ways. The most common way of measuring
"Safety" is in "Lost Time Accidents.'~ But since "Lost Time Accidents" can be "gamed" in
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order to hide accidents on the job, it may not be a reliable indicator of project safety.
Another way to measure Safety is in "Recordable Incidents" as required by Oregon
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Recordable incidents include all
accidents not considered as "first aid" and generally requiring medical attention. The
records required by OSHA distinguish between accidents that cause an employee to lose
work entirely from those where the employee returns for work in a "modified" or different
capacity_ Another way of measuring safety performance is in total dollar value of accident
liability. However, as it turned out, contractors would not release that information, and the
owner simply did not require it. While safety information is required by Oregon OSHA,
Oregon OSHA is not disposed to release that information to the public, much in the same
way the IRS is not disposed to release individual tax returns.
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3.3.4 Input Metric Definition
1e
Construetlon p to eet I nputs andCompany P to fil
Metric

Contractor Capacity
This is a measure of the
Contractors' project
management capabilities

·

Design Completeness
Design Quality
Labor Markel & Quality
Adequate Access to Site
Adequate Time allowed by Owner
Adequate Budget allowed by
Owner

':(q k0!!mlete @ Bid 2r QMf

Your estimate of% complete of the plans al the time of
the Bid or GMP

# o(RFI's (Reguests f2f lnfonnation}

Actual # ofRFI's issued by the Contractor?

Lab2r Union Employment Level

Rating of Access from Difficult to Easy

Owner's project time expectations
relative 12 Indum Standard fQ[ ~~e &
~

Owner's budget relative to M~ans
Standard fur ~~ & ~ work

Owner's Project Team
This is a measure of how
prepared the Owner's team was
to assist the Contractor in the
performance of the project

··
·

# Years Experience

Project Manager's years ofConstruction Experience at
the time ofthe' project? This is meant to be management
experience, and includes years as a Field Engineer,
Project Engineer, Scheduling Engineer, Superintendent,
Project Manager and/or Project or Company Executive

Response

Team Experience

Project/System Constraints
This is a measure of the
obstacles to the Contractors
performance in terms of quality
of documents, difficulty finding
trained Jabor, physical
constraints of the site and the
available time and budget
ex.pectations of the owner.

··
··
··

How to Calculate

Measure

Owner's Ability to define project
Experience of Owner's Team
Responsiveness to $ & Time
issues

Your estimate, based on "nonnal" labor market
conditions and your ability to attract experienced,
quality tradesmen for the job: on a scale of 1·5, with I
being: No problem and 5 heinl(: very difficult 10 attract.
Your estimate on a scale of 1-5, ofhow difficult the
project site was to access, amount ofspace available for
storage and parking: Easy Access = I; Average;
Difficult Access = 3; Extremelv Difficult Access = 5.
Your estimate on a scale of 1-5, of the Owner's
expectations about the amount oftime allowed to
perform the work: easy to achieve = 1, about average fur
the work = 3, very aR2fessive schedule = 5
Your estimate of the Owner's budget expectations on a
scale of 1-5: Unrealistic and Inadequate for the work
requested = I; A bit low. but not unrealistic = 2;
Adequate to do the work and cover some contingencies
= 3; mqre than adequate = 4, budget never a
consideration/concern = 5

Scale 1·5

Scale 1-5

Scale 1-5

Scale 1-5

# ofArchitect Revi~i2n~

Actual # of revision drawings issued by the Architect to
correct design errors, flaws or unexpected conditions in
the work.
Your estimate ofthe Owner/Architect's team level of
experience in Construction ofthis type on a scale of 1-5:
Low = I, Average = 3 or High = S?

Scale 1-5

Years Exmlrience & Training

Your estimate ofOwner/Architect's response to time
and money issues on a scale of 1-5: Slow to respond= I;
about average for this type ofjob=3; very responsive5.

Scale 1-5

A ver!!ge # days to resJ1Qnd lQ issu~s

Figure 13 Picture of Project Input Data Collection Sheet

Two different Project Input Data sheets were given to Contractors at the beginning
of the data collection phase this research.

Figure 13 above is the project input data

collection sheet, and the other data collection survey instrument was used to describe the
overall company resources: personnel, bonding capacity, and total volume ofwork.
The key player in any project is the project manager whose experience,
background, and training as well as his or her ability to anticipate problems and solve them
in a timely manner is critical to project success. The Expert Panel felt that one way to
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measure this resource would be the number of years of professional construction
management experience.
Other inputs were described as: "obstacles to the contractor's perfonnance" and
included: Design Completeness, Design Quality, Labor Market, Access to the work,
Amount oftime allowed under the Contract and Adequate budget for the work.
The intent was to characterize the amount of infonnation that was available to the
contractor at the time of the bid or fonnation of the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) 
noting that the amount of infonnation would fall somewhere between no infonnation and
perfect infonnation.

Design completeness is one way to evaluate the amount of

infonnation and could be measured as the percent complete of plans and specifications at
the time of the bid or GMP. On a Design-Bid-Build project, it is generally assumed that
the plans are 100% complete in spite of the fact that is almost never the case, and of course
even 100% complete plans and specifications fall short of what would be considered
"perfect infonnation." However, unless otheIWise noted by the contractor or architect or
other data source, 100% complete plans and specifications would be assumed on all
projects. 37

Architects differ in how they rank levels of design and at what precise

percentage complete each level of design actually achieves. In general, the levels are:
planning, conceptual design, design development, schematic design, and working drawings
or final design. Recall from Table 4 planning and conceptual design are on the order of 10
to 40% ofthe final completed drawings, schematic design ranges from 30% to 70%; design

37 This would be true for both CMlGC and DBB projects, although it is normally the case that CMlGC
projects are authorized as "fast track" the uses less than complete plans to start the work. Since 100% is
the maximum number it would be conservative relative to the model, to assume 100% unless otherwise
noted, because this would neither reward nor substantially penalize a proj ect' s efficiency score.
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development ranges from 60 to 90% complete but usually is on the order of75% complete,
and working drawings range from 90% to 100% range.
Another way to evaluate "information" is to look at the quality of finished plans
and specifications

this can be accomplished by obtaining the number or Requests for

Information (RFI' s) or questions regarding the work from the contractor, and number of
architects' revisions or Proposal Requests instigated by the architect to clear up confusion
in the plans and specifications.

3.4

Data Collection Phase
The data collection phase began in the summer of 1999 with the issuing of the data

collection survey instrument.

3.4.1 Contractors
Based on our experience in the construction industry, we expected that contractors
would be the best source of data for this research. A contractor's profit on competitive
lump sum bid projects, for example, would never be known by the owner or architect on a
project.

Items like the total profit realized as a proportion of the amount initially

anticipated at bid time could only come from the contractor themselves. In addition, items
like the number ofRFI's (Requests for Information), the Number of Punch List Items, and
Schedule performance would be more readily accessible to the contractor, who is more
likely to track of these items in his management information system.
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3.4.2 Making Use of the Expert Panel Members
The strategy adopted early on was to solicit the support of the contractor's
management persormel to serve as expert panel members. It was expected that if they
served on the Expert Panel and helped to arrive at the metrics measured in the study, they
would be more likely to provide the data that they determined was important to measure.
In addition, the strategy was to gain the support of the largest and most influential general

contractors in the state and those with the most experience in both CMlGC and Design
Bid-Build contracting methods: Vice Presidents, Chief Estimator's and Senior Project
Managers from Hoffinan Construction Company, J.E. Dunn, Andersen Construction,
Lease Crutcher Lewis, and Baugh Construction Oregon, the five firms with the majority of
early CMlGC experience and three (Andersen, Dunn and Hoffman) of the oldest general
contractors headquartered and doing business in Oregon. These five firms performed
approximately $1.8 billion of the $5 billion in construction documented in this research 
one contractor, Hoffinan accounted for $1.1 billion of this figure; therefore, in order to
have a credible study, their participation was considered key.
Unfortunately, in spite of our successful strategy to recruit and capitalize on
contractor Expert Panel members, the acquisition of data from contractors did not go as
swiftly as planned, nor did it yield the amount of data that we had hoped. The five initial
contractors provided us with approximately 180 projects, but these were heavily skewed
toward CMlGC projects with only about 30% being DBB. As one Expert Panel member
told me, his company's main concern was making sure that this research did nothing to
diminish the use of alternative contracting methods and specifically CMlGC; therefore,
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they would only provide us infonnation on CMJOC projects and only those that were
considered superior proj ects.
The data collection from contractors started in the summer of 1999 and was
completed in February 2002 with a total of approximately 180 projects; however, not all
projects were useable in our model. Some did not contain enough of the required data,
while others were not "public projects;" but rather were private CMlOC jobs.

3.4.3 Non-Expert Panel Member Contractors
The Expert Panel member companies, while being among the largest public
construction contractors, certainly were not the only companies that perfonn a substantial
amount of public building projects in Oregon. One of the larger sectors in public buildings
is the public school sector which had been dominated by a number of smaller general
contractors, principally Robinson Construction Company headquartered in Hillsboro,
Oregon. However, we were less successful in obtaining data from non-Expert Panel
member companies. For example, Robinson's chief estimator agreed to provide data for
the research, but left the company prior to working on that effort. Subsequently, the Vice
President that oversees construction promised to have someone work on the data collection
but never found the time (nevertheless we did obtain several Robinson Construction
projects through other sources, principally owners and the DJC). Yet another contractor,
Emerick Construction, simply refused to provide any infonnation or data for our study
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because the president of the company felt the study was biased against CMlGC
procurements. 38
We were successful in obtaining information from a number of non-Expert Panel
contractors, either directly or through owners. Kirby Naglehout, headquartered in Bend in
central Oregon provided data on several projects as did several central Willamette Valley
contractors including Pence-Kelly Construction in Salem, Ramsay Gerding Construction
Company9 in Corvallis and Wildish Construction in Eugene. Some of this project data
was incomplete, but by combining it with project data obtained from owners, architects,
and the Seattle Daily Journal ofCommerce (DJC), we obtained enough project information
to be able to use many ofthese projects in the model.

3.4.4 Contractor Websites
The World Wide Web has become an amazing source of information of all types
including information on construction projects. Nearly every one of the contractors in our
database of projects has a website with past project information. This information was
typically limited to data on project type, size, often times the final project cost, architect,
and owner. This information could then be cross checked with architect's and owner's
websites for accuracy and completeness. Using all of these sources together, combined
with data from the Daily Journal of Commerce, it was often possible to piece together
enough information on a project that it could be used in the model.
Some of the early data collected by the researcher for the dissertation proposal that simply
documented the growth in CM/GC projects in Oregon and the distribution of contractor's performing
that work was introduced in a hearing before the Oregon Legislature considering a rewrite ofbidding
requirements and again in a Marion County Court hearing by a group of contractors opposing a CMlGC
award to Emerick.
39 Now, T. Gerding Construction.

38
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3.4.5 Owners
There are literally hundreds of public owners in Oregon; however, the vast majority
ofpublic building pr?jects that fit our model criteria are constructed by a surprisingly small
number of government entities. These include: Oregon University System (and its seven
member universities), Portland and Clackamas Community Colleges, the Cities of
Portland, Salem, Eugene, Beaverton, Tigard and Gresham, school districts in these same
cities, The Oregon Department of Administrative Services, The Oregon Department of
Corrections, The Oregon Military Department, and the Port of Portland. While these
owners don't track all of the data that we would like to have obtained, they do track and
keep infonnation on costs, change orders, schedule, punch lists, claims, and RFI's in their
archives. 40
The Oregon University System (OUS) was the most fertile and (generally
speaking) most open to allowing access to their files of any groups that were approached.
Portland State University (PSU), Oregon State University (OSU), the University of Oregon
(U of 0) and Western Oregon University (WOU) granted complete and uncensored access

to their construction project files. The U of a even supplied a summer intern student to
assist in finding and pulling project files in their vast archive. Only Oregon Health Science
University (OHSU) initially refused access to their project records, claiming that they were
exempt from public disclosure laws under current statutes. OHSU's corporate counsel

The final change order on a project was the single best source of data because it typically would list
the original contract amount, original schedule requirements, and all changes to those requirements. As
noted earlier, this is standard on public projects in Oregon, because a project manager and state agency
must have a legal contract amendment in order to pay a contractor more than the original bid amount or
otherwise risk severe penalties under the law.

40
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detennined that they were in fact not exempt and did provide some infonnation on a few of
their projects.
Each of the major universities, PSU, OSU and the U of 0, provided this study with
between ten and twenty projects each. WOU, a smaller campus located in Monmouth,
Oregon contributed another five.

We contacted Southern Oregon University (SOU),

Eastern Oregon University (EOU), and Oregon Institute of Technology (OIT), but only
SOU had recently built a project that met our research guidelines, and it was under
construction when we contacted them. OIT and EOU had built sizeable projects in the
past, but none in the most recent 20 years.
The Cities of Portland, Salem, Eugene and Beaverton all contributed multiple
projects data for this study, as did Portland Conlffiunity College, Portland and Beaverton
School Districts, the State of Oregon Departments of Corrections, Administrative Services
and the Military.
The data obtained from project owners could generally be retrieved from a small
number of project files. Most owners keep files on the original project contract, change
orders, correspondence, and close-out. The original contract file nonnally documents such
data as the project description (including size in square feet), original contract schedule,
and cost. The Change Order file will give the final contract amount. 41 The correspondence
file often either contained or referenced the number of RFI's on a project; alternatively,
many owners keep a separate RFI log file as well as a proposed change order file. The

All public contracts in Oregon authorize the expenditure of public funds and limits that amount to the
amount of the contract as amended by change order. In order to pay a contractor more than the original
contract price a proper change order or contract amendment must be executed (see WE Group v. State
of Oregon.)

41
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project close-out file usually docwnents the date of substantial completion, fmal payment
and may contain the architect's punch lists; some of these data may be in their own
separate files or found in payment or correspondence files. On the CMlGC projects, some
profit information may be found in the owner's files ifthere was a project audit performed.
Few owners actually maintained websites that were of much help to this work.
One exception was PSU, whose facilities department actually has plans and descriptions of
every campus building on their website. These were extremely helpful for gathering data
on floor areas.
The owners also contributed the ORS 279.103 post hoc reports on CMlGC projects
discussed more fully in Appendix F.

These reports were required by the Oregon

Legislature following the 1997 session as discussed in Section 2.7.2. As noted earlier,
these reports vary in completeness from agency to agency, but regardless of the quality of
the particular agency reports, they all provided the minimwn amount of project data (with
the possible exception of the COCC report which required other information sources
including the DIC, the world wide web, and contractor input) required for the projects to be
used in the model.

It is interesting to note that the Oregon University System and OHSU are exempt
from ORS 279.103, and project personnel at OHSU, OSU, WOU, U of 0 and PSU do not
have to prepare these post hoc Evaluation Reports, and so far as we were able to determine
they have not prepared them.
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3.4.6 Architects

After finding a number ofprojects on contractor's websites, the next step taken was
to search the major architecture firm's websites. This resulted in the acquisition of several
projects for a number of firms. Unfortunately, architects generally don't track the type of
infonnation that was necessary for this study, so the architect's website project information
became both a back-up for confinnation and ajumping offpoint for acquiring data.
3.4.7 Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce On-line Database

On August 15th , 2002 the Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce (DJC) granted us
unlimited and free access to their on-line database of projects which dated back to 1994
and contained more than two hundred Oregon public projects. A sample ofthe information
contained in the DJC reports is presented in Figure 14.

Construction of the Eugene Public Library
Eugene, OR, #2001-1001
Bids due: 4 pm Oct 11,2000 Extended from Oct. 4. Subs due 11 :30 am, Oct. S.
1-3 addenda
Estimated cost: $22.7 million
Owner: City of Eugene Public Works Dept, Facility Management Div, 210 Cheshire Ave, Eugene, OR
97401, 541-682-2689
Printer: Central Print & Blueprint, 47 W 5th Ave., Eugene, OR 97401,541-342-3624, fax 541-345-3286
Submittal Docs: $200 non-refundable from Owner
Bids to: Owner
Invitation #: 2001-1001
DJC Ref #: 0008290013
Bond: 10%
Notes: The bidder must be registered with the Construction Contractors Board. Sub-bidders and suppliers
may purchase documents from the printer.
Pre-Bid: Conference lOam, Sept. 13 at St. Mary's East Main Hall, 1062 Chamelton St., Eugene, are.
Scope: City Job No. 50160: Construct a 5-level, 160,000 sf library and office building, consisting of 1
level below grade parking, 3 floors of library, and 1 floor of general office space. Project includes site
work and public improvements.
Apparent Low Bidders 7 bid(s) received
John Hyland Construction, Eugene, OR jensmitMijhconst.com:
26,525,100
Robinson Construction Co., Hillsboro, OR
26,705,800
JE Dunn Construction, Portland, OR
27,004,800

Figure 14: Text from DJC database
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Many of the DJC reports contained valuable infonnation for our study, including
the name of the owner and architect, the date the project was let, the type of the project

(CMlGC or DBB), the scope of the work (typically including the square footage and type
of project - in the above case a new library), and in most cases the original bid price, award
price (if it differed from the lowest bid) and sometimes the initial GMP, if known. On
several projects the perfonnance period was given as well as infonnation on project
contacts such as phone numbers or email addresses ofthe owner, Architect or Contractor.

3.5

Data Available for the Analysis
Through all of the different sources we were able to identify over 500 public

projects, 407 of which generally fit the size and complexity criteria for this research. We
did include a few projects that were smaller than we had originally wanted to use, however
it was determined that they were all sufficiently complex enough to include in the analysis.
Of the 407 projects, we obtained some cost infonnation on 367 projects, ranging in cost42
from a $175,591 (CMlGC) fire station project to a $189,859,282 (CMlGC) airport
expansion project; totaling $5,050,962,407 of public construction between 1986 and 2002.
We were not able to get final project costs on a large number of the projects we obtained
from the DJC website, and some of the projects we obtained from architect's and
contractor's websites did not tell us what PDS was used. A summary of the 407 projects
by PDS is contained in Table 8:

These costs are adjusted to 2001 using Engineering News Record's Construction Cost Index obtained
from their website at: http://enr.construction.comlfeaturesiconEcoicostIndexes/collstIndexHist.asp .

42
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Project
Delivery
System

Number

CM/GC

136

Design-Bid
Build

191

Unknown

80

Total

407

Largest

Smallest
$175,591
1,400 SF
$663,325
4,600 SF
$223,166
11,300 SF

Number with
Unknown Financial
Information
8 with no $ data
17 missing some $ data

$189,859,282
1,000,000 SF
$112,497,017
569,000 SF
$35,211,963
$270,000 SF

2 with no $ data
89 missing some $ data
2 with no $ data
78 missing some $ data

Table 8: Summary of Oregon database Projects by PDS

Note that the final model included 215 projects, III of the 136 CMJGC jobs and
104 of the 191 DBB projects. We obtained a higher proportion of the CMJGC projects
principally because the infonnation on a large number of the DBB projects from the period
ofthe 1980's through 1995 no longer exists, as noted earlier.
A total of 71 different Construction Contractors were represented43 in the Oregon
database obtained. The top six Contractors by total sales are listed in the following table:
DBB

CMGC

Contractor
1
2
3
4
5
6

Hoffman Construction
Dunn I Drake Construction
Baugh Construction Oregon
Robinson Construction
Kirby Nagelhout
Lease Crutcher Lewis

No.

Total $

No.

Total $

Total

42
10
18
6
3
11

1,490,850,578.18
281,124,745.46
334,845,361.45
37,947,953.39
21,421,521.39
124,723,971.16

3
15
1
14
10
0

134,662,229.86
176,474,011.61
883,949.85
122,554,258.92
106,540,769.06

1,625,512,808.04
457,598,757.07
335,729,311.30
160,502,212.32
127,962,290.45
124,723,971.16

-

Table 9: Top five contractors by total sales in the Oregon database

A total of seventy different architecture finns 44 are represented in the Oregon
database, and the ten Architecture finns with the greatest number of projects in our study
are shown in the table below:

43

This number includes two Joint Ventures as separate companies from their parents.
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c

~

Architect

CJ
:E

CD
CD

CG

0

13

48

4

9

5

1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1

1
4
7

3

12
8
5
7

7
1
2
0

7
6
7

61
18
14
14
13
12
11
10
10
8

0

::)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Dull Olsen Weekes
ZGF
BOORIA
SRG Partnership
Malhum Architects
gLAs Architects
YGH
Arbuckle Costic
Soderstrom
Barber Barrett Turner

0

c
.:tt:.
c

0

c

3

~

Table 10: Architects in Oregon database

The table of architects shows that there were 106 projects where the project
architect was not known, and this was the largest single groups of projects in the database.
The firm of Dull Olsen Weekes and Associates (DOWA) provided the study with the
largest number of projects. DOWA, as they are known, specializes in school construction
and nearly all of the 61 DOWA projects are elementary, middle and high schools in
Oregon.

3.6

Adjusting the Data for the Model

In this section, we discuss how we dealt with the data and prepared for the actual
analysis.

Note that some firms have changed names over the years; we have attempted to count a firm only
once if it added or lost partners along the way. However, Joint Venture firms were counted separately
from their parent organizations consistent with our treatment of contractors.
44

111

3.6.1 Transferring the Data and Data Reduction
The process of taking the data from the Access Database and running the nlodel
was not a trivial procedure. The first step was to take all of the data and copy it into an
Excel spreadsheet; this spreadsheet was given the name "Base Data." Two data
transformations were performed on the Base Data sheet: first, a Look-up operation was
performed to inflate the "fmal billing" amount to end of the year 2001 base dollars using
construction cost index figures obtained from the ENR website. Secondly, the cost control
metric was recalculated as a cross check to make sure no calculation errors h~d taken place.
After these two operations were complete, the Base Data Sheet was generally never
touched again, except to reference.
The next step was to copy the main "Base Data" spreadsheet to a new spreadsheet
named 1st Reduction. The data was transferred from the Base Data sheet where some of
the numerical data in the Access Database transferred over as text. At this point we
corrected all text errors and architect and contractor name inconsistencies.45 All data
transferred from the Base Data Sheet to the 1st Reduction Sheet were copied and pasted
using the "Paste Special" function in Excel that allows you to transfer over only the
"values" and exclude formatting and functions.
Once the 1st Reduction sheet work was completed, it was copied into a 2nd
Reduction Sheet. This sheet was used primarily to perfonn pivot tables in order to obtain
the information shown in the tables in Section 3.5 above.

45 In some cases architecture firm "XYZ" may have included the word "Architect" or "Architect's &
Planners." Names for contractors likewise may have included the word, "Contractors," "Builders," or
"Construction Company."
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At this point another sPreadsheet was opened and named 3 Reduction. This is the
first point where we began deleting projects from the data in order to perform the analysis.
The process began with the sorting ofthe project data in ascending order by: Project Size in
Square Footage, Final Project Cost and Original BidlGMP.

Thirty projects in the

spreadsheet contained no information on any of these measures and therefore could not be
analyzed in the model. The next ninety-seven projects had no information about either
Project Size in Square Footage or Final Project Cost and were therefore eliminated at this
~

point, and eight additional projects contained no information on both final and original
costs and the schedule control metric necessitating their elimination from the spreadsheet.
Finally, fifty-nine of the remaining projects had no information on the two principal output
metrics of cost and schedule control and were therefore eliminated. This left a total of215
projects in the spreadsheet for analysis; of these, 111 were known to be CMlGC and 104
were known to be Design-Bid-Build projects.
The final step is to prepare the "DATA" spreadsheet to be used in the analysis.
This requires transforming the information contained in the 3rd Reduction sheet to fit the
input and output model described below.

3.6.2 Model Inputs
The inputs for the model include two input metrics intended to reflect the amount
of information the contractor would have at the time of preparing his price, which are %
Complete of Plans and Specifications and Total SF/(RFI + AP) issued during the course of
the work. The first metric is rather straightforward; it is simply a measure of how complete
the plans and specifications are. The second measure is intended to try and measure the
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quality of the plans and specifications. It is assumed that a poorer quality set of plans will
produce a larger number ofRFI's (for clarification sake) than a higher quality set of plans,
and also would require more Architects' Proposal (AP) requests to deal with deficiencies.
While we stand by this assumption, we acknowledge that the issuance of RFI's can
become something of a game for contractors, design professionals, and owners. RFI's can
be used in a number of ways to document problems the builders encounter in the plans and
specifications. In addition, on several projects perfonned before 1990, we found that
several Contractors did not use specific "RFI" fonns; instead they used project
correspondence, often tracked by "serial numbers" to document problems and change order
requests.
Since the assumption made earlier was that number of (RFI + AP)' s increases as
the quality of the plans and specifications decrease, we needed to find a way to express this
data so that it confonns to the model input requirements that a large number should
indicate a large resource with which to produce outputs. A small number reflects a limited
resource that inhibits the production of outputs. In addition, we observed that very large
projects would naturally have more RFI's than very small projects, and that a large project
would not be as constrained as small projects with the same number of RFI's. In order to
reflect this relative resource and constraint, we divide project size in square footage by the
sum ofthe RFI's and AP's.

3.6.3 Missing Data in Model Inputs
Missing Data in Model Inputs had to be dealt with at this stage because several
projects lacked RFI and AP data. Since that would result in a zero resource on the input
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side of the model (which would result in an infinite output/input ratio), we would have to
adjust that data in the most reasonable way possible without harming the rest of the
project's efficiency performance measurement. The most reasonable way to do this, we
concluded, was to assume that every project would have at least one RFI issued during the
course of the job, which seems a reasonable assumption, given that every project that did
include data on RFI's and AP's had at least one RFI (in fact the lowest number was 9). In
doing so, we are assuming a near perfect set of plans for the level of completeness
estimated by the project team. This would insure also that the "quality" input would not be
used by any ofthe DMU's and it was not.
For the other input, % complete of plans and specifications, 100% complete was
used as the default ifdata was missing.

3.6.4 Model Inputs That Were Not Used in the Model
The Expert Panel work, described in Section 3.2.1, resulted in six measures for
model inputs that were not used in the initial DEA model. These were scaled subjective
ratings (1-5) that attempted to evaluate the difficulty of the "construction environment"
during the course of the project. These included: skilled labor recruitment, access to the
work, owner's schedule expectations, owner's budget expectations, owner team's level of
experience, and architect's timeliness of response to issues as they occurred. Another
metric not initially used was the number of years of experience of the contractor's project
manager.
These data were obtained from the contractors with relative consistency; however,
remarkably few architects or owners ranked their projects on these metrics. This was
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probably due to the fact that few owners would know precisely what the market conditions
for labor employment were actually like and would only be able to guess at the project
manager's experience. It's likely that the owner would think his budget and schedule were
adequate regardless ofwhat the contractor thought. These missing data tended to skew the
results with an enormous amount ofmissing data.

3.6.5 Model Outputs
The basic model outputs were consistently agreed upon by all of the stakeholders in
the Expert Panel: Financial Performance (both budget and profit), Schedule Performance,
Quality of the Work (workmanship, disputes, and fmalizing construction), Minority
Participation, Project Safety, and Satisfaction of the Project Participants. They are similar
to the measures used by Sanvido, Konchar and the

crr [75, 76,

126, 182, 183], although

modified for the DEA model.
Some, like Ruskin [176], have proposed an "earned value" metric; however, while
this is a recognized tool for tracking the project performance, it provides no advantage over
the metrics used here for post project performance derived by the Expert Panel or as used
by the crr supported studies (cited above.)
Note again that for the DEA model, outputs are considered "goods" whereas inputs
can be considered "bads" in the sense that increasing these will either make the efficiency
score increase (good) or decrease (bad). Therefore, the input and output metrics had to be
mathematically arranged to reflect this arrangement. For example, the metric used in the
model for project budget and schedule performance are "cost control" and "schedule
control" instead of the more common reciprocals: cost and schedule over-run. TIlls is
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because if we were to use cost or schedule over-run as an output, the more the cost and
schedule exceeded the contract cost and schedule requirements, the better. Obviously, this
is counter to the goals of a project (to reward the project for being more over budget)!
Therefore, the metric used for budget performance: cost control, is equal to: (Original
Contract Cost)/(Actual Amount Paid).

A similar formulation is made for schedule

performance or control. Alternatively, profit is the reciprocal, that is, the more profit the
better, so the profit metric is equal to: (Actual Profit)/(Contract or Bid Profit.)

3.7

Output Metric Two-dimensional Plot

One example that is commonly used to explain the DEA and frontier analysis
generally is to plot the results in a two dimensional scatter plot. This can easily be done in
cases where there are either no inputs or one single input for the DMUs and two outputs as
shown in Figure 15.
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Output Metric Plot
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Figure 15: Two Dimensional Scatter Plot of the Output Metrics from the Oregon Database

If there were no inputs, and the only outputs were schedule control and budget
control, then the envelopment of this data, shown as a dashed line above, would give us an
efficiency frontier, and the technical efficiencies of the projects would be calculated as the
relative distance from the origin to that frontier. From the plot, it appears that the minimum
efficiency would be in the range of 0.70 or 700/0, Again, however, the important thing to
note is that the data is not broadly distributed, but instead it is rather tightly grouped around
the 1.0, 1.0 intersection. In fact, only just slightly more than 13% (29/218) of the projects
with non-zero data points fall outside of plus or minus 20% of the 1.0 measure in either
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direction. If DEA had been run using this data, it appears that just three projects would
form the efficiency frontier, but the model used in this research does include inputs and
additional outputs to consider.
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4

Data Analysis
This chapter presents the data analysis used to answer the first three research

questions regarding project perfonnance, project efficiency and benchmarking.

The

objective in this section is to detennine, through quantitative methods, if the public policy
that allows public agencies to select construction contractors on the basis of past
perfonnance instead of lowest responsible bid should be continued and to detennine if
there are "best practice" applications ofthe two PDS' s.
The DEA model was analyzed using the EMS software developed by Holger
Scheel (Version 1.3 2000-08-15). This program uses an Excel spreadsheet to store the
input and output data, which greatly facilitated the data processing.
4.1

Project Performance Statistical Analyses
Project perfonnance is analyzed using the principal output statistics cost and

schedule control. Here we test the hypotheses:

HA1 : Negotiated Procurement, Construction Manager/General
Contractor (CM/GC) method of Project Delivery System (PDS)
results in projects that outperform the traditional Design-Bid
Build (DBB) PDS method on cost and schedule control metrics.
H0 1: There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB
projects with respect to cost and schedule control metrics.

Figure 16 is a single frequency histogram of the output metric Budget
Perfonnance, which we defined above as the total final cost divided by the initial bid or
contract guaranteed maximum price. Note the average Budget Perfonnance is 0.947, with
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a standard deviation of 0.07. The figure indicates that the data is generally well distributed
with one outlier at the extreme left-hand side of the figure.
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Figure 16: Budget Performance Metric Histogram
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Figure 17: Schedule Performance Metric Histogram
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Figure 17 is a single frequency histogram of the Schedule Perfonnance metric,
which indicates a much broader distribution than the Budget Perfonnance metric. This
stands to reason because time is a more available resource than money in most situations,
and exceeding planned perfonnance time is more likely and less costly than exceeding the
project financial resources. It's far more likely to allow a project to run longer by 100% of
the original schedule, resulting in a Schedule Perfonnance Metric of 0.50, than increase by
double the cost. An increase in total cost of double would in fact only occur in projects that
undergo a "Cardinal Change46" and therefore, by definition, the original contract value is
irrelevant because it does not reflect the intent ofthe contracting parties.

4.1.1 Population Independence
The principle purpose of this research was to determine if the different project
delivery systems resulted in better projects based on certain output metrics as determined
by the Expert Panel.

Project Delivery
System
Budget Control: DBB
CM/GC

Schedule Control: DBB
CM/GC

N

Mean

101
112
97
102

0.9382
0.9541
0.9400
0.9310

Std
Deviation
0.0766
0.0718
0.1293
0.1321

t-value
p
1.686
0.093
0.451
0.653

Table 11: Group Statistics for the Oregon database47

A Cardinal Change, in construction contract law, is a change that exceeds the magnitude or limits
allowed by the contract or implied warranties, thereby allowing the contractor to seek compensation on
the basis of "quantum meruit" or the "value of the work" provided [71]
47 The reader will note that the numbers of cases are not the same for each Metric; this is due to the fact
that some information is missing in some of the cases and zeros have been omitted from this statistical
analysis. In the case of the DEA analysis that follows, zeros are included in the output measure.

46
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Table 11 above presents the Group Statistics for the two populations: DBB and
CMJGC projects. What this analysis tells us is that while there are differences in the
population, they are slight and not statistically significant. The important thing to note here
is how little variance there is in the principal output metrics.

4.1.2 Validation and Comparisons with Other Studies
In this section the statistical analysis of the principal output metrics from this study

are compared with the other studies identified in Chapter 2, principally: [75, 99, 183] and
the

crr Benchmarking Study update.

In order to do this, we convert the data into the

format used by the other studies.48 A summary ofthe studies is given below in Table 15.

Note that for the purposes of the DEA analysis this study used cost and schedule control, defined as
the planned divided by the actual performance. In the en studies, the statistic used was [(actual
planned)/planned] *100, which gives a % difference (increase or decrease) from the planned
performance.

48
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Study

i

Oregon Database
Washington Data
[99]
OreQon Database
CII [183]

Number of
Projects
Total:
(CM/GC  DBB)
215 (111-104)
16(16-0)

215 (111-104)
176 (72  104)50

5.35
7.19

215 (combined)
26 (unknown)

Cost
SO

Schedule
SO

Cost
SO

Mean

Mean

8.14
7.09

10.46

22.18

N/A

N/A

Mean

I

Schedule
SO

Mean

7.77

14.6

9.40

22.37

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Median49

Median

Median

Median

4.00
3.37

0.00
0.00

4.90
4.83

0.00
4.44

All Projects
Cost
Schedule
SO
Mean
Median

Cost
Mean SO
Oregon Database
CII Benchmarking
Study [511

DBB

CM/GC

5.88
7.9

7.49
10.4

9.98
4.9

22.24
11.0

4.9
7.2

Schedule
Median

0.00
2.9

Table 12: Summary comparison of different study results on the common project performance
metrics cost growth and schedule growth, given in percentages.

Table 15 is a summary ofthe Oregon database results transfonned from the metrics
used in this study to the metrics used in the

crr and state of Washington studies on PDS

perfonnance. The comparisons reveal that the Oregon database results are substantially
similar to the earlier studies. As we noted in Chapter 1, the only metric comparison whose
difference is greater than 5% is the comparison between the schedule perfonnance in the

err Benchmarking Study [51] (which included only 26 projects) and the Oregon database
on schedule perfonnance.

However, the standard deviations of both populations is

significantly larger than the difference in the means (cr ~ 11 % in the

err data and 22% in

the Oregon database) .. It is interesting to note the difference in the mean and median
schedule perfonnance metrics in the comparison of the

en Benchmarking data and the

In [183] reported the Median and not the Mean for both cost and schedule increase; data from the
Oregon Database is presented likewise for comparison.
50 There were 315 projects total in the CII study ([183] at p. 68), but only 176 of those were DBB or
CM/GC, 44% (139) of their projects were Design-Build. The ClI Study does not break down the data
by project type, e.g.: buildings as opposed to bridges or chemical/industrial plants.
49
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Oregon database. While the means are slightly more than 5% apart (4.9% compared to
9.98%), the medians are a lot closer; just under 3% apart (2.9% compared to 0%).

It is

also interesting to note that the Oregon database has a higher mean but lower median than
the

crr data.

This is due, of course, to the large number of "on-time" projects (a lot of

which are schools) in the Oregon database (and there are no schools in the ClI data.).
Sanvido and Konchar state in both [183] and [75] that they used the median
measure because it would reduce the impact of outliers in the data, and we see here that
their concerns are at least partly borne out. Of course, the problem with using the median,
as discussed earlier, is the fact that it does not reveal much about the population, such as the
variance of the

da~

whlch is very important to project owners. While it is helpful to have

a median cost growth of zero, if the variance is very great, the actual probability of
realizing zero cost growth may be quite small and the risk of going greatly over budget or
under budget may be quite high.51
The comparisons with the other studies in the literature validate the Oregon
database results and data collected.

4.1.3 Study Results on Schedule Performance
In this and the following section the project output statistics are given in graphical
box-plots in order to visually compare the different studies.

This research project is

51 For example, assume that there are 101 projects in the database, 50 achieve cost growth of minus 5%,
one has cost growth of 0% and 50 have a cost growth of 100%. The median of this data is 0% cost
growth; however, the likelihood that the owner will achieve 0% growth is less than 1%, while his
likelihood of having his costs less by5% are slightly less than 50%, and the likelihood of his costs
increasing 100% are likewise approximately 50%. In fact, the owner's expected increase is not 0%, but
rather a 47% increase in cost.
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presented first, followed by [183], and [51], which does not present the data by PDS, but
nevertheless is useful infonnation for comparison.

PDS Type

N

DBB

96
102

CM/GC

Mean
9.4%

Std. Deviation
22.37%
22.18%

10.46%

Median
0.00
0.00

Table 13: Oregon database mean, SD and median for Schedule Performance over-run% the
metric used in the CII studies for comparison purposes

Note that Table 13 indicates that there is schedule perfonnance data missing for
some projects in the Oregon database as was discussed earlier, in Chapter 3.
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Project Schedule Growth
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Figure 19: Project Schedule Growth from ell Benchmarking Study (51). Note here that
Schedule Growth is given as a decimal, not a 0/0 , and represents all projects in the
study, regardless of I PDS

The scales ofthe graphical representations are clearly not similar, and therefore it is
difficult to make direct comparisons; however, the output graphics and descriptive statistics
do provide valuable infonnation about schedule growth. The Oregon database results
collected for this research indicate a mean schedule growth for CMlGC of 10.46% and
9.4% for DBB. These figures cannot be compared directly with any of the other studies,
since none of the other studies reported mean and standard deviation data by PDS.
However, when CMlGC and DBB jobs are combined, the overall project schedule increase
of 9.940/0 with a standard deviation of 22.24% compares with the cn Benchmarking study
[51] for all domestic building projects, which indicates a 4.9% mean schedule growth with
a standard deviation of 11 %, on a population that was a small fraction of the sample size
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data collected for this research. Given the data from the
possible to reject the hypothesis that the

en study [51], it would not be

en Benchmarking Report data was drawn from

the same population as this research.
The median schedule growth reported by the en in [183] of 0.0% for eMlGC and
4.44% for DBB compares with 0.0% for eMlGC and 0.00% for DBB from the Oregon
database. One possible reason for the difference may be the popUlations themselves. In
the Oregon database, the DBB jobs include a large portion of school buildings that, for the
most part, opened on time. Approximately 55% of the DBB jobs in the Oregon database
reported 0.0% schedule increase. In the eMlGC projects 47% of the jobs reported 0.0%
schedule growth. With such a large proportion of "on-time" jobs, it is unlikely that the
median would be anything other than 0.00/0. But, as discussed above, the project owner is
not necessarily as concerned with the median ofthe popUlation data as she may be with the
variance in the popUlation and the expected value and probability of going over budget and
beyond the project's contractual schedule requirements, because that represents the project
risk that has to be taken into consideration when the contract for construction is signed. It
should be noted also that the Oregon database includes some extreme outliers in the
schedule performance metric in both the eMlGC and DBB populations; that does not
appear to be the case in the en studies.
When the Oregon database results for schedule growth are plotted in a Box &
Whisker plot using the mean, standard deviation and 95%, instead of the median, 25%,
75%, and maximum range of the data, the two popUlations are hardly distinguishable from
one another. Furthermore, the graphical effect ofthe outliers is greatly ameliorated.
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Box & Whisker Plot: CILSCH
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Figure 20: Box & Whisker Plot of the Oregon database using the CII study metric % Schedule
Growth, graphing the Mean, Standard Deviation, and 95% data ranges

4.1.4 Study Results on Cost Performance
In order to compare data from this research study with that of the Cll, the data was
converted to percent increase ([Final Cost-Original Cost]/Original Cost).

The group

statistics results from this study are given in Table 14 below.

PDS Type

N

DBB

100
110

CM/GC

Mean
7.77%

5.35%

Std. Deviation
14.6%
8.13%

Median
4.00
5.00

Table 14: Oregon database mean, standard deviation and median for Cost Performance
over-run%, the metric used in the CII studies for comparison purposes
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When the same metrics the

cn studies [75, 76,

183] are used to compare budget

perfonnance, the CMlGC projects show a 5.35% increase on average, whereas the DBB
projects realize a 7.77% increase, but the difference is not significant.
A comparison ofthe box plot Figure 21 from this research actually shows that while
the mean of the CMlGC projects is slightly lower, the DBB project data is more compact
than the CMlGC data; however, DBB appears to include more extreme outlier cases than

CMlGC, which represents greater expected risk as noted earlier.
Box & Whisker Plot: CILBLID
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Figure 21: Box and whisker plots of the Oregon database results using the CII cost performance
metric, Cost Growth as actual/expected, for comparison with the CII results

Figure 21, compares to the % Cost Growth Box Plot found in [75, 183] from the

Cll, here Figure 22:
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Also, the CII Benchmarking Study BMM2001-1 [51] analysis for all domestic
building projects without regard to PDS is given below in Figure 23:

Project Cost Growth
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The

crr

Benchmarking study [51] for all domestic buildings, regardless of the

PDS, has a mean schedule growth of 7.90/0 with a standard deviation of 10.4% and a
median of 7.2%; however, this part of the crr study included only 29 projects. The results
from Goldblatt and Septelka [99] for CMlGC projects is found in Appendix E; again, as
with the crr Benchmarking study, [99] had a very small sample population. Nevertheless,
a similar mean cost growth of 7.19% and Standard Deviation of 7.10% was recorded. This
data is presented graphically in Figure 24.
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Figure 24: Box Plot of Cost Growth from the Washington data in [99]

4.1.5 Summary of the Comparisons

In order to make direct comparisons between the Oregon Research Data, the

crr

studies [51, 75, 183], and Washington state report [99], the data from this study had to be
transformed into consistent measures.

When this was accomplished, a comparison
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between the different studies could be made.

A summary of those comparisons is

presented in Table 15.
The most striking observation from these comparisons is how similar the results of
the different studies actually are. The only significant difference is the median schedule
growth reported in [183] of 4.44% compared with the Oregon database, which yielded a
median of 0.00%. However, as pointed out above, the Oregon database was exclusively
public buildings, whereas [183] was heavily weighted toward industrial projects. In the cn
Benchmarking Study [51], where the comparable data was found to be construction
contractor reported and domestic building data, the study used only 31 projects (although
not all 31 projects were used in each analysis,) where this research collected data on nearly
seven times that amount. Nevertheless, the differences in the project data analyses are not
significantly different.
The most interesting observation is that in spite of the fact that these data analyses
are not significantly different, the

cn [183]

found that the CMlOC PDS delivers projects

faster and controls growth better than the DBB PDS claim that is then repeated in [76].

4.1.6 Results of the Analysis

Research Question 1

The analysis shows that we reject the hypothesis that CMlGC projects out-perfonn
DBB projects on schedule and cost control metrics. However, a valid interpretation of this
analysis is that the CMlOC is not better than DBB, but it likewise is no worse, and that the
public pays no additional price in tenns of cost and schedule growth for starting a project
earlier by using CMlGC. But the analysis does call into question the public policy that
requires CMlGC projects to provide the public with "substantial cost savings."
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4.2

Research Question 2: Efficiency Analysis
The scatter plot presented in Figure 15 is a useful representation of project

outcomes when inputs are not considered. Our research was intended to consider both
inputs and outputs. However, the important thing to note from Figure 15, and from out
statistical analysis presented above, is that the project outputs are not dramatically
dissimilar. In fact, while there is quite a range of outputs, particularly in the schedule
perfonnance metric, the vast majority of the projects had perfonnance outputs that were
substantially similar, with few truly outstanding and few truly horrible projects and no
standout or single dominate project. Even those projects that did poorly on one of the two
metrics appear to have made up for it in the other
In this section we seek to detennine if, when both inputs and outputs are

considered, CMlGC projects are more efficient than DBB projects. To do this we test the
hypotheses:

HA2 : CM/GC projects are more efficient than DBB projects,
where efficiency is defined by a DEA model that considers both
inputs and outputs from the construction process model.

Ho 2 : There is no significant difference between CM/GC and DBB
projects with respect to efficiency scores where efficiency is
determined by a DEA model that considers both inputs and
outputs from the construction process model.

4.2.1 Initial DEA Model Analysis (CRS and VRS Models)
The nonnal method for evaluating DMUs in DEA is by application of either a
Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) model or a Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) model.
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These models have been used throughout the literature and applied in a number of different
industries and economic sectors. However, neither the traditional CRS or VRS models is
well suited to the evaluation of the data set in this research. This is because of the peculiar
fact that the inputs vary so substantially but the outputs do not, which is the distinctly non
linear relationship between inputs and outputs in the mode.

Traditionally, when a

researcher wanted to evaluate a data set of DMUs with extreme differences in input and
output metric values such as comparing grocery stores and including mini-marts,
traditional mainstream stores, and warehouse stores in the same data set, the researcher
would apply a VRS model; however, this would not work in our case because it is a
distinctly different type ofnon-linear relationship.52
To check this assumption, we ran the VRS model which resulted in only 130 of
215 total projects with greater than 50% efficiency scores, and 48 of215 with better than
90% efficiency score is depicted in Figure 25 below. These results do not correspond to
either the results of the statistical analysis (Table 11 above) or the output scatter plot
depicted in Figure 15, nor do they match the perception of the Expert Panel Members who
uniformly maintained that, except in rare cases, projects should fall within a narrow range
ofresults.

52 In the grocery store example the mini-mart has small inputs and small outputs, the warehouse store
has large inputs and large outputs. However in this research we have projects with small inputs and
medium outputs and those with large inputs and medium outputs.
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VRS DEA Scores
120.00% . , . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

100.00%

80.00%

60.00%

40.00%

20.00%

0.00%
1

9

17

25

33

41

49

57

55

73

81

89

97 105 113 121 129 137 145 153 161 169 177 185 193201 209

Figure 25: VRS DEA Scores - Base model with efficiency score on the Y axis and projects
plotted on the X axis.53

It is probably intuitive, but the results of a CRS model are even worse than the
VRS model. The CRS model resulted in only 16 of 215 projects with efficiency scores
above 90% and only 87 of 215 with scores better than 50%. It should be obvious from
these

result~

that the application of either a CRS or VRS model without significant

modification does not shed any light on the analysis of this construction project data.

4.2.2 Modifying the DEA Model for the Non-linear Construction Project
Information Data
It is apparent why the VRS and CRS models result in the distribution of scores as
they do; it is because the outputs lay within a rather narrow range and the inputs vary from

53 Note that in order to produce this histogram the output oriented DEA scores in the VRS model had to
be inverted.
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0.25 to 1.0 (or 25% to 1000/0 complete plans and specifications). Nearly all of the projects
with plans and specifications of 100% complete will have efficiency scores below 50% 
which is exactly what happens in this model. The problem comes in the evaluation of
those input metrics.

Recall that above we stated that there is no fixed standard for

evaluating percentage complete, and the method we used was simply to ask the various
parties to assign a number based on their past experience. This results in extreme non
linear relationships between the principal inputs and outputs.

While there is basic

agreement that "conceptual design," is less complete in terms of "0/0 complete plans and
specifications" metric than "schematic design" or "preliminary design" the precise
estimates of these values varies. In other words, what one project manager means by 25%
complete may be considered 35 or 40% complete by another.
The generic economic production model used in the Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) methodology assumes a linear relationship between inputs and outputs even though
we are unaware of precisely how those inputs are converted to outputs. The VRS model
allows for economic comparisons among a relatively narrow range; however, the basic
assumption that underlies the formulation remains the linear relationship between inputs
and outputs, and the VRS model does not handle problems where there are extreme non
linear relationships between inputs and outputS. 54
There are a number of commercial institutions where the economic transactions
can be characterized by non-linear relationships between inputs and outputs

in particular,

54 Some have suggested transforming the data using logarithms or other methods, but these
transformation methods would require a strong theoretical foundation and none is known for this
situation.
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those where there are limiting boundaries for either measure or endogenous effects that
cannot be fully captured. This is particularly true with professional services where input
resources like "information" and output measures "time" and "cost" have definite fixed
boundaries. One example is weather prediction. Given very little information such as the
desired location and having some idea of the historical climate, it is easy to predict the
weather at the location within a given range. For example, we can say that the temperature
in Portland, Oregon tomorrow will range between 50 Fahrenheit and 1050 F. We can say
this no matter what the time of the year that the most extreme temperatures ever recorded
in Portland fall within these boundaries. With a little more information, such as the day of
the year requested, we can narrow that range significantly. But no matter how much
money we invest, we know that we cannot exactly predict the weather six months from
now.

Therefore, there is a distinctly non-linear relationship between the amount of

information paid for and obtained as an input, and the accuracy of the prediction of the
weather as an output.
The same relationship can be said to be true in the construction sector of the
economy. Since we know that the cost of construction is finite and exists within some
approximate range, say between $10 and $500 per square foot, a very broad estimate on
any building project can be made with little or no information. The amount of information
collected by the owner and transmitted to the contractor narrows the range of costs
considerably, but more information simply cannot eliminate the variability or range
entirely, in part because the building environment exists in nature, the state ofwhich cannot
be reliably predicted well out into the future. The question many owners want answered is,
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"how much infonnation should I pay for in order to reduce the uncertainty in the pricing
and how much infonnation is simply a waste of resources, given a limited budget?"
It is also important to note that the analysis set forth in Table 11 and described in

Figure 15 supports Kagel and Levin's point [118], and our conclusion that the amount of
actual "Infonnation" provided is not fully captured by the metric "% complete plans and
specifications" in spite of the fact that the Expert Panel recommended it. This is because
the metric fails to take into account the economic reality of the industry and the amount of
training and experience of the estimators and managers of the construction companies
involved, which is substantiaf5. This is perhaps better visualized in the Process Model
suggested by Figure 26.

Owner Provided
Information Inputs
Plans & Specifications

Figure 26: DEA Model revised to reflect the Construction Industry setting where the amount of
information provided by the owner is greatly complimented by the contractor's own
knowledge and experience

55 One reason for limiting the projects to a certain size, larger than $5 million, was because we knew
that only construction firms with substantial resources and experience can qualify for Miller Act,
perfonnance and payment bonds, for that size of work.
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We know both from our own study and from industry standards that the cost per
square foot of public buildings of virtually all types resides within a relatively small range.
For example, RS Means Building Construction Cost Data estimating guide provides a
section that provides per square foot cost estimates for approximately sixty different type
buildings from apartments to warehouses. This data includes estimates at the 25 percentile,
median and 75 percentile ranges. Furthermore, while these data are determined by national
averages, the guide also provides regional indexes to convert the average costs to a cost for
a specific area. Portland, Oregon, for example, has a weighted average of about 1.06 times
the national cost average for buildings, according to Means [212].
Armed with a commonly available estimating guide and experience in the local
construction market, it is possible, easy in fact, for a construction estimator to narrow the
range of possible costs far tighter than an input of 25% to 1000/0 would imply. So, for the
purposes of a DEA model, is it possible to account for this base of knowledge that is an
additional "resource" (or enhances the Information provided resource) that results in
"production" from the model?

And the answer to that question is, probably, though

probably not to a level of certainty that makes the evaluation meaningful. Also, while we
did collect data on the different construction companies, none of the data we collected as a
proxy for experience (including number of years in business, bonding capacity, project

team experience and so on) could be reliably tied to a single input metric for "knowledge"
that would differ significantly from company to company. This, again, would make the
input meaningless (if, for example, all the companies had the same input value).
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In situations where the inputs and outputs are not directly linearly related and the
exact relationship is unknown or not captured by known inputs, a possible approach would
be to apply a "categorical" variable model. If applied here that would mean that projects
for which only "conceptual design" has been completed would not compete directly with
projects that have complete or "final design" complete jobs. They would only compete
with other projects that have projects whose plans and specifications are similarly in the
conceptual phase. However, that would render meaningless the point of this research,
which is in part to compare the PDS by outcome against one another and determine if one
type is significantly superior to the other.
Another possible approach would be to use ordinal categorical values, such as A >
B > C, where all members of category A are compared against both the members of
category A, and also category B and C. Merrlbers of category B would only be compared
against members ofB and C, and members ofC are compared only against themselves.
The decision was made to apply a modified ordinal categorical model using
successive data sets that included: 1) all project data; 2) only projects with higher than 40%
complete plans and specifications; 3) only projects with higher than 75% complete plans
and specifications; and finally, 4) only projects with higher than 95% plans and
specifications (in other words, only those that had the design complete).
This process can be visualized as in Figure 27 below:
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Figure 27: Conceptual structure of the modified ordinal categorical DEA model, where DEA
scores for concept design are derived in a comparison against all categories, schematic
design projects are compared against only schematic, preliminary and final design
category members, preliminary design members are compared against preliminary
and final design category members, and final design category members derive their
DEA scores in a comparison solely within the final design category members.

In the first run of the model, the "conceptual design" projects actually compete
against all other projects for their technical efficiency scores and once these scores have
been detennined the "conceptual design" projects are dropped from further analysis. In the
next rOlUld, "schematic design" level projects compete with all of the remaining projects in
the Oregon database for their technical efficiency scores. Once they have been detennined,
these projects are removed from the model and the process is repeated for the "preliminary
design" level projects. Finally, the only projects that are left are the "final design" level
projects, which compete only against themselves for their technical efficiency scores.
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The controlling direction of the analysis was guided by state statute. In Oregon, as
nearly every other state, on public building projects, the state gives priority to open public
bidding and discourages closed negotiated procurements except when it can be shown to be
a substantial benefit to the public. The relevant portions of the particular Oregon statute,
ORS 270.015 are as follows:

279.015 Competitive bidding; exceptions; exemptions. (1) Subject to
the policies and provisions of ORS 279.005 and 279.007, all public
contracts shall be based upon competitive bids or proposals except:
(2) Subject to subsection (6)(b) of this section, the Director of the
Oregon Department of Administrative Services or a local contract
review board may exempt certain public contracts or classes of public
contracts from the competitive bidding requirements of subsection (1) of
this section upon approval of the following findings submitted by the
public contracting agency seeking the exemption:
(b) The awarding of public contracts pursuant to the exemption
will result in substantial cost savings to the public contracting
agency. In making such finding, the director or board may consider the
type, cost, amount of the contract, number of persons available to bid
and such other factors as may be deemed appropriate.

(3)(a) Before final adoption of the findings required by subsection (2) of
this section exempting a contract for a public improvement from the
requirement of competitive bidding, a public agency shall hold a public
hearing.

It is clear from these sections of the statute that the Oregon Legislature intended to

make the option of exempting from bidding and negotiating public building contracts a
difficult and well reasoned alternative to open competitive public bidding, but certainly an
option. Since the state has established the baseline PDS to be DBB, then the negotiated
procurements, the CMlGC projects, must be considered the "challenger." Therefore, the
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challenger, which is disfavored in the statute, has the burden to show it is superior against
the baseline, whereas the baseline has no such burden. It is reasonable to argue that this
being the case, there is no need to evaluate the different levels of information in terms of
the Percent Complete metric, rather, simply run all CMlGC jobs categorically against all
competitors, and then run only the DBB projects to establish their efficiency scores. While
this obviously can be done, we wanted a finer break-out from the analysis.

4.2.3 Results from the Modified DEA Model
We did not recode the existing computer software, but instead the Modified DEA
Model was run using EMS® Software from project data, stored in an Excel® spreadsheet.
Four passes were made on the data each using a Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) input
oriented model as described above. (We note that the proper theoretical model for this
application is the output oriented DEA model, however we used the input oriented model
for ease in reporting the efficiency scores. Since we used the CRS model (in absence of
weight restrictions), we can make use of the fact that the DEA scores in the input and
output oriented CRS formulations are merely reciprocals of each other [64] and provide the
same results. By using the input oriented model, we simply save one step ofcalculations.)
The results of this process are depicted in Figure 28 below:
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Modified Model Efficiency Scores
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Figure 28: Modified Model Efficiency Scores

The DEA efficiency scores from the Modified model range from approximately
67% to 100% and have an arithmetic mean of 91.52%56 and a standard deviation of 7.76%

•

Also shown is a single frequency histogram of the DEA efficiency scores from the
Modified Model, presented in Figure 29.

56 DEA scores are known to be non-normally distributed bounded by: 0.0 and 1.0; however, both the
arithmetic mean and the standard deviation do provide us with valuable information about the
distribution of the DEA data,
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Figure 29: Histogram of all DEA efficiency Scores from the Modified Model reflects a common
DEA distribution, a relatively continuous distribution with a local maximum, above at
about 920/0, and a large number of 100% efficient DMUs at the far right.

The results obtained by the Modified Model are more consistent with the Expert
Panel's intuitive understanding of construction project performance than the results
obtained in the earlier DEA models depicted in Figure 25. Fifty-seven of the 215 projects
in the final data set were determined to be 100% efficient, and 140 projects scored 90% or
higher.

4.2.4 Model Verification
To verify that the DEA model could be used to analyze construction projects in the
manner prescribed by this research, we reviewed projects that were both rated highly
efficient and those rated inefficient to determine if these ratings accurately reflect the
project performance. (We did not review each and every one of the projects.) Verification
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was accomplished in several steps, and these included using super-efficiency methods and
analysis to the comparators to explore project dominance in the peer groups. (See [226] for
a discussion on Super Efficiency on page 217.)

The analysis of comparators is

accomplished by reviewing, what the EMS software tenns as ''benchmarks,'' the efficient
DMUs, which all inefficient DMUs are compared to and all virtual DMUs are constructed
from. The super efficiency method was helpful in "debugging" the initial model runs and
finding data that was suspect. (Most importantly was dealing with missing data on the
input side of the model for specific projects.) In the final analysis, the super efficiency of
the most-used benchmark project was 1580/0, and the highest super-efficiency score was
3090/0 on a project that was used by 49 others as a benchmark. The latter project earned a
high-quality output score while starting with project information at 40%.
Of the DBB project data, the top five efficient projects were used as benchmarks in
the following order: 95, 72, 26, 18, and 9 times by the inefficient projects. The top two
jobs were used as benchmarks significantly more often than any others. These jobs were a
new construction higher education building and a remodel of another higher education
facility. The former project completed on time and was under the original bid amount,
while the remodel project experienced both cost and schedule growth but achieved a low
cost per square foot in spite ofhaving a low input level and quality ofinformation.
The CMlGC projects had a more efficient project than DBB, and the distribution of
comparators or benchmarks was found to be more dispersed.

The top five efficient

projects were used as benchmarks for the following number of projects: 176, 154, 137,85,
81 and 76. The first project was a new high school project with both the architect and
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contractor estimating the plans and specifications to be no more than 15% complete at the
time the GMP was agreed upon. While the project incurred significant cost growth, the
project was completed within the contract period, opening in time for the school year to
begin. The second project was a new corrections facility that started with 75% complete
plans and specifications and finished on time, on budget and earned the contractor his
expected fee.
The reason the CMlGC jobs are used as benchmarks by 176 and 154 projects, as
opposed to 95 and 72 for DBB jobs, is due to the way the modified model was constructed.
Most DBB projects were started after final design was complete and therefore their
benchmarks were established principally using only other DBB projects, whereas most
CMlGC projects were compared against all 215 projects in the data set.

The lowest rated projects among both the CMlGC and DBB jobs were those that
either had missing data, thus reducing the number of pathways to the efficiency frontier, or
were at the high end of the amount of information (input) in their peer group, an aspect of
non-linearity that we were not completely able to eliminate. (However, this drawback
would not affect the outcome ofthe analysis as demonstrated in the following section.)
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that the modified model adequately
reflects the building construction environment, and the model scores can be used to
compare the performance of the PDS' s.

4.2.5 Evaluating the Project Delivery Systems
The next step in our analysis was to evaluate the two project delivery systems,
DBB and CMlGC based on their DEA technical efficiency scores. This was done by
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applying nonnal statistical methods, reserving, of course, the same caveats about statistical
analysis of DEA score distributions that was previously discussed.

Both the group

statistics and the tests for independence are presented in Table 15 and Table 16
respectively.
PDS

N

Mean

Std. Dev

CMGC

111

92.50%

8.59%

DBB

104

90.48%

6.64%

Table 15: Group Statistics of DEA Scores from the Modified Model

Note from the analysis in Table 15 the difference between the means of the two
populations is just over 2%, with CMlGC projects having a slightly higher mean technical
efficiency score.

However, Table 16 below indicates that the difference in the two

populations is not quite statistically significant at the 95% level (although it is quite close
with p = 0.056).

Score:
Equal
Var.
Assm'd
Score:
Equal
Var.
not
Assm'd

Levene's
Test for
Equality of
Variances
Sig.
F

t-test for Equality of Means

t.

df

Sig
(2-tail)

Mean
Diff

Std
Error
Diff

9.89 0.002

1.92

213

0.056

2.020/0

1.050/0

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Upper Lower
-.052%
4.10 %

1.93

205.7

0.054

2.020/0

1.04%,

-.0360/0

4.08%

Table 16: Test for Independent Populations for PDS based on DEA Scores from the Modified
Model
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This statistical analysis of the DEA scores gives similar results as that produced on
the base output data analysis presented in Table 11. That is, in spite ofthe fact the CM/OC
negotiated procurements have a slightly higher average, the difference between CM/OC
and DBB is not statistically significant in terms ofDEA scores from the modified model.
One interesting note is that the CM/OC projects have a greater range in efficiency
scores than the DBB jobs. Levene's test for equality of variances shown in Table 16 finds
that the variances, and therefore the standard deviations ofCM/OC and DBB projects, are
significantly different. These results indicate that while the means may not be statistically
different, the CM/OC projects n1ay pose the greater risk in terms of cost and schedule
growth. It also indicates the owner has a greater range ofpossible project savings.
4.2.6 Nonparametric Methods of Comparison

Since DEA is a non-parametric method and the DEA scores are distinctly not
normally distributed, another way of evaluating any difference in the two populations is to
actually look at the distributions and apply non-parametric techniques. Observing these
two populations

~e

note that the CM/OC projects have a higher proportion of 100%

efficient projects than do the DBB jobs. In fact, 41 of 111 CM/OC projects were
determined to be 100% efficient, whereas only 15 of the 104 DBB jobs were determined to
be 100% efficient. However, this difference becomes less distinct when you compare all
projects with 90% or better efficiency scores; in that case, 64 of the 104 DBB jobs scored
better than 90% efficient, while 74 of the 111 CM/OC projects scored 90% or better. And,
on the other end of the spectrum, six of the 111 CM/OC projects scored less than 75%
efficient, whereas only one of the DBB jobs scored lower than 75%. This is probably due
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to the fact that infonnation provided in the DBB projects is more consistent (since nearly
all DBB jobs have 100% complete plans and specifications), whereas the CMlGC
population of projects have a broad variation in the amount of infonnation (ranging from
15% to 1000/0 complete plans and specifications).
Section 2.14 discusses different types of nonparametric statistical methods for
evaluating populations that, like DEA scores, are not nonnally distributed. One of those
tests is the Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon tests (which give the same results through two
different methods).

PDS
DBB
CM/GC
Total

N
104
111
215

Mean Rank

Sum of Ranks

95.86
119.47

9959.00
13261.00

Table 17: Mann-Whitney Nonparametric Rank Method Analysis

The test statistic Z of -2.82 and level of significance at 0.005 indicates that the
DEA scores are not from the same population, and in this case the difference is significant.
The DBB projects have a lower rank, but in this case, since the DEA technical efficiency
scores range from 1.0 down, it means that the CMlGC projects in fact have a higher mean
technical efficiency score, which is better. From this analysis, we can state that the CMlGC
projects have a higher mean technical efficiency score, and that the difference is
statistically significant.
In summary, the nonparametric analysis of the DEA technical efficiency scores

results in a statistically significant difference between the two populations, whereas the
nonnal parametric Wlvariate statistical analysis did not. Since the DEA technical efficiency
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scores are distinctly non-normal, the nonparametric analysis is more appropriate. From the
nonparan1etric analysis, it can be said with some confidence that the CMlOC projects
achieve higher DEA technical efficiency scores than DBB projects, and that the difference
is statistically significant.

4.2.7 Results of the Analysis Research Question #2
Using non-parametric analysis to test the hypothesis:

HA2 : Negotiated Procurement, Construction Manager/General
Contractor (CM/GC) method of Project Delivery System (PDS)
outperforms the traditional Design-Bid-Build (DBB) PDS method.

We cannot reject the hypothesis that the CMlOC projects outperform the traditional
DBB PDS method projects in terms of overall project technical efficiency. However, one
question that remains is, if the CMlOC projects do not outperform the DBB jobs in terms
outputs but do in overall efficiency, can we determine why this occurs? (This question will
be addressed below.)

4.2.8 No-input Model
Figure 15, the scatter plot ofthe Oregon database presented in Section 3.7 above, is
similar to a two-dimensional DEA model that assumes no inputs, or where all ofthe inputs
are equal to some number (in the specific case 1.0). A final run of the DEA model using
1.0 as the only input while using all of the outputs as in the previous model, in the same
graduated method as before, was done.

This model yielded fewer efficient projects,

twenty-three (23) total; with eleven (11) DBB and twelve (12) CMlOC. Statistical and
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non-parametric tests were perfonned on these model results and indicated that while there
were differences in the populations of projects by PDS, the differences were not
statistically significant. 1bis was probably to be expected given the earlier analysis of the
output metrics discussed in Section 3.7.
The one important observation from this alternative model and analysis is that the
significant advantage that CMlOC projects obtain in the DEA model accrues principally
because ofthe inputs, in particular, the percent complete ofplans and specifications.
4.2.9 Summary
In summary, the nonparametric statistical analysis of DEA technical efficiency

scores showed that the CMlGC projects have, on average, higher technical efficiency
scores, and the difference between the CMlOC and DBB populations is significant based
on the non-parametric statistical analysis. We reject the null hypothesis that CMlOC
projects do not result in projects that have a higher technical-efficiency score, and we
accept the hypothesis that CMlOC projects are more technically efficient than DBB
projects. Furthennore, the analysis shows that a higher proportion of CMlOC projects are
"technically efficient" (with '41 of 111 CMlOC projects compared with 15 of 104 DBB
technically efficient jobs). Also, 55 ofthe 111 CMlOC projects had DEA efficiency scores
of 95% or above, whereas 25 of the 104 DBB projects achieved DEA efficiency scores of
95% or above. Finally, the advantage that CMlOC projects enjoy accrues principally from
the inputs, in particular the percent complete plans and specifications. This is the strongest
evidence that fast-tracking of projects is the primary benefit of using the CMlOC PDS,
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since fast-tracking is one principal difference between the two PDS's (along with pre
construction services offered to the owner by the CM/GC).
There is no way to precisely detennine if one method is more cost effective than
the other, but theory and empirical study (such as: [135]) would suggest that on average,

CMJOC projects are more costly than competitive bid projects due to the absence of other
competitive bidders. This will be explored in more depth in Chapter 6 which is a case
comparison oftwo similar projects.
The analysis of the DEA model input and output weightings gives some clues as to
how the two populations maximized their DEA scores and made it to the production
frontier. The difference between the two populations is slight but generally consistent with
the comments made by the stakeholders in the stakeholder sUlVey found in Chapter 5,
specifically a greater focus on quality but a lower focus on schedule control. Looking at
the data in another way, the slacks indicate the improvement required to reach the
efficiency frontier given the weightings of the virtual DMU. There is an important point to
note here: if, as in some cases with the Oregon database, a DMU has no data is reported for
an output metric, the virtual DMU most likely does not utilize that output in its model and
therefore no improvement is reported to be available - presumably because the comparator
also did not use that metric. The analysis of the slacks indicates that there is no statistically
significant difference between the populations ofprojects (CMJGC and DBB) with respect
to improvement.
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4.3

Research Question 3: PDS I Project type Interaction through Analysis of
the DEA Scores and Weightings
This analysis was perfonned to detennine if one of the PDS's outperfonned the

other on specific types of projects, that is, if there is some kind of interaction between
project type and PDS based on DBA efficiency score. The intent here is to determine if
some guidance can be offered to public agency project owners on the type of PDS they
should consider using for specific types of projects. In other words, if, for example, PSU
was going to build a library, can we detennine if CMlOC or DBB is the more appropriate
PDStouse?
We use the results from the Modified DEA Model obtained in the earlier analysis
for the first part of this analysis, which looks at the mean and median DEA scores by
project type to determine if there is any interaction between project type and PDS. The
second analysis looks at the mean DMU weighting schemes to detennine if there is a
difference in the way each of the project types maximizes their particular DEA score.
These weightings were taken from the EMS® software model using the "virtual weights"
option, which reports the weighting schemes of the virtual DMUs associated with each
inefficient DMUi and of course, in the case of the efficient DMUs, EMS reports their
weighting scheme directly. These weights are actually the

Ui Xi,O

and

VO'i,O

for the virtual

and efficient DMUs, which results in a sum of 1.0 for all inputs and outputs in the model.
For this analysis we test the hypotheses:

HA3: CM/GC PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
on similar types of projects.
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HA3 .1: When applied to corrections projects, CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3 .2 : When applied to hospital projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3 .3 : When applied to institutional projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3 .4 : When applied to library projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3 .S: When applied to office building projects CM/GC
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
projects.
HA3 .6 : When applied to parking structure projects CM/GC
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
projects.
HA3.7 : When applied to building remodel projects CM/GC
PDS results in projects that outperform DBB PDS
projects.
HA3 .a: When applied to school projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.
HA3 .9 : When applied to sports facility projects CM/GC PDS
results in projects that outperform DBB PDS projects.

H03: CM/GC PDS does not result in projects that outperform
DBB PDS on similar types of projects.
(Note the sub-hypotheses of the null hypothesis H03 are omitted for
brevity.)

4.3.1 DEA Scores by Project Type and PDS
This analysis is perfonned to detennine if one PDS or another works best in one
particular situation or another, and to detennine if one PDS or the other is significantly
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better for a particular type of project. In Table 18 below, the nwnber of projects, mean
DEA score, median DEA score and standard deviation of DEA score are given by project
type and PDS.
Note that while these are non-nonnally distributed populations, the non-parametric
methods generally will not work because those methods typically require an N ~ 10 [120],
and while that is met for some ofthe comparison groups, it is not met for each ofthem.
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Office

Parking

Remodel

School

Table 18: Results of DEA Scores by Project Type and PDS; note that bolding of the
PDS by type indicates a higher average DEA score and light shading
indicates that the difference in the average DEA score are greater than 5%

From the results in given in Table 18, it should be noted that the CMlOC PDS has a
higher mean DEA score on six of the nine different project types, although none of these
differences are statistically significant (principally because the N's are so small and the
variances in the data so large). Hospitals show the greatest difference in DEA Scores with
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CM/GC DEA scores 10.35% higher on average, but in the case ofCMlGC projects, it's an
average of one. DBB projects average about 8% better than CMlGC PDS projects on
office buildings, but again, this is an average of only two projects, compared with seven

CMlGC jobs. DBB projects achieved DBA scores 5% higher than CMlGC parking garage
projects, and while these are nearly equal populations (3 DBB projects and 4 CMlGC), the
difference between the two means is not significant. The three largest populations of
projects were institutional projects with 25, remodel with 51, and schools with 81. CMlGC
projects had higher mean DBA scores on all three of these project types than DBB: 4.05%,
3.28% and 1.0%, but again, none of these differences are statistically significant, and the
practical significance ofthese differences is not great.
Another way to look at the DBA scores is to look at the number of efficient and
near efficient projects (those with DBA scores> 95%) by project type and PDS. This data
is captured in Table 19 below.

1
1

7
3

5
2

1
1

1
2

22
7
1
Table 19: Number of Projects with DEA Score> 95%

Here the difference between the CMlGC and DBB project scores is made more
clear and is consistent with the non-parametric analysis results above. Note that most of
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the data are relatively close in comparison except in the case of Remodel and Corrections
projects, where CM/OC dominates the DBB PDS performance. In schools, since there are
so many DBB school projects (58 as compared to 23 CM/OC school jobs), the fact that
there are more efficient and near efficient CM/OC projects is significant also (as well as
counter intuitive. )57

4.3.2 DEA Model Weights
The weighting schemes used by each DMU to maximize their efficiency score are
assumed to be an indication of how a project is managed. A project manager that puts a
heavy emphasis on schedule performance as opposed to budget performance should result
in a higher relative weight on the schedule as opposed to the budget metric. The intent of
this analysis is to determine if CM/OC projects are managed significantly differently from
DBBjobs.
Table 20 presents average virtual DMU weighting scheme given by the EMS
software for the DEA model in order to maximize the particular DMU's technical
efficiency score. Note these are averages of the weighting schemes given by project type
and the total average for each PDS and are not the weight of any particular project, except
in the case where only one project is a member ofa particular project type.

57 As mentioned earlier, schools are the most common public building built in Oregon and elsewhere, as
reflected in the Oregon data. Since there are more schools than any other type building one would
expect that competitive bidding on schools would be fierce and that any problems in construction of this
type would have been worked out, meaning little or no unknowns. Furthermore, since schools more or
less have to open at the beginning of the school year, the opportunity for schedule growth is extremely
limited. Of course, looking at it from the other side, perhaps those are reasons why the CM/GC projects
have a higher average DEA score and higher proportion of efficient and near efficient projects. Fierce
bidding reduces profits through winner's curse and errors, things that are not present in CMlGC. In
addition, since the amount of knowledge and experience on schools is so broad and great, perhaps that
allows CMlGC's to start even earlier and pay no cost in terms of performance.
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An analysis of the DEA model input and output weightings gives some clues how
the two populations maximized their DEA scores and made it to the production frontier
(see discussion in [64] at page 25).
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Table 20: Mode) average weighting scheme by project type and PDS for inputs and
outputs

The difference between the two populations is slight. The CMlGC proj ects placed
a slightly lower weight on the "0/0 complete of plans and specifications" input than the
DBB projects did, which is perhaps indicative of the fact that the plans and specifications
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are generally incomplete and to a lower level of quality in the CMlGC projects than in the
DBBjobs.
On the output side the differences are again generally slight. The DBB projects
place a higher proportion of their weight on the schedule control metric than do the

CMlGC projects, while the CMlGC projects place more weight on the profit output metric
- but this may be due to the fact that few ofthe DBB projects reported "profit," whereas in
most of the CMlGC projects, the fee was known.58 Both methods place about the same
weight on the budget control metric and total cost per square foot metric. CMlGC projects
place a higher weight on the quality metric than the DBB jobs, but the difference is only
4.5% on average for CMlGC as compared to 2.3% for DBB.
One interesting difference is found in Hospital work, where CMlGC projects
placed no weight on the cost control metric and nearly all (98.9%) on the schedule control
metric, whereas the near opposite is true with the DBB projects, where all of the weight is
distributed between budget control and profit maximization metrics and no weight is given
to schedule control. However, it should be noted that this analysis is based on just one (1)

CMlGC project and three (3) DBB jobs, meaning the result is probably an anomaly.

The CMlGC jobs were mostly cost reimbursable jobs and therefore were audited, which often
included the amount paid for fee. DBB projects on the other hand were not audited nor billed in the
same manner. The only projects where the profit metric was known was in cases where the contractor
provided it to us.
58
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Table 21: Percent difference of average weightings: CMlGC vs DBB
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Table 22: Absolute differences in average weightings: CM/GC-DBB
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Table 21 and Table 22 present two different ways of looking at the different
weighting schemes employed by the different PDS's. The percent different statistics can
be somewhat misleading because they magnify what may actually be rather small
differences, such as the 92% difference in corrections quality input metric (SF/(RFI+AR»
which is in fact only a 5.1 % absolute difference. But overall, these statistics do point out
some very important differences in weighting schemes, which we take to imply differences
in management priorities. Project quality has a 63% higher weighting in CMlOC than
DBB, which is consistent with the comments taken from the stakeholder analysis (see
Chapter 5). CMlOC projects place a 36% lower weight on the schedule control metric than
DBB projects do and a much higher (63%) weight on the profit maximization metric, but
this is likely misleading as discussed above.
Lastly, a cluster analysis was perfonned using all of the weighting data from the
DEA model to detennine ifthe PDS were clustered by output metric. For example, did all
of the CMlOC projects cluster into one group with a significantly. different output
weighting scheme than DBB projects did? For this analysis a K-means clustering method
was used and three different clustering arrangements were specified: four clusters, three,
and two.
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CMGC

DBB
CMGC

DBB
CMGC

DBB

1

2

3

4

22
9

38
59

18
10

33
26

1

2

3

24
12

40
63

47
29

1

2

62
69

49
35

'----

Table 23: Cluster Membership by PDS

In all three clusterings, there is one cluster that places a high weight on the Budget

Performance Metric and another cluster that places its highest weight on the Schedule
Performance Metric. However, cluster membership does not appear to be related to PDS,
except in rare si!Uations. In the four cluster analysis, cluster 1 is dominated by CMlOC
projects (more than 2:1), cluster 2 is dominated by DBB projects (about 3:2), and cluster 3
appears to be dominated by CMlOC projects (nearly 2:1). However, while there is a large
difference between cluster 1 and cluster 2, with cluster 1 placing its highest weight on
Budget Performance and cluster 2 placing its highest weight on Schedule Performance,
there is no notable similarity between clusters 1 and 3, nor is there a large difference
between the memberships by PDS of cluster 4. In the three cluster analysis, there is a
significant difference between clusters 2 and 3. Cluster 2 is dominated by DBB projects
and places its highest weight on the Schedule Performance Metric, whereas cluster 3 is
dominated by CMlOC projects and places its highest weight on Budget Performance. The
two cluster analysis indicates little difference between the memberships by PDS but
follows the same pattern ofweightings as the previous analyses.
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It is possible to conclude that CM/GC projects are managed with a higher emphasis
on budget perfonnance than schedule perfonnance and vice versa for DBB projects. This
is consistent with the earlier analysis, but weakened by the fact that the major differences
disappear in the two-cluster situation and a discriminate analysis of cluster membership by
PDS was not significant.

4.3.3 Slacks
The other important question to ask is how could the inefficient DMUs actually
improve? In linear programming models like DEA, the slacks tell us "the possible input
excesses and output shortfalls" [64] at page 44, or in other words, areas where the project
can improve in order to become efficient.
Table 24 below is a gross comparison of the means of the output slacks from the
DEA model for the 159 inefficient projects by PDS.
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Table 24: Statistical comparison of the DMU slacks

The data presented above gives us only a broad notion of perhaps how the projects
on average can Improve. Nonnally, the value of the DEA model is derived by evaluating
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the projects on an individual basis and detennining how each individual project or groups
ofprojects would have to improve in order to reach the efficiency frontier. For example, it
would have been possible to break the projects down by construction company and let the
management know if there are any trends in their projects that make them inefficient and
suggest ways to improve them. However, in order to obtain project data for this research,
complete confidentiality about the projects had to be granted (as detailed in Chapter 3), and
therefore is not presented here.
One note of caution is that missing data in the outputs will have a significant effect
on the slacks (for example, in the profit performance output metric). In general, both

CMlGC and DBB projects show the least available improvement in the cost control metric
and relatively high available improvement in quality and cost per square foot output
metrics. But, the variances in the data are quite high relative to the mean in all categories.
Lastly, it must be remembered that the slacks only occur in inefficient projects; the fact that
a higher proportion of CMlGC projects are efficient, as compared to DBB, raises questions
about whether or not this analysis can be generalized to the entire population of CMlGC
projects.

4.3.4 Summary of the Interaction of PDS by Application
In answer to the third research question regarding the interaction of proj ects by
project type and str~tegy of getting to the efficiency frontier, there is no significant
difference between the PDS's. Neither PDS appears to be significantly out-performing the
other on specific types of projects,. nor does it appear the popUlations of projects use
different management priorities or emphasis in order to reach the efficiency frontier,
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although there appears to be a weak relationship between CMJGC projects and budget
control emphasis and DBB projects and schedule control emphasis. These differences in
the weighting schemes used by the two popUlations of DMUs and differences in the
efficiency scores ofthe different project types by PDS are marginal and do not appear to be
statistically significant. In addition, only institutional, remodel, and school project types
had sufficiently large numbers in both types to make the comparison particularly
~eaningful.

This finding is unfortunate because one of the early goals ofthis research was

to provide public agency building owners some guidance in making a PDS choice based on
the type ofproject.
We fail to find sufficient evidence to support the hypotheses that CMJGC projects
have higher mean technical efficiency scores than DBB projects for specific project types
(the principal hypothesis

H03

and each of the sub-hypotheses:

H03.1

to

Ho3.9).

We find no

basis for rejecting the null hypothesis that CMJGC does not outperfonn DBB projects of
similar proj ect type.
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5

Surveys from Stakeholders
As has been noted throughout this dissertation, this research emphasizes the

application of operations research and statistical models to evaluate a public policy in the
public construction industry sector.

The analysis of public policies in a complex

environment simply cannot be limited to quantitative models, as Quade noted in 1982:

"In public policy affairs, no matter what problem the analyst investigates
there will always be aspects for which quantitative techniques are
clearly inapplicable or inadequate. Sometimes, (but rarely) this is of
little consequence ... a quantitative model, which may not include all
aspects of the problem, may provide the analyst or decision-maker with
sufficient insight for him to modify the results in the light of his additional
knowledge about aspects that could not be incorporated into the
modeL" "policy analysis is critically dependent upon the use of [expert]
judgment" [163].

This extended quote demonstrates that, in the realm of policy analysis, the tole of
expert opinion is often times a key ingredient in the final outcome. Furthennore, as
Crowley [67] states, ''there is a puzzling contrast between policy-makers and practitioners
on the effectiveness ofcompetitive procurements."
ill order to better understand the PDS decision, that is, the choice to exempt or not
exempt a specific project from competitive bidding, expert opinion ofthe practitioners was
sought. ill addition, we sought to uncover information that would either support or refute
Crowley's supposition, that there are strong differences of opinions among project
stakeholders. Finally, we sought to better understand and explain the different underlying
attitudes ofthe stakeholders.
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5.1 Research Question #4:
The fourth research question basically asks whether or not the opinions of
practitioners, the actual persons that deal with projects on a daily basis, are consistent with
the data analysis, and secondarily, if all of the practitioners' views are consistent with
respect to project perfonnance under the different PDS's?

5.1.1 Multiple Stakeholder 'Analysis
The idea of utilizing mUltiple perspectives in analysis dates to the 1950's with
extensive contributions in the 1960's culminating in Linstone's 1984 book, Multiple
Perspectives in Decision Making [142]. However, stakeholder analysis, as discussed by
Harrison and S1. John in Strategic Management ofOrganizations and Stakeholders [106],
has generally been treated as an analysis tool to fonnulate business strategy that balances or
optimizes the rewards (and penalties) to the various stakeholders.

Here, we use the

stakeholder analysis to better understand the PDS decision, and the different attitudes and
perceptions ofthe project stakeholders with regard to the choice ofPDS.

In the Washington study [99] the authors elicited comments from the different
stakeholders in the projects as part of their analysis. The authors asked the participants to
answer to provide comments and observations about the use of CMlGC 59 and to compare
CMlGC with DBB on these public projects. The authors did not make an evaluation of the
comments; however, they did put all of the comments arranged by commenter type:
architect/engineer, contractor, owner, and subcontractor in their, "Appendix 1."

59 Or in their case "GC/CM or sometimes referred to as CM with a GMP" but they are equivalent PDS
to CMlGC used in Oregon, and CM@R and CMR used in the ClI Studies.
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The analysis here generally follows the "Systematic Form for a Narrative
Analysis" outlined by Manning and Cullum-Swan [144] with conclusions and evaluations
made consistent with additional sections found in [73].

5.1.2 Project Stakeholders
ht the construction industry, stakeholder analysis has been used as part ofthe TQM

process. As noted by Kumaraswamy [130], its purpose is to recognize the "heightened
need for effective and efficient evaluations by stakeholders...

[to help] improve the

management of ongoing and oncoming projects." Kumaraswamy lists the construction
project stakeholders as owners, contractors and professional consultants and notes that the
construction industry is currently lacking the type of systematic project evaluations
proposed in [130].
ht addition to owners, consultants and contractors, the subcontractor and supplier

connnunity along with the taxpayer could be considered as project stakeholders. Clearly,
subcontractors have a stake in successful project outcomes since a bad project outcome
inevitably reflects poorly on them as businesses (i.e.: poor quality) and a bad financial
outcome might be passed on to them from the general contractor (i.e.: withholding
retainage or progress payments). However, the enabling legislation that allows for the
exemption from competitive public bidding requires that an exemption will not result in
reducing competition or favoritism (see Section 2.6 above). This requirement has been
taken by many public agencies to mean that all subcontracts are to be competitively bid.
For this reason, the relationship between general contractor or CMlOC and their
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subcontractors is not fUndamentally changed by the change in general contractor selection
method. 60

5.1.2.1 DBB Lump Sum Bid Selection Management Model
Figure 30 below depicts the management relationships typical of the lump sum bid
selected construction project as presented by Eberwein [85].
Relationships in the
Lump Sum Bid Selection Model

Selected by Bid, Managed Strictly by Contract: - - - - - - -..
Selected by Preference, Managed as Team:
III
..

Figure 30: DBB or Lump Sum Bid Relationship Diagram

Note that in this model the owner and the design consultants fonn a team, while the
general contractor and subcontractors are managed strictly by contract provisions.
Furthennore, note that the relationship between the design consultant and the general
contractor passes only through the owner. This is due to the "privity of contracting"

Although some subcontractors may argue that the CMlGC method is actually more difficult for the
subcontractor because the CM/GC acts as the owner's agent to deny subcontractor extra work claims
since the CM/GC does not stand to benefit from the change order, particularly if it exceeds the GMP.
This changes the CM/GC from an ally to an adversary.

60

172

requirements. The owner and the design consultants have a strong mutual relationship
because the owner, by selecting the design consultant on the basis ofpreference as opposed
to lowest bid, has a stake in the design consultant's success and vice versa.

The

relationship between the general contractor and the owner is much weaker on a personal
level because the owner has less personal credibility at stake ifthe lowest bidder happens to
fail in one way or another. That is, the decision to select the contractor was not entirely in
the owner's hands because the lowest bidder is automatically selected.61

In the nonnal process, general contractors select subcontractors on the basis of
lowest bid price in assembling their bid. This process results in relationships that are more
often than not contractual as opposed to personal or team oriented. 62

5.1.2.2 Non-bid (CM/GC) Selection Management Model
Figure 31 depicts the management model for the non-bid or CMlGC construction
project as presented by Eberwein [85].

61 There are some pre-qualification requirements contractors must meet for bidding; however, these are
minimal, and if a contractor is capable of obtaining a performance and payment bond, they are normally
considered "qualified." Also, contractors can be disqualified post bid if they fail to meet various
minority business utilization requirements on some contracts.
62 General contractors have substantially more flexibility in selecting subcontractors in that there is not
legal mandate that the general contractor must use the lowest sub contract bidder; it is simply a rational
business decision to use the sum ofthe lowest sub prices when the general contractor is selected on the
basis of lowest total price.
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Relationships in the Competitive
Negotiation (CM/GC) Selection Model
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Selected by Bid, Managed Strictly by Contract: - - - - - - +
Selected by Preference, Managed as Team:
~
III

Figure 31: CM/GC Relationship Diagram

Note in this model the management relationship between the owner and the
CMlGC is essentially the same as the relationship between the owner and the design
consultant. This is because the method by which the CMlGC and the design consultants
were selected is essentially the same.

They are both selected on the basis of owner

preference based on perceived qualifications for the job, among other considerations. Note
also that there is now a direct "team management" relationship between the CMlGC and
the design consultant. However, since the selection method for the subcontractors remains
the same as in the lump sum model, the relationship between the general and
subcontractors remains essentially the same. This analysis holds equally true for suppliers,
perhaps even more so, because suppliers nonnally simply ship materials to a jobsite and
receive payment through purchase orders, a practice common to both management models.
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Since the fundamental relationship between the subcontractors and either a general
contractor or CM/GC is essentially the same, we have decided not to include
subcontractors in our stakeholder analysis. This is not to say that subcontractors and
suppliers are not stakeholders in project outcomes; they certainly are, as discussed above.
We are simply saying that since the relationship is the same in both models, we expect their
view of efficiency would not be affected by selection method.

5.2

Goldblatt and Septelka [99] Stakeholder Analysis
Goldblatt and Septelka [99] asked stakeholders and competitors to provide their

observations and comments about the use of CM/GC on public projects and to compare the
PDS's in terms ofproject performance, project team performance, design, pre-construction
services, subcontractor work-packages, project management, construction, commissioning
and start-up, and acceptance and close-out. They also asked competitors, both contractors
and subcontractors preswnably who did not work on projects, to provide comments.
Finally, they invited the Agencies to provide "Project Evaluation Survey Comments" on:
Schedule, Cost, Changes, Quality, and Process Evaluation.

5.2.1 Team Survey Comments
The project teams, including the CM/GC, the architect/engineer, owner and
subcontractors were asked to comment on the project performance and compare the

CMlGC process on the particular project that they were working on. The comments by the
CMlGC, the owner and the architect/engineer were generally positive observations with
some caveats such as:
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•

Subcontractors have performed well in dealing with tough remodel
conditions. The change order prices are at a premium.

•

Met & exceeded a very aggressive schedule while delivering a high
quality product. Cost was appropriate to the product value.

•

The design took longer than expected; however, we are on track for
an early building delivery.

•

Good project except for warranty issues.

•

The resulting building has received an AlA Honor Award, as well as
others. User satisfaction is very high. Process to get there was very
difficult and painful.

•

Very good input from the [CM/GC] RE: Cost, Schedule, and
Con structa bility.

Subcontractors had distinctly different observations:
•

Unreasonable and inflexible schedule drove cost increases. Lack of
CM/GC self-performing significant portions of the work themselves
caused a disconnect between the CM/GC and the project schedule.

•

Poor CM/GC performance. Withholds information. Slow to respond
to RFl's and change orders.

•

For a variety of reasons, the build-out was delayed 6 months with the
completion date remaining unchanged. The compression created
significant impacts given 250 electrical changes & 2500 RFI's.

In comparing the PDS's directly, again the architect/engineers (AlE), contractors

(C) and owners (0) comments were generally positive and in favor of CMlGC. A sample
ofthe comments by commenter type are given below:
•

AlE: Project proceeded more smoothly with [CM/GC] leadership as
agent for the owner.

•

AlE: Performance was accomplished with less conflict than in DBB.

•

AlE: The [CM/GC] contractor has been only "slightly" more of a
partner in problem solving for design problems than with a DBB
contract.
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•

C: There was considerable project savings.

•

C: [CM/GCl process provided the owner beUer control of the program
components at a lower cost than a similar DBB.

•

C: WSU had many bad DBB experiences and opted for [CM/GC]. It
was a wise choice - project has been a resounding success.

•

C: This project was completed on time, within budget, and without
claims, which likely would not have happened under the traditional
DBB process.

•

0: Better construction documents, no surprises and better team
attitud.e on the side of the contractor.

•

0: It is very difficult to separate cost and schedule problems into
those resulting from conditions at the time of project, and those
resulting from [CM/GC] methods.

•

0: Reduced Claims by subs.

•

0: [CM/GC] process has no vested ownership except $, they sided
with the subs on all disputed issues.

•

0: The performance of the [CM/GCl on this project is far superior to
that on any other DBB project with which I've been involved.

•

0: [CM/GCl cost management between design phases (estimates)
yield better cost control of project.

•

0: Higher level of cooperation among team members. Changes
rnade with less impact. Better quality.
There was only one subcontractor comment listed:

•

[CM/GC] offers the subcontractor no control in comparison to DBB.
Job stagnated due to multitude of RFI's/changes. [CM/GC] removes
subcontractor from direct contact with the owner.
On Team Perfonnance, again the architect/engineer, contractor, and owner

comments were generally positive, while the subcontractor comments were generally
negative.

It is clear from the comments that the owner-contractor-architect/engineer

relationship in CMlGC is considered improved over the DBB process. Each of these
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construction team members commented that the "relationships have been good and
positive," ''very collaborative I trusting," ''Team worked very well together'" "Excellent."
There were a couple ofisolated negative comments:

•

AlE: Owner's representative was too weak.

•

0: Partnering process was incomplete and virtually abandoned.

•

0: Biggest problem was lack of mechanical/electrical design
coordination.

Subcontractor responses, which include only three (3), were not as positive:

•

Overly aggressive design period and incomplete project
programming prevented complete design prior to construction
phase. This contributed to cost overruns.

•

[eM/Ge] and AlE were poor performers; slow to respond; avoided
problern resolution.

•

Performance suffered from magnitude of design deficiencies.
[eM/Ge] had limited experience with several key personnel. Job
tended to move on its "mass" as opposed to positive schedule
directions.

The survey in [99] goes on and elicits comments regarding Design, Project
Management, MACC Negotiations,63 Pre-construction Services, [CM/Ge] Selection
Process, Subcontractor Work-packages, and other topics. The responses under these topics
are consistent with those discussed above. Architect/engineers, contractors and owners are
generally positive with a very few negative comments and caveats, and the Subcontractor
comments, which are few by contrast, are generally negative with a few positive notes.

MACC is Maximum Allowable Construction Costs - a process that is solely part of the negotiated
contract and does not pertain to DBB.

63
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One area that [99] was able to look at that this research did not, was a survey of
disappointed competitors.

While these comments, sixteen (16) in all, and equally

distributed between general contractors and subcontractors, make up only one of the 18
pages of comments, they do provide an interesting insight to the process by those who were
unsuccessful in obtaining CMlGC work or, in the case of subcontractors, work on the

CMlGC jobs. (Comments are preceded by "C" and "S" for contractor and subcontractor.)

•

C: This selection process was still based on a low fee proposal as
opposed to including qualifications and interview as part of the
selection process. The current law and selection process is much
better.

•

C: The owner selected an out-of-region contractor who has
performed poorly and jeopardized the [CM/GC] process for this
owner.

•

C: The delivery method is proven. Your process of applying this
method restricts you from greater value. Your rigid RFP limits
creativity and forces us back into the box.

•

C: You're more concerned about past similar experience than the
best team & the best ideas.

•

C: [CM/GC] submitted a very low fee/GC proposal, which moved
them from last to 1st in the ranking and got them the job!

•

S: The drawings were so convoluted we could not tell what we were
bidding for and what was by others. On top of that, State General
Conditions [CM/GC] have many more requirements that just make it
harder to comply. They would like to do all the work themselves.

•

S: [We] did not pre-qualify because of [a] technicality (no shop
drawing sample with proposal) and we were later told they had too
many applicants.

•

S: Project was bid with no solicitation process. Only contractors that
qualified for Phase 1 were allowed to bid on Phase 2.

•

S: Pre-qualification was largely based on sales volume and having
performed much larger projects than this project. Eliminated free
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competition to small & mid size contractors who have had proven
success in project of this magnitude.

In summary, it is clear from the comments in [99] that the process in Washington
state has a lot of supporters, particularly among the ranks of the successful CM/GC
contractors, owners and architect/engineers. Subcontractors, on the other hand, both those
who worked on the projects and the disappointed bidders, revealed some of the
shortcomings of the process as it's practiced in Washington. This would likely be true of
any new process; however, and is probably not limited just to CMlGC. However, as
discussed in above, it may be difficult to get an honest and objective set of comments when
the vast majority ofthe respondents either are personally invested in the decision to use one
PDS over another, and the others are the beneficiaries, the successful contractors. The
comments from the disappointed contractors and those from the architect/engineers reveal
more skepticism about the process than the owners and the successful contractors did.

5.3

Stakeholder Survey
For this research, it was detennined that the stakeholders and construction

professionals should be asked specific questions regarding the different PDS's, the benefits
and drawbacks, and to whom they accrue. The different stakeholders were given the
following questions to consider, in the order found in the following Table.
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Please describe, in your own words, the benefits of the negotiated public
contracting project delivery system, commonly known as CM/GC for the
contractor, the owner, the design professional, and the public at large?
Benefits for the contractor:
Benefits for the project owner:
Benefits for the project design professionals:
Benefits for the public at large:
Please describe, in your own words, the drawbacks of the negotiated public
contracting project delivery system, commonly known as CM/GC for the
contractor, the owner, the design professional, and the public at large?
Drawbacks for the contractor:
Drawbacks for the project owner:
Drawbacks for the project design professionals:
Drawbacks for the public at large:
Please describe, in your own words, the benefits of the competitive bid public
contracting project delivery system, commonly known as Lump Sum Bid
Method, for the contractor, the owner, the design professional, and the public at
large?
Benefits for the contractor:
Benefits for the project owner:
Benefits for the project design professionals:
Benefits for the public at large:
Please describe, in your own words, the drawbacks of the competitive bid
public contracting project delivery system, commonly known as Lump Surn
Bid Method, for the contractor, the owner, the design professional, and the
public at large?
Drawbacks for the contractor:
Drawbacks for the project owner:
Drawbacks for the project design professionals:
Drawbacks for the public at large:

Table 25: Stakeholder Survey Form, which was originally published on eight pages, shown here
with blank sections removed for brevity.
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This method could not be described as a "scientific" survey because a broad cross
section of stakeholders was not surveyed; only those members of project teams who
provided project data were asked initially to respond. Additional contacts were made
through the Oregon Public Contractor's Coalition (PCC) as well as members ofthe Expert
PaneL Finally, professional associates, many ofthem members ofthe Oregon Construction
Bar, were asked to give their comments on these questions and their observations on the
two PDS's. In all just under five-hundred individual comments from 21 stakeholders were
recorded. And, while this research instrument was structured differently than the one used
in [99], no claim is made here that these responses are better considered or carry more
weight.

5.4

Stakeholders
The principal stakeholders in the public construction sector of the economy are the

contractors that build the jobs, the design professionals that prepare the plans and
specifications, the public agency project team that manage the project from womb to tomb
(referred to here as "owner") and the public at large who eventually use the project Three
of these members are readily identifiable by the roles that they have on a project, but the
fourth, the public in general, is a bit more difficult to identify. In absence ofa broad survey
of building users or the public, this research considers the guardians of public trust, the
"owner," as the adequate proxy for the concerns of the "public at large." It should be
realized that the project management staff may not always have what's best for the
taxpayer or public at large first and foremost in their minds, especially when what's best
for the taxpayer may not be what's easiest or most convenient for themselves in the
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manag~ment

of the project in pursuit of its completion, and keeping as much "stomach

lining" as possible at the end ofthe project.
A group that is neither a proxy for the public nor a direct project participant, but
one included in this analysis, is the members of the Construction Law Bar of Oregon.
These attorneys handle the vast majority of construction disputes that rise to the level of
third-party negotiation, mediation, arbitration and litigation. Their insight was considered
valuable infonnation to include in this section ofthe research.

5.4.1 Contractors
Contractors are perhaps the most affected members of the project team by the
choice of PDS on the project because that defines the roles and risks the contractor must
execute the project under. Contractors make up the largest number ofthe comments in this
survey; roughly 44% ofall comments were contractor comments.
As documented in Chapter 3 above, contractors on the Expert Panel were the first
to be contacted in the data collection effort. Included in their data collection Notebooks
was "Tab 6

Written Comments" that contained the questions listed exactly as they appear

above.64 This is the principal reason that contractors provided the largest number of
comments. Of course, contractors also have the most experience in the different PDS' s
since their jobs involve the construction of public building projects on a daily basis.
Furthennore, unlike owners and design professionals, contractors, in particular estimators,
see many projects each year that they bid on but do not "win." This gives the contractor a

Although the survey form presented above has been edited to remove the empty spaces between the
individual questions, the original Tab 6 Written Comments was eight pages long.

64
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distinctly different viewpoint than either the owner or the designer. In addition, of course,
the contractor is in business to make money on construction work, period. The beauty of
the job may be pleasing, but the construction project manager and superintendent that
consistently build high quality, beautiful projects that lose their companies large sums of
money, generally find themselves not working in the business long.

Conversely, the

superintendent that consistently returns large job profits on marginal quality work is likely
to be retained.
Construction is a risky business with total fees on sales to the general contractor in
the range of two and one-half to five percent (2.5% to 5%), which is among the lowest of
any business sector. However, the fact is that while the general contractor on building
projects has a substantial risk of subcontractor performance, much of that risk is laid offon
the surety industry. The total amount of actual performance risk a general contractor has
on a project is typically only about ten percent (10%) ofthe total project cost, which means
that the general contractor's fee is more in the range of twenty-five to fifty percent (25% to
50%) of their direct work. Furthermore, the subcontractors that account for about ninety
percent of the actual work performed are also in business to make a profit, and their fees
range from five to fifty percent (5% to 50%) of their total subcontract bid cost. This means
that the total amount of fee derived from a construction project to all parties is more in the
range of thirty percent (30%), which is more in line with other service industries.
Nevertheless, as businesses go, few have the potential for such large gains or windfall
profits and extreme bankrupting losses on a single endeavor as construction contractors
face on virtually every job. Contractors bring to the construction team the understanding of
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how a project actually gets built and what kinds of sacrifices and trade-offs have to be
made along the way to make it happen. As a group, it is fair to say that contractors see
themselves as protecting the public interest against wasteful design solutions brought by
design professionals that have little or none of the practical building experience that comes
from actually building a project.

Even in the competitive bid market where

contractor/owner relationships are more confrontational and adversarial contractors
probably complain more about wasteful design solutions that make their job harder for no
visible benefit than they do about the unfairness of an owner's position on the design issue
or decision about the cost.
The part of the construction business that is the subject of this research, namely
large building construction, attracts a group of individuals that are very bright, imaginative,
highly motivated people that are extremely hard workers, fiercely competitive and almost
bluntly self reliant. In the competitive bid market, they compete in a remarkably pure fonn
of economic competition in the US economy, a market where an owner puts a project up
for a sealed price auction and the competitors, each acquiring symmetric infonnation about
the task, weigh the risks and rewards and gives a price. And, in absence of some fonn of
gerrymandering the bid, the lowest price bidder takes the prize. The construction project
managers, estimators and company executives that responded to the survey for this
research have built literally billions of dollars in public construction between them. Their
experience is vast and deep and without their contributions to this research, it simply would
not have been possible.
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5.4.2 Owners
Owner's representatives are the agents of the public charged with the public trust
and responsible for spending the public's taxes wisely. They initiate the

projec~s,

hire the

design professionals, guide the process through design into construction, manage the
construction process, pay the design professionals and the contractors, and finally occupy
the end product

the building. Often, the owner's representative is even involved in the

financing or procuring offunds through bond sales or other forms ofpublic finance.
Owners may have a difficult time relating to other stakeholders, but they know that
building projects cannot be accomplished without the teamwork of all three construction
partners. It is the owner who decides on how that working relationship will be structured
through the choice in PDS, and therefore understanding the motivations and feelings of the
ones who make that decision is an important contribution to the understanding of why and
how that decision is made.
As with the contractor group, the initial contact of owners was through the expert
panel members. That effort extended when the data collection phase included directly
retrieving information from the owner document files at the different institutions. The
majority of the owner comments come from expert panel members or senior project
management personnel, in particular those directly involved in making the PDS decision.

5.4.3 Design Professionals
Architects and engineers playa key role in the execution of any public building
project. Architects prepare the information upon which the pricing for the project is based.
They more often than not follow the project from design through construction, inspecting
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the construction professional's work and advising the owner on change requests and
pricing submitted by the contractor. The contractor too has to rely on the architect for
design solutions for unanticipated and hidden conditions as well as a fair interpretation of
the plans and specifications when a change request is submitted. In the most recent version
of the General Conditions prepared by the American Institute of Architects (AIA), AIA
form 201, the role of the project architect is so important that the owner cannot summarily
dismiss and replace the architect without the prior acceptance ofthe contractor.
The design professional respondents predominantly come from the expert panel,
which includes partners in many of the largest architecture and engineering firms in
Oregon. Most have extensive experience in both PDS's being considered in this research
and are often called upon by owners to give their opinion on which method should be used
in the performance of a particular project. Furthermore, several served in the past on the
selection committees that selected CM/GC's for specific projects that they mayor may not
have had direct responsibility for.

5.4.4 Attorneys
One group that was not originally considered in the Stakeholder Analysis Proposal
was the members of the Construction Bar in Oregon.

Construction law is a very

specialized field with fewer than one hundred fifty (150) active members,65 the majority of
whom work for one of fewer than two..dozen firms, mostly located in Portland. The
members of the Construction Bar are not actively involved in the direct execution of
construction work, except as it may relate to specific contract provisions that they may be
65

Which, compares to the more than 1000 members of the Tort Law Bar in Oregon.
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asked to opine upon. However, these professionals have a unique role in the construction
process in that they are involved in mediating, arbitrating and litigating construction
disputes. From that vantage point, they witness what kinds of things go well, and more
importantly, what kinds ofthings don't.
The lawyers that responded to this survey serve owners, contractors and
subcontractor clients. Most practices emphasize one or another type of client, but very few
if any only take "owners" or "contractors" as clients, and each of the respondents in this
survey has. served or serves each of the three parties. That fact makes them uniquely
qualified to comment on the impact of different contract structures on various parties.
Finally, while attorneys are advocates for their clients' position, like engineers,
their duty extends beyond that owed to their particular client, to the Court and the public at
large.

Attorneys accounted for a total of 61 individual comments, with benefits

outnumbering drawbacks 38 to 23. Since attorneys are perhaps the least directly affected
by the use of one PDS or another, it is likely that, as a group, they provide the most
objective observations,66 although it should be noted that three of the attorney respondents
worked directly for an owner or a contractor as either an in-house counselor a project
manager.

Although at least one contractor Stakeholder would disagree, noting that if CMlOC reduces claims,
lawyers are out of work, which is a valid point. However, it is actually quite rare that construction
disputes actually go so far as trial;, as many as 95% of all construction disputes are settled in
negotiation or mediation according to one prominent mediator. And, while the CM/OC - owner
relationship changes, the CMlOC - subcontractor relationship is changed little from the DBB model.
The OSU Valley Library Project discussed above, for example, was a multi-million dollar claim
brought by a subcontractor against both the CMlOC and the owner. Nevertheless, the point is well
taken.

66
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5.5

Responses
There were 499 individual responses from the stakeholders, although at least three

of the responses from one owner were word for word the same for three of the four
beneficiaries. The breakdown ofthe comments is reflected in the following table:

Stakeholder
Attorney

Benefit!
Drawback

CM/GC

DBB

Total

Benefits
Drawbacks

25
13

13
10

38
23

38

23

61

108
34

30
49

138
83

142

79

221

28
24

17
19

45
43

52

36

88

58
21

21
29

79
50

79

50

129

311
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499

Attorney Total
Contractor

Benefits
Drawbacks

Contractor Total
Design Professional

Benefits
Drawbacks

Design Professional Total
Owner

Benefits
Drawbacks

Owner Total
Grand Total
Figure 32: Stakeholder Survey Responses

The most striking observation is that contractor comments reflected benefits from

CMlGC more than three-to-one over drawbacks, while indicating drawbacks to DBB
nearly five-to-three over benefits. While all of the Stakeholder groups had more benefit
than drawback comments for CMlGC, and more drawback than benefit comments for
DBB, no other group showed such a striking difference. In part, this was due to the fact
that several of the contractors simply refused to comment on drawbacks to CMlGC,
perhaps feeling that their comments could come back and be used against them or the
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process. Some contractors also decided not to provide any benefit comments under DBB.
These actions call into question the objectivity of the respondents; however, their
comments still have importance because they allow us to understand the motivations and
mindset ofthese participants.

5.5.1 Contractor Responses
All of the contractors have experience in CMlGC, some more than others;
however, all of the largest CMlGC contractors in this study did provide responses to this
survey. Thirty of the one hundred eight (108) noted that the benefits of CMlGC were
benefits that accrue to the "contractor," and contractors contributed two hundred twenty
one (221) ofthe nearly five hundred comments in this survey.

5.5.1.1 Contractor's Perceived Benefits of CM/GC
The "majority of the benefit cOlmnents from contractor respondents deal with risk
and the contractor's ability to mitigate his risk by having significant input during the design
process as well as gaining a better understanding of the proj ect before the budget and
schedule are established. One commented that, "basically risk is shared with the owner."
There are also administrative and financial benefits accruing to the contractor on the cost
reiInbursable form. hl spite of the fact that the overall profit is expected to be lower, there
is a greater assurance that the profit goal will be met and that they can count on an adequate
level ofadministrative support.
The relationship between the parties is another benefit that contractors felt accrued
to themselves from the CMlGC PDS. "It makes the whole construction process a team
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effort." '''The potential or opportunity to develop a good working relationship with the
owner and designer." And "Less chance of adversarial relations ... more stomach lining
[left] at the end ofthe job."
Contractors generally responded that design professionals benefited from the
CMlGC process by having the contractor's input during the design stages.

They

commented that, "construction professional input [resulted in more] cost effective
construction," and that they aid design professionals in coming up with "more realistic
schedule milestones" and "cost estimates." The contractors felt that CMlGC "reduces or
eliminates redesign efforts" and costs, and results in a "far better working relationship,"
which is a benefit to the design professional. Contractors responded that the "reduced risk"
generates "increased profit potential" for design professionals through mechanisms as an
"independent design review" oftheir work by the CMlGC.
In short, as with the benefits accruing contractors, the contractors responded that

the same apparatus that reduces risk and results in better working relationships benefit
design professionals in similar ways.

The one difference, of course, is the fact that

contractors did not see design professional's input in CMlGC as a benefit to contractors,
but they consistently remarked that their input during design was a benefit to the design
professionals.
Contractors commented that owners benefit from CMlGC principally by reduction
in the risk of claims and lawsuits; faster construction schedules; better designs through
contractor involvement; "reduced conflict;" more reliability on costs and schedules;
"lower fees" and lower overall costs.

191

Of course, the data analysis perfonned in Chapter 4 of this research does not
support their comments that CMlGC results in more reliable costs or schedules than DBB,
and competitive bidding theory dictates that a single competitor will result in higher, not
lower, costs. There is little doubt that the relationship between the owner and CMlGC is
far better than the typical owner

DBB contractor relationship, and contractors

consistently commented that the change in relationship results in a higher likelihood of a
"successful project."

In addition, the cooperative process allows for and generates

"improve[d] opportunity for a lower cost of construction on larger or more complex
contracts." While the early input from the CMlGC gives the owner, "the benefit of an
experienced and practical mind set in the development of the design, i.e. function leading
fonn" and "the overall opportunity for a better design ... [resulting from] the availability of
a practiced eye, In the review of design documents [that] provide for the opportunity to
reduce errors or inconsistencies in the drawings, catching mistakes on paper rather than in
the field." Finally, the CMlGC "can use their skills and experience to advise the owner and
architect as to the cost and efficiency of a project design at the time when those ideas can
be incorporated most easily and cheaply" thereby providing for the most efficient use of
limited public funds.
Contractor's comments on the benefits to the public in general mirrored those of
the owners and design professionals but elicited the fewest total number of comments from
the contractors. Contractors generally commented that the public benefits when the project
team relationship is improved, in that projects are delivered with "less risk for delays [and]
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claims," and they "receive better accountability through open book methods of contract
administration67" and "better use oftaxpayer dollars."
One extended comment from a contractor questioned the premise of the question:
If one is willing to take the broad view and consider the public at large
as the "owner" of Public Works projects, then it would seem logical that
the benefits to the owner section could conceivably be duplicated here.
Outside of the broad view, the issue of a potential increase in quality,
value, schedule, etc., may have a direct impact on the public. This
would be in the form of quicker access to, use of, and/or enjoyment of a
public facility, highway, etc. Aside from this "potential" I see little benefit
to the public at large.

But generally it is fair to conclude that contractors felt that the public benefits from
lower risk and "enhanced potential for project productivity" creating lower construction
costs.

5.5.1.2 Contractor's Perceived Drawbacks of CM/GC

While contractor's felt there were a lot of benefits of CMlGC, they provided far
fewer comments regarding drawbacks. While there were thirty (30) benefits to contractor
comments, there were only thirteen (13) drawbacks accruing to contractor comments.
Most of the drawback to the contractor comments reflected the lower fees derived from
CMlGC contracts and complaints and fiustrations about the non-level playing field of
competition. The following comments are examples ofthe latter:

However, Section 2 ofthis research documents the Audits Division of the Oregon Secretary of State's
office audit of several CMlGC prison projects and their conclusion does not appear to support the claim
of better accountability. Further, it should be noted that the model contracting rules (see Oregon
Administrative Rules 137-30) requires an auditing provision on all public contracts, which is mirrored
in most agency construction contracts.

67
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•

First, foremost and generally likely is the potential for abuse. The
misuse of the CM/GC delivery method as a means of getting around
fair solicitation practices hurts all but a very few privileged
contractors.

•

The contractors with little or no experience in the process have very
few options in the way that they can develop the necessary
experience to compete in the CM/GC RFQ/RFP solicitation process.
It's the old Catch 22: one needs the experience to get the projects,
yet needs the projects to gain the experience. Unlike bonding
capacity, it is very difficult to grow into qualifying requirements
necessary to compete.

•

CM/GC projects tend to cherry pick the larger, more desirable
projects out of the general marketplace.

•

The success of CM/GC for the contractor depends upon the skills of
the personnel the contractor has assigned to the project. They are
different skills than a design-bid-build contractor uses to make
money.

•

Difficult to impossible to penetrate existing relationships i.e.
[CONTRACTOR NAME] and the Port of Portland and Justice
System.

•

Harder for the smaller, newer contractor to obtain work.

•

Contractors must develop staff resources and knowledge of CM/GC
to be competitive for public CM/GC contracts.

While generally positive about CMlGC, contractors do acknowledge its
drawbacks, particularly on smaller and up and coming contractors and their ability to
obtain negotiated work in competition with the more established firms. In addition, there
has to be a change in attitude that is difficult for some project team members to assume, to
"shift to [an] owner first mentality." Further, in order to compete successfully, the CMlGC
has to devote more time and money to "marketing," and those who depended solely on the
competitive bid market in the early years of the CMlGC implementation saw fewer jobs
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coming their way.68 This increase, and in some cases start-up of marketing department
costs, is an added "overhead" cost that must be paid from construction fees, thereby
reducing the aggregate profit ofthe organization.
Contractors made few comments regarding drawbacks to design professionals, and
some of the comments on the surface do not appear to be drawbacks, for example, "allows
fast track construction at the public level" and "allows contractors to influence design with
cost schedule issues." Why contractors considered these to be drawbacks to the design
professional is not clear. Also, the comment that "the architect is no longer working in a
vacuum; the contractor is looking over its shoulder and this sometimes annoys son1e
architects" is directly in conflict with the comment that the team approach alleviates much
ofthe project animosities.
Contractors also commented, "I've never known any [drawbacks], ask an
architect" but added from the contractor perspective, ''Not sure there are any." And finally
this:

The drawback for design professionals may have some dependency on
the ethical nature and/or the quality of the firm and the construction
sawy or sophistication of the owner. A less than higher quality firm,
which might normally have little concern of performing QC work and
being paid directly by the owner. Aside from that anomaly the process
should only benefit a design professional.

68 Note that there was a substantial concentration of early CM/GC awards to one contractor. On the
order of 19 of the fIrst 21 projects were awarded to one general contractor who probably had the most
established marketing apparatus in place because they competed in both the public bid and private
negotiated construction markets. The shift to negotiated public construction contracts played directly
into their strategic strengths, which resulted in capturing the lion's share of the market in the early
years. This changed as other contractor developed better marketing skills and the market matured to
where it is today with more broadly distributed awards.
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This essentially means that the drawbacks to the design professional may be
outside the PDS itself, but are rooted in the owner, architect and contractor's failings,
irrespective ofthe PDS.

5.5.1.3 Contractor's Perceived Benefits of DBB Contracting
Contractors seem to comment that the benefits of DBB contracting are primarily
financial because of reduced administrative costs, "Marketing department not required"
and "opportunity for maximum profit." It's "easier to acquire work" but the work "may
not be profitable." It's easier for a contractor to penetrate new and different markets and
easier for "newer contractors to get work." It may be easier to motivate personnel to
perform because they "can be profit oriented" as opposed to "owner first."
Good DBB contractors with well trained personnel can successfully execute work
under DBB, and on occasion DBB is the best PDS for both the contractor, its
subcontractors and the owner, as the following comments attest:

•

By a clean record of good performance and financial stability, a
contractor can grow bonding capacity and therefore increase overall
number and dollar size of the projects they can go after and complete
for. While some of the "Catch 22" problems exist here too, it is not
quite as insurmountable.

•

Lump sum bid or design-bid-build (DBB) is generally best understood
by both the public contracting entities and the construction industry, has
the strictest rules and remedies for all in the event of a failure of any
party to adhere to those rules. For these reasons, it is therefore less
likely to be abused.

•

Skills in construction management, fair treatment of subcontractors,
good record of performance and stability leading to lower bonding costs
all provide a "good" contractor with legitimate means of gaining a
competitive edge.
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Contractors see fewer benefits ofDtaccruing to design professionals, with only
five comments and one of those being "?".

d another that "Some design professionals

will like to not have to include the contract+ in the pre-construction phase (they are short
sighted, of course)" are probably honest and maybe even true, but seem kind of meanspirited.
Ultimately contractors view CMlGC as providing design professionals with more
benefits, but they do comment that the "old tried and true project delivery system" that is
understood well by most parties, and the freedom to assert "more control over the design
processes," are benefits ofthe DBB PDS that accrue to the design professionals.
Contractors disagree on benefits to the owner, one stating that "I don't see any. The
only one I have heard 'floated' is the certainty of the bid price, with which I vehemently
disagree. Change orders on a bid job can hurt an agency budget badly." Others comment
that DBB "insures the greatest [amount of] competition" and "depending on the design,"
results in ''the cheapest price available."
According to contractors, the benefits that accrue to the owner are the same as
those that accrue to the public in general. In fact, of the six comments provided by
contractors, one is word for word the same and all but one, that there is "less potential for
the perception of unfairness in the public works arena," which was not mentioned with
regard to owners, are similar.

5.5.1.4 Contractor's Perceived Drawbacks of DBB Contracting
While it is fair to say that the drawbacks to DBB Contracting that accrue to the
contractor are principally the opposite ofthe benefits that accrue under CMlGC, the lack of
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a cooperative and team-oriented relationship stands out. The competitive bid award that
creates the adversarial relationship can be blamed for virtually every drawback comment
that contractors raised:

•

"Increased" and "very high risk"

•

Creates owner's rep and the architect/engineer as decided
adversaries

•

Lack of repeat business objective

•

All parties in an adversarial position (protect [your] own turf)

•

The amount of fires increase

•

Bad jobs get worse

Not explained, of course, is that DBB "must" create or result in an adversarial
relationship - which is not necessarily true69 , but if one does assume it to be the case, a
logical explanation of how and why should have been forthcoming. Conversely, it is not
necessarily the case that CMlOC completely eliminates the possibility of an adversarial
relationship, but admittedly, project professionals report that it happens a lot less often, but
as seen in [99], some of the owners commented that the relationship was little changed
fromDBB.

5.5.2 Owners
Project owners accounted for 129 of the 499 responses, or nearly 26%. These
included 79 on CMlOC (58 of which were benefits) and 50 on DBB (29 of which were
drawbacks).

Much literature has been de.voted to the concept of "Partnering" as a method of reducing adversarial
relationships on projects [96].

69
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5.5.2.1 Owner's Perceived Benefits of CM/GC
Owners clearly see the greatest benefit of the CMlGC PDS accruing to the
contractor, principally through the reduction of risk and "working in a cooperative team
atmosphere." Risk is further reduced by the "opportunity to fully understand the job before
committing to a GMP."
Design professionals, according to owners, benefit from CMlGC through lowered
risk of claims (perhaps owing to the fact that the CMlGC better understands the contract
documents and works with designer during their part of the preparation, therefore the
chance of a misunderstanding of the contract requirements is reduced, which in tum
reduces the possibility ofclaims).
Owners see themselves and the public in general to be the biggest beneficiary from
CMlGC PDS, but are split on some specifics. These comments are examples:

•

Requires less sophisticated staff by owner if architect/engineer is
used to administer the construction contract.

•

Contractor can sacrifice quality and schedule for profit if owner does
not have sufficient resources or knowledge to provide administration
and quality control.

•

Contractor can make additional profits through change orders if the
drawings and specifications are poor quality and the owner is not
knowledgeable.

And these regarding the working relationship on the job:

•

This process almost always creates an adversarial relationship with
the contractor since his objective is to maximize profits and the
owner's objective is to minimize costs.

•

Team approach in completing project
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And these regarding the types ofprojects it should be used on:

•

Works best on small projects, less technically complex projects ...

•

Contracting method to deal fairly with complex projects having
significant unknowns (for example: remodels/seismic upgrades).

And finally on Cost:

•

Ensures the public the lowest cost project ...

•

CM/GC results in a lower overall price ...

•

This process does not necessarily guarantee the lowest life-cycle
cost or the best quality project for the cost.

In fact, it appears that some ofthe respondents were confused about which question
they were answering, particularly in light of the fact that they appeared to "cut and paste"
in the san1e answers to different questions, in some cases both benefits and drawbacks of
the same PDS.
At least one owner forthrightly stated that CMlGC allowed the "opportunity to
choose the contractor" that the agency wanted and exclude contractors they didn't want to
use. (Two others made similar but less pointed statements regarding choice of contractor.)

It was clearly not the intent of the exemption clause to allow the public agency owner the
ability to exclude contractors on public projects, but the possibility certainly exists
whenever such latitude is afforded "less-than-perfect" human beings. In order to avert such
an abuse of discretion, agencies generally have adopted policies governing selections, but
these policies are in no way unifonn nor are they statutorily required. And, instead of
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tightening up the statutory scheme, the legislature in Oregon enacted more sweeping
exemptions for its university system and Oregon Health & Sciences University.70

5.5.2.2 Owner's Perceived Drawbacks of CM/GC
Owners remarked that contractor's only drawbacks resulting from CMlac are the
additional financial burdens of "lots of up-front marketing," taking more time to complete
the job (due perhaps to extensive pre-construction services period), and the inability to
"strike it rich" on a given job.
Owners see few drawbacks accruing to design professionals, except that they have
to surrender some of their "pride of ownership in the design" to the team, and that they
"have to deal with the contractor's comments [and] opinions." For the owner and the
public in general, owners seem to agree that the process "could cost more up front," and
that the process "takes longer [and] professional fees are higher" and "may cost a little
more than a hard bid job." Another drawback is the fact that there is no clear objective
winner in the selection process and that the "selection process may be viewed as biased by
some contractors calling into questions ethics and public administration." But others saw
no drawbacks to the use of CMlac PDS.

5.5.2.3 Owners Perceived Benefits of DBB Contracting
Owners commented that contractors benefit most from DBB PDS in that the
selection process is very objective and the opportunity for profits especially through
ORS 351.086 Oregon University System exempt from certain laws; authority to contract with public
agencies. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and ORS chapter 352, the provisions ofORS
chapters 240, 279, 282 and 292 do not apply to the Oregon University System.
70
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"change orders" (one commented "Lots of'), is higher, including through deceptive
bidding practices.
Design professionals gain little benefit from DBB, according to owners, except that
it is a common practice that designers are familiar with and that they have complete control
over the design process, and once they've finished the design, "they are done."
Owners benefit from the bid process by obtaining the lowest first price and,
depending on the quality ofthe contract documents, perhaps the lowest overall price - after
claims and change orders. Owners may even "get a bid price below what the actual cost
is."

5.5.2.4 Owner's Perceived Drawbacks of DBB Contracting
Owner's comments on drawbacks ofDBB were principally concerned with money
issues and risk, principally that the contractor has higher risk and initial profit margins are
low with the "opportunity to lose a lot ofmoney." Design professionals have to do a better
job of writing specifications and drawing the plans to avoid claims by the contractor, and
they may have to redesign certain parts ofthe job to meet the budget and are forced to work
in an "adversarial situation at times." Owners face the prospect of getting a contractor they
do not know or may not want, and may be faced with a lot of change orders, which drive
up the cost of the work beyond the allowable budget. The public in general may suffer
from higher cost, lower quality work, particularly if the "contractor embraces claims as a
way ofdoing business."
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5.5.3 Design Professionals
Design professionals accounted for about 18% of the total comments and were
fairly balanced in assessing benefits (45) and drawbacks (43) but gave the majority (60%)
oftheir comments on the CMlGC PDS.

5.5.3.1 Design Professional's Perceived Benefits of CM/GC
Design professionals comments regarding benefits accruing to the contractor from
CMlGC were generally along the same lines as the contractor saw them: "less adversarial

relationship;" "less risk from unknowns;" the ability to have "input on constructability
issues."

Oddly, design professionals commented that the administrative costs for the

contractor and cost ofpreparing for the selection cost less, when in fact administrative costs
are necessarily higher due to pre-construction services and additional cost reporting
required for a cost reimbursable contract. Also, the cost to prepare the kinds of documents
required for a CMlGC selection are significantly more detailed and difficult to prepare than
a simple bid, particularly when the total cost of marketing is factored in.
They themselves benefit from the process by working with the contractor in a less
adversarial context during the design phase, resulting in fewer instances of "redesign" for
budget purposes.
Owners and the public in general benefit from "less risk of change orders;" "more
certainty of the final costs;" lower "possibility of claims;" and getting "higher quality"
projects that have a better chance of being completed "on time." These perceptions are not
entirely borne out in this research; while quality may be higher, and that is difficult to
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judge, the CMlGC projects do not have a higher likelihood of finishing on time or lower
total change order costs.

5.5.3.2 Design Professional's Perceived Drawbacks of CM/GC
Design professionals probably see themselves as the most negatively affected by
the CMlGC PDS as evidenced by the following comments:

•

Must be willing to spend some extra time revising documents when
input is gathered from contractor during pre-construction.

•

Contractor can control the pre-con phase, extended time for
architect during design.

•

Possible conflicts when more individuals are involved in the design.

•

Higher price, typically about 15%.

•

With no competition, it is a more difficult position if it is felt that the
price of a system should be less.

•

Required extra time for inclusion and involvement with the
contractor, typically the contractor is not very good at estimating
design drawings instead of completed documents and
specifications.

Contractors, on the other hand, suffer only from the fact that the original estimates
and budgets may not reflect the final product, particularly when the contractor has to "lock
in" a price based on incomplete information. The owner and public in general may suffer
from higher costs and unscrupulous contractor pricing and the possibility that a contractor
may be selected for factors other than being the best to do the job based on "relationships
and not qualifications."
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5.5.3.3 Design Professional's Perceived Benefits of DBB Contracting
The basic fairness ofthe bidding environment is the major benefit ofDBB PDS for
contractors according to the design professionals, but they see little benefit accruing to
themselves (only four comments, and none dealing with the actual "work''). Again, design
professionals comment that owners and the public in general benefit due to lower initial
costs (and possibly lower total costs) and having a larger pool of contractors looking at the
job.

5.5.3.4 Design Professional's Perceived Drawbacks of DBB Contracting
The drawbacks to DBB PDS come from increased risk due to unknown pricing
prior to bid, which may cause the project to be dropped or redesigned. They note an
increased risk of claims, a more adversarial relationship that can generate "conflicts and
claims [that] could delay completion." Finally, design professionals note that the "most
qualified contractor is not always selected," which may mean a lower quality project.
5.5~4 Attorneys

The unique perspective of the attorneys in this survey is described above. As a
group they contributed sixty one (61) ofthe nearly five hundred comments, or a little more
than 12% of the total responses. One thing that sets the attorneys apart from some of the
other respondents is the length ofsome oftheir responses, many being several lines long.
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5.5.4.1 Attorney's Perceived Benefits of CM/GC
Seifer notes that, "any contract serves the primary purpose of allocating the risks
and responsibilities between the parties" [185], and therefore it is not surprising that the
attorneys focused many of their comments on "risk" and risk reduction. With respect to
the benefits that accrue to the contractor:

•

The contractor is clearly able to identify its risks and negotiate specific
terms in the contract that it would otherwise simply have to accept as
part of the RFP or ITB process, which may increase its profit and
decrease its risk on the project. It may also exclude out of the project,
elements it does not want to undertake, that it would otherwise have to
accept.

• -Less risk more certainty to profit percentage, may be low but fair
certainty that that's what you book.
•

I think for the contractor the negotiated public contracting process offers
much more "certainty". The negotiated process involves more
opportunity to understand the project and the owner's objectives and a
contractor is much surer of the costs, adequacy of design plans and
overall reasonableness of the construction project before it begins. The
negotiated process involves the contractor at a much earlier state,
which benefits project communications which can lead to more
certainty.

Attorneys also commented on the flexibility granted the contractor and the owner
under CMlGC, and the better team relationship that seems to result:

•

OAR's do allow some ability to negotiate some terms of the contract 
time of performance - LD's, can't negotiate statutory requirements i.e.
prevailing wages.

•

Fee based performance - advantageous because becomes more of a
"Partnered" less adversarial.
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Design professionals, according to attorneys, benefit least of the stakeholders; in
fact, only one genuinely positive comment was made:

•

I think the project design professionals benefit from a negotiated project
for the same reasons the contractors and owners benefit--more
certainty. The contractor and designers talk much earlier in the
process, and this helps to define issues and affords everyone an
opportunity to become familiar with the project objectives. The
standard bid process has the designers estimating construction costs in
a vacuum, which leaves the public owner in a tough position in terms of
project budgeting. When a project is put to bid and it comes back too
high, this leaves the owner frustrated and the designers looking bad.
The negotiated process helps to reduce the chance of error, lawsuits
and disappointments.
Attorneys commented that owners and the public in general also benefit from both

the reduction in risk (which includes greater cost and schedule performance certainty, as
well as a lower chance of claims) and the different contractual structure:

•

Greater certainty as to completion: in a Lump sum the owner chooses
the time, in CG/MC the CM negotiates the date to complete and that
means the date is more certain. In LS the GC might just add LD's to
bid price risk.

•

I think the project owner benefits by being more assured that he/she will
get what he/she expects. In my opinion and experience, the
ordinary/regular "low bid" process was a lot like a game of chance--you
really didn't know what you were getting with that low bid. Furthermore,
it's tough to throw out the low bidder unless it is obvious way, way, way,
way out of any reasonable ball park. Low bidder doesn't necessarily
mean highest quality either. However, high bidder doesn't mean high
quality either. That's my point: price shouldn't drive a public (private or
any other kind) of project! With a negotiated public contracting process,
the public owner gets to introduce many more issues (Le. quality,
timeliness, project coordination, involvement of MBE/wBE & DBE's,
etc.) into the discussion. Being able to introduce those types of
substantive issues into the discussion with a contractor is a good thing
for the public.

•

General reduction of claims, less pass through claims.
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•

Single point of responsibility: owner does not get caught between a
designer and the contractor.

Perhaps because the owner can select the CM/ac contractor on a basis other than
lowest price, overall project quality is seen as another benefit ofthe CM/ac PDS:
•

Prescreen and solicit good capable contractors, not just everybody that
is not irresponsible.

•

Price can become a secondary selection criteria, could be quality.

•

I believe the public at large benefits from higher quality projects that are
built more on time and within budget. The reason is that the (astute)
public owner can build a multitude of incentives into a negotiated deal
to ensure that the contractor is highly motivated to do a great job. For
example: a negotiated deal might include performance incentives (Le.
sharing in a projects savings), which can help boost a contractors
margin. Those kinds of "money in the pocket' incentives work, and the
public at large benefits. Theoretically, the public benefits from lower
taxes, but more directly the public benefits from better projects.

5.5.4.2 Attorney's Perceived Drawbacks of CM/GC

While attorneys as a group recognize several benefits to the use of CM/ac on
public building projects, their observations also caution significant drawbacks for all of the
stakeholders. In the case of"contractors" these are financial market-related risks:
•

Fewer contractors have the ability to participate.

•

Less than level playing field to get the benefits of public works.

•

Tends to favor larger, union-oriented contractors (my observation) at
expense of smaller shops.

•

If an owner doesn't use adequate safeguards, the negotiated public
process can easily turn into a "closed" process. This type of process
can reduce competition because usually the process starts with an RFI
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to narrow the field to the relatively small group of contractors who will
be asked to submit answers to an RFP. The contractor who wins the
RFP is the one who gets to negotiate. This can be a closed process
that hurts contractors, particularly smaller, less RFI/RFP sawy players.

And particularly with respect to subcontractors:
•

Second tier subcontractor - it is a beauty contest against/between big
contractors. Locks out smaller contractors, nobody gets fired for buying
IBM syndrome. This leads to some economic waste because the lack
of competition in the long run will eventually raise costs. Also, not every
sub will bid the beauty queen and thus the public will not get the lowest
price possible.

This comment is practically the only comment received that specifically recognizes
the fact that by reducing the competition from several general contractors competing for a
project to one negotiating for the work, that other parties could be damaged. Further, here
the respondent points out that, "in the long run [this process] will eventually raise costs,"
which is precisely what theory would predict and a reasonable interpretation of what the
state found in [135]. However, recall from Section 2.6.3, the court in ABC v. Tri-Met
expressed little concern for subcontractors and the relationship between subcontractors and
the general contractor, opting instead to interpret ORS Chapter 279 to principally apply to
the relationship between the government agency and the general contractor.
Attorneys did not consider the design professionals to suffer many drawbacks from
·the CMlGC PDS. In fact, the sole comment on this subject from attorneys concerned
reduction in fees due to fewer field adjustments, which in some sense is not necessarily a
drawback, particularly if the designer is on a fixed-fee basis.
Owners and the public in general lose out some when competition is reduced and
in fact commented that CMIGC can make a problem project worse for owners:
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•

Often no cost savings.

•

Less competition may not lead to best or most effective results; CM/GC
is best when used with some competitive selection process.

•

Often cost savings very elusive.

•

When it works, it works well; when it fails, it results in major disasters
(Le. owner has less control over outcome, particularly during course of
performance).

In addition, attorneys recognized there may be some unforeseen costs associated

with implementing the process that the owner may not consider:
•

I think the primary drawback for the project owner is the costs and
personnel time it takes to effectively conduct a negotiated public
contracting project process. This type of construction delivery system is
not for every public owner. The public owner must devote the
appropriate level of time and have the necessary staff of consultant
talent available to "negotiate" a good/fair contract.

•

The negotiated process, if not handled properly (see comments above)
could actually lead to higher project costs without commensurate
benefits. Also, as I mentioned earlier, the negotiated process allows a
public owner to more creatively and legally address other relevant
issues such as MBEIWBE/DBE involvement, but unless the public
owner has skilled, experienced staff doing the negotiating, then such
goals may not be attainable.

5.5.4.3 Attorney's Perceived Benefits of DBB Contracting

The benefits of DBB PDS, according to attorney respondents, are few and limited
to issues like objectivity and fairness in contractor selection. For contractors, they also
observed that DBB can result in more profits if executed properly. Owners may be able to
shift more risk to the contractor, if, of course, the plans and specifications are adequate.
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And, once the bid price is received, there may be greater certainty as to the final cost,
although that observation was disputed by the other parties in the survey above.

5.5.4.4 Attorney's Perceived Drawbacks of DBB Contracting
Attorneys made the fewest comments regarding drawbacks to DBB, with only ten
(10) comments, and one of those being "few." The two principal comments appear to be
that the owner does not realize the benefit of an experienced and creative building
professional during the design that may result in delays and additional costs. In addition, as
one respondent observed:

•

Nothing is "guaranteed" in the construction work, and a project that
begins as a lump sum bid might end up with a stretched budget in the
end. Things happen along the way and the "lump sum" may have to
change, and the owner has to be financially prepared for that potential
reality.

And design professionals may be among those carrying the greatest burden under
this PDS as one comment suggests:

•

5.6

I think the design professionals are under a lot of pressure to do things
right (well documented design, excellent cost estimates, etc.) with a
lump sum bid job. The owner will really be very dependent on the
accuracy of designer documents and very upset if things go awry with
what he/she thought was a "lump sum" bid.

Summary of Survey Responses
One constant theme throughout these survey responses is the belief that the

CMlGC PDS process reduces risk by giving the builder a better understanding ofthe plans
and specifications at the time when the price for the work is established. Since the process
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includes the builder during the design phase as an equal member of the construction team,
the relationship between the owner, contractor and architect/engineer is greatly improved.
The builder's input during design and estimating throughout the design process is felt to
avoid the need for costly redesigns and change orders after the contract price is established,
thus making for greater certainty of the project costs to the owner. Also, since the CMlGC
Contractor is on the team during the early stages, it is felt that a more reasonable and
accurate construction schedule can be developed, leading to greater certainty in the
completion of the work. The better relationship between the parties is thought to deliver a
better project, higher quality, on time and perhaps at a lower cost. There is near unifonn
agreement that there are fewer "claims" for additional compensation and change orders
when CMlGC is used, although the data from Oregon shows that "claims" are actually rare
in both CMlGC and DBB projects.

By no means are CMlGC projects immune from

"claims" as documented in Appendix F above. Nevertheless, the word "claim,,71 (or lack
thereof) is consistently used to describe one of the benefits of CMlGC and the drawbacks
ofDBB.
The assertion that CMlGC results in lower and more predictable costs is contrary to
what competitive bidding theory and empirical studies would suggest. The data from the
Oregon projects in this research does not support the conclusion that there is greater
predictability in either cost or schedule metrics, which is consistent with the ClI study

The tenn "claim" evokes an almost irrational emotional response from both owners and design
professionals, as though all "claims" are frivolous and without merit. Yet, a large portion of claims are
settled in negotiation or mediation or entitlement is established and quantum awarded by a court.
Owners, almost uniformly fear what they describe as "claims oriented" contractors, who in the owner's
mind underbid the costs of a job in order to make it up on change orders and claims. This, in spite of
the fact that these contractors on average appear to save the owner money, according to [135].

71
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[183]. The research perfonned by Lattimer [135] suggests that having mUltiple bidders on
a project creates significant cost savings on the overall project; however, these results are
disputed by the building Contractors. They assert that CMlGC results in lower costs,
particularly on complex building projects, which are significantly different from the
highway contracts studied in [135]. Attorneys, some owners and design professionals do
agree that there may be higher overall project costs, owing in part to the fact that there is an
extensive pre-construction effort and a higher level of cost reporting required in CMlGC,
both of which are costs not found in DBB. However, they point out, as do the contractors,
that the fees contractors extract in CMlGC are lower on average because they reflect a
lower risk than DBB contract. Also, the fact that the owner pays more for pre-construction
work actually results in higher quality projects, with lower risk of redesign and change
order costs. Left unsaid, of course, is the fact that the initial negotiated GMP has a higher
likelihood of including the possible change order costs up front, rather than on the back
side ofthe project. In short, since the CMlGC contractor has an opportunity to clear up any
misunderstandings or ambiguities in the plans and specifications prior to establishing the
GMP, it is less likely that he will wrongly interpret an ambiguity in the contract docwnents
that results in a lower initial cost.
Risk to the contractor in DBB is cited as a major drawback to the DBB PDS, in
spite of the fact that Kagel and Levin [118] determined that construction contractors rarely
suffered winner's curse and that bonding of major subcontractors can ameliorate some of
the single largest risk to the general contractor in DBB. But there should be no doubt that
construction contracting is a risky business and contractors have been known to make a lot
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of money on projects and lose a lot of money on projects. The CMlGC PDS through
negotiated procurement clearly reduces the risk ofthose kinds ofprofit and loss swings.
The adversarial relationship created under DBB PDS is another major issue
discussed as a drawback to DBB and conversely, its reduction as a benefit ofCMlGC PDS.
The reason for this paradigm is probably multi-factorial, but most likely is rooted in the
cross-financial objectives of the parties as pointed out by one of the respondents: The
"contractor's objective is to make money while the owner's objective is to cut costs," and
that naturally leads to friction. One construction company owner interviewed in the course
of this research stated that in the 1960's his company was turning away work with fees of
twenty to twenty five percent (20% - 25%). Today, large DBB projects are bid in the range
of three to four percent (3% - 4%) and CMlGC jobs result in negotiated fees as low as two
percent (2%)! That reduction in fee consequently reduces the contractor's ability to absorb
additional costs for unforeseen conditions or errors in the plans and specifications. That
means those costs must be passed on to the owner, who arguably gets the benefit of the
lower initial cost.
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6

Case Comparison Review
The principal reason that construction projects are offered by bid in an auction

market institution as opposed to other pricing models is that they are generally considered
unique.

This characteristic also makes it very difficult to compare project outcomes.

Critics of such analyses have rightly pointed out that you will never build the same project
in the same location under the same environmental, financial and market conditions a
second time [150]. As much as analysts try to measure one project against another, the
reality of the construction environment and differences between projects make
comparisons between all but the simplest of structures subject to doubt. For that reason
studies like [75] and the present one tend to measure project perfotn;lance in tenns of
metrics like cost and schedule growth instead of cost efficiency measures like cost per
square foot. The present research, as well as the studies by the crr cited in Chapter 2 and
Appendix E, have evaluated PDS's, in short by their ability to assist construction project
management in delivering projects as promised at the tune the deal was established.

6.1

Research Question #5: Direct Project Comparisons
A senior partner in one of the :finns that supplied data for this research pointed out

that the Oregon database includes three elementary schools that were constructed using
essentially the same design. Two of the school designs were based on the first and were
constructed in the same time frame, using different PDS' s. He suggested that a case study
could be perfonned on those schools and went on to point out that his :finn, which designed
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all three schools for the srune Owner, had different experiences with the different PDS's
used.

6.1.1

Nancy Ryles Elementary - Prototype School
The Nancy Ryles Elementary School located in the southern part of the Beaverton

School District was built in 1991 as a prototype school design for the rapidly growing
District72.

The elementary school was originally approximately 56,000 SF and was built

using the CMlGC PDS. The original GMP was $4,675,000 and incurred cost and program
growth to a final $5,041,777 actually paid to the CMlGC, an increase of 7.85%. The
school was opened on schedule and incurred no schedule growth. In 1996 Nancy Ryles
underwent a second phase that added several additional classrooms and approximately
12,000 to 13,000 SF, for a new total of 68,000 to 69,000 SF.

The second phase was a

DBB project.
The fact that the project was a prototype may have more to do with the fact that the
cost growth was slightly higher than the average for projects in the Oregon database for
both CMlGC and DBB PDS' s than the choice of PDS itself. Schedule growth at 0% was
lower than the mean ofthe Oregon database for both PDS' S73.
Once completed, and the design consultants and owner management team had
compiled all of the "lessons learned" from the job, the Nancy Ryles school was to serve as
Information on the Beaverton School District can be found at www.beaverton.k12.or.us
It should be noted that very few of the schools in the Oregon database show that they finished early
and nearly all of the schools finished on time. This is in part due to the unique structure of the "school
year" in Oregon and elsewhere, that the school building site is essentially vacant during the summer
months and there is little value in completing school building in July when it won't be occupied until
September. Conversely, it is extremely important that the building be ready for occupancy when the
school year begins or there will be serious educational, social and financial consequences to the District
and the student body.
72
73
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a prototype for future similar sized elementary schools in the district. The designs for
future schools in the district over the next decade or so would use essentially the same
"cookie cutter" type design layout, modified and oriented to fit the specific sites.

6.1.2 Bond Levy Construction
In the November 1996 general election, the Beaverton School District successfully
passed a capital construction levy in order to fimd the construction of new schools needed
to accommodate the rapidly expanding student population in the district. There was an
immediate need for a new elementary school in the north part of the district, with a new
elementary school in the southern part ofthe district needed a year later, in the fall of 1999.
After some time to digest the outcome of the election, to refine their student population
estimates, identify sites, and decide on construction priorities, the District directed their
Architect to "dust off' the Nancy Ryles prototype drawings and update them for the new
site selected along Northwest Saltzman Road. The school needed to be open for the 1998
school year, only eighteen (18) months more or less from the beginning of design.
Most elementary school construction programs, particularly under DBB, are a
twenty four (24) to thirty (30) month process.

This school, to be named Findley

Elementary after the family that had farmed the area for five (5) generations, had to be
opened in a year and a half. This being the case, the Local Contract Review Board74
declared an emergency and exempted the new school project from the competitive bidding

74 See ORS 279.011(1) and ORS 279.055 for defmitions and duties of the Local Contract Review
Boards.
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requirement under ORS 279.015, allowing the District to immediately bring on a CMlOC
to accelerate or "fast-track" the construction process.
The District immediately solicited for competitive proposals from the construction
community to perform CMlOC services on the project. The process involved a pre
qualification and selection phases that included SUbmitting a proposal with the highest rated
CMlGC proposers to be interviewed. When this "RFP" process was complete, the District

selected and entered into an agreement with the highest rated CMlOC proposer.
The construction team, consisting of the District management, the architect's team,
and the CMlOC, immediately started to work on plans and budget. A target amount had
been set by the District and the architect, based in part on the Nancy Ryles project costs
with scope additions and site work changes for the new school in order to meet the overall
bonded program requirements. The District determined that the new school would be
larger than Nancy Ryles, approximately 70,000 SF. Therefore, the architect's team began
by making changes in the plans based on scope changes and the site work, while the
CMlGC started to put together construction budgets for the eventual GMP. The District

team had the responsibility of deciding what to add and what to take out, depending on the
costs and the funds available.
The process did not go smoothly. The CMlOC's cost estimates were significantly
over the budgets the District and their architect had established. The architect made
numerous revisions to the plans, at the direction of the District, in order to reduce the
overall project costs. According to the design team, this was a very frustrating period
because, "the CMlOC would not come to the table with solutions or suggestions for cost
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savings; they merely gave us a cost estimate for the design solutions [the architect's team]
developed" [215]. In the end, the original CMlGC was not able to negotiate a GMP with
the District and the decision was made to part ways.
Months had elapsed since the original RFP had gone out and the time frame for
construction had necessarily been reduced, making the situation all the more serious for the
District. Luckily, the District was able to come to a quick agreement with the second
highest rated CMlGC to take over the project, and according to the architect, ''within two to
three weeks, they had negotiated a GMP" that was substantially lower than the previous
CMlGC had proposed and was within the District's original target range. The original
GMP for the project was $6,905,000. The project proceeded as required to be ready for the
opening of school in the first week of September 1997; however, the project did experience
cost growth of approximately seven percent (7.0%) over the original GMP to a final
amount paid of$7,388,000 (or an additional $483,000.)75
At the same time the Findley School was initiated, the District identified the need
for another elementary school in the south. However, that school, which would come to be
known as the Scholls-Heights Elementary School, would not be needed until the start of
school in the fall of 1999. This meant that there would be no need to "fast track" the job, as
it fell within the nonnal program parameters ofDBB for schools, particularly since the near
identical design was being implemented at Findley. The decision was made to use DBB
for the Scholls-Heights School, whose name was taken from the Oregon Pioneer and great
nephew ofthe woodsman Daniel Boone, Peter Scholls.

75

The Nancy Ryles School had cost growth of7.85% for a total of $366,777.
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Scholls-Heights was bid while the Findley School was under construction, and
while the two schools had nearly identical floor plans, there was some difference in the
amount of site work (less at Scholls than Findley). Scholls is listed in the Oregon database
as being slightly smaller at 69,000 SF compared with Findley at 70,000 SF, but according
to the Architect, they are the same design. Scholls-Heights received an unknown nmnber
of competitive sealed bids76 and awarded the job to the low bid contractor for a price of
$6,405,000, exactly $500,000 less than the Findley GMP established just a year earlier.
The architect commented that while some of the difference could be attributed to
the site work differences, ''There was no one big difference in the projects that accounts for
the difference in costs."

''The Scholls project was consistently lower in every cost

category." Furthermore, in spite of the fact that inflation during the period was very low,
there was some cost inflation, and more importantly, the employment levels in construction
during the Scholls project were at record levels in Oregon, higher than during the Findley
project77 • With higher levels of employment, fewer bidders feel the need to be risk taking,
thus you expect higher not lower bidding. None of the environmental or endogenous
factors accounts for the difference in costs except perhaps the fact that one project was
competitively bid and the other was not.
Scholls-Heights opened on September ih, 1999; as with Findley, the project was
on time, but did experience cost growth. However, perhaps due in part to lessons learned
76 The architect had no records of this type for the project, having turned them over to the District, and
the Beaverton School District was unable to locate any files related to bidding of the job for the
purposes of this research - meaning that they may still have the documents stored somewhere but there
was nobody available to look for them and the only way they could be found and retrieved would be if
someone paid the District to do so.
77 The Oregon Economic Forecast showed that 86,500 were employed in the construction sector in the
third quarter of 1999, whereas one 83,300 were employed in the third quarter of 1998.
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on Findley, the cost growth on Scholls-Heights was considerably less, at only three percent
(3%) for a total of$192,150. In the final analysis, Findley cost the District nearly twelve
percent (12%) more than Scholls-Heights, nearly $10.00 per square foot of building floor
area, which according to the architect, could not be accounted for by any specific
difference in the jobs [215].

6.2

Summary of the Case Comparison Study
Table 26 presents a summary ofthe two projects evaluated in this chapter.
Findley

Scholls

CM/GC

DBB

1998

1999

70,000 sf

69,000 sf

Original GMP/Bid:

$6,905,000

$6,405,000

Final Amt. Paid:

$7,388,000

$6,597,150

Cost Growth:

$483,000

$192,150

Cost/sf:

$105.54

$95.61

Schedule
Performance:

On time
-17 Mo.

On time
24 Mo.

School:
PDS:

i

Year opened:
Size (sf):

Table 26 Summary of Case Comparison

As much as anything, this case comparison study demonstrates the difficulty of

comparing two construction projects, even two that have the same design, same design
team, same owner and similar time frames. How much were the costs in Findley affected
by the shortened time frame is really anybody's guess. It is known that the CMlGC on the
Findley job brought to the owner the three supposed lowest subcontract bids for each type
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of work, and unless there was some convincing reason not to, the low subcontractor was
selected. But what is not known and quite possible is that given the shortened time frame,
the CMlGC and Owner may have selected subcontractors that could perfonn the work in
the time allowed as opposed to the cheapest. In addition, as seen in the legal cases
described in Section 2.6.3, CMlGC's have broad discretion over whom they wish to "pre
qualify" for bidding subcontract work. The CMlOC on the Findley project may very well
have not solicited or accepted bids from weaker but cheaper perfonners78.
The .analysis in Chapter 4 showed that, based on the overall construction
management model, CMlGC projects perfonn better than DBB jobs. However, recall that
the statistical analysis of the output metrics indicated that there was no statistically
significant difference between the outcomes. It should be pointed out that both Findley and
Scholls-Heights fall within the cost control metric means for the overall study and both
projects perfonned well in schedule perfonnance (both with 0% schedule growth). What
the case study indicates perhaps is that while broad statements can be made, there is no
way to precisely predict the outcome of a specific project. And the choice of the PDS
needs to be carefully evaluated to meet the specific needs of the project and promises no
guaranteed outcome.
There may be another factor to be considered regarding the use of CMlGC on
certain types ofprojects. In two extended interviews with the architect and his partners and
staff for this research (the latter being [215]), these design professionals questioned the
value added by the CMlGC in public school projects.

78

In short, the professionals

The CMlOC project team was not available for comment.
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commented that they had designed literally hundreds of schools in Oregon and Washington
in their three decades of being in business, as one commented, "What is the CMlGC going
to bring to the table that we already don't know or haven't seen before?" He added,
"We've seen a lot more schools than any single contractor has because schools are pretty
much all we do, and furthennore, they are not incredibly complex jobs like a hospital or
require cutting edge materials or technology like a new office building."
While the Architect's comments and opinions here must be gIven a lot of
credibility, the analysis in Section 4.3.1 indicates that CMlGC school projects performed as
well or better than DBB school jobs. There was fewer than half the number of CMlGC
schools than DBB schools, but more CMlGC schools, seven, achieved efficient or near
efficient DEA scores, compared with only five of the DBB schools. But these analyses do
not account for differences felt by the design consulting team, which may be substantial.
As one of the interviewee's noted, the architect is usually the one that ends up bearing the
cost of changes incurred during the CMlGC process. By example the architects discussed
a school designed for a rural Oregon district. The CMlGC maintained that they would be
unable to get qualified carpenters for the job, so therefore it should be a steel frame
building. The architect objected but was directed by the owner' to make it a steel frame.
When the pricing started to show that steel would not be competitive with wood, as the
architect predicted, the architect was directed to redesign the structure using wood. This
meant a change to all ofthe details and a redesign of the main structure. Since the ''team,''
including the owner, architect and CMlGC, had agreed to "bring this job in on budget" the
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architect received no additional compensation for redrawing the plans and rewriting the
specifications for the change in structure.
This case comparison shows that CMJGC projects do not always result in a
"substantial cost savings" to the public contracting agency, nor that CMJGC projects will
always result in substantially lower construction cost growth than similar DBB projects.
However, the case comparison also shows that CMJGC can deliver jobs in a shorter overall
time frame (including both design and construction) than DBB.
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7
7.1

Summary, Conclusions and Additional Work
Summary and Findings of Analysis
This research evaluates the public policy in Oregon that allows public agencies to

exempt projects from competitive public bidding and negotiate with a construction
contractor (selected in a competitive, but subjective process) to build a project.

The

analyses presented in this dissertation shows the public policy requirement, that the pubic
agency show that the exemption from competitive bidding will result in substantial cost
savings, is not supported by the data analysis.
This research concludes that the exempted projects, the CMlGC projects, are more
efficient than the competitive bid, DBB jobs, only when the entire input-output model is
considered.

CMlGC projects do not outperform DBB projects in terms of cost and

schedule control metrics alone.

Empirical analysis, including the case study project

comparison, shows that the CMlGC projects may be more costly than similar DBB jobs.
This is also confirmed by the opinions ofvarious stakeholders surveyed.

CMlGC projects become more efficient than DBB projects through the ability to
fast -track the work. That is, to start the actual construction work with less information in
terms of the completeness ofthe plans and specifications. Since fast-tracking appears to be
the principal benefit ofCMlGC, it should be the principal reason projects are exempted.
Project stakeholders are consistently incorrect in their assertions that the use of

CMlGC PDS reduces overall project "risk," since there is no statistically significant
difference between the DBB and CMlGC jobs with respect to cost and schedule control.
These findings from the Oregon database were validated by similar data from other studies,
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principally [51, 75, 99, 126], in spite of the fact that Konchar and Sanvido [75, 126]
reached alternate conclusions.

7.2

Recommendations
We recommend that the State of Oregon revise the current public policy and shift

the exemption requirement from "significant cost savings" to a focus on "schedule"
requirements, specifically the need to fast-track the project. Also, including an analysis of
other factors, such as project complexity as suggested by the Oregon Public Contracting
Coalition [56], should be considered.
Second, we recommend that the state do a better job enforcing the requirements of
ORS 279.103, both in tenns of getting the reports done, and also making certain that the
reports are in fact the "objective analysis" required by the statute. It may require the state
to shift the responsibility for collecting and reviewing these reports from the Department of
Administrative Services to the Secretary ofState's Audit Division.

7.3

Future Work
This research is neither the final word on this DEA application or the public policy

debate regarding the procurement of construction services for public building projects.
Clearly there is a need to better understand the process by which certain types of
information are converted into inputs for DEA models in order to apply DEA to this
broader set of service sector applications. The process construction contractors undergo is
similar to the process that any professional consultant undergoes in order to produce a
product or outcome for an owner. Whether that person is an accountant, architect or
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engineer, all are given a varying amount of data from their client, which they convert into
useful inputs through some "process model" and eventually into outputs. The next step in
this process is to investigate, both in theory and application, different transformations ofthe
data to better understand and model "information" as used as an input in the DEA model.
As for the policy debate regarding construction contracting project delivery
methods, it is clear from our research that the Oregon legislature must to come to grips
with the fact that the current policy is simply unworkable since it cannot be supported by
either empirical or theoretical data analysis. The focus of this effort should be in better
aligning the policy goals with the benefits that can be achieved by the different methods.
The fact that the public pays no additional cost for starting a project at the conceptual or
preliminary design phases is a clear indication of the advantages presented by the method
that is ignored in the policy statement.

7.4

Limitations of the Study
The limitations of this study were addressed in Chapter 1 and are repeated here in

brief:
•

The study is limited to building projects and may not be generalized to the
broader construction industry that includes heavy highway and industrial
projects.

•

The study considered only building projects in Oregon and may not be
generalized to all states (although Washington state is discussed) or the
federal government.
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•

The Expert Panel members may have been biased, but the panel was
balanced with members from three stakeholder groups. Furthermore, the
metrics derived from the Expert Panel were substantially similar to those
used in the other PDS studies, and much of the data obtained from the
Panel members was corroborated from other sources.

•

The projects studied are not a random sample of the popUlation of all
projects, but the study contained the majority of CMlGC projects identified
in the database (111 of 136) and over half the DBB projects (104 of 193)
constructed in the state over the study period that fit the criteria for the
study (note that 68 projects were identified and that the PDS was unknown,
although at least two of these were DB and the majority of the others were
probably DBB.)
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

0/0 Complete @ Bid or GMP

An estimate or opinion based on the project team's
experience. As a general rule, Conceptual drawings
are considered 10 to 50% complete, Schematic design
can range from 40% to 75% complete, Preliminary
design range from 60% to 90% complete, and
Working drawings, somewhere between 90% and
100% complete. Experience tells us that 100%
complete drawings are extremely rare in large
complex construction projects of the type considered
in this study.

AP Architect's Proposal or
Proposal Request (PR)

An Architect's Proposal or Proposal Request is
similar to an RFI generated by the owner or his
architect. Unlike an RFI, the AP presupposes that the
change or addition will affect the cost and schedule of
the project. AR's like RFI's are followed by a COR
and finally a CO.

Bid

By Bid, Bid Price or Bid Fee, we mean the
competitively bid total price, or in the case of Bid Fee,
the Contractor's fee at the time of the competitive bid
- prior to buy-out or any augmentation.

Budget Control

The Budget Control metric is calculated as the:
(Original Budget, Bid or GMP)I(Actual amount paid,
to the contractor or total final billings at the end of the
job.)

C.O. - Change Order

A Change Order is an amendment to a contract.

cn

Construction Industry Institute at the University of
Texas, Austin (http://construction
institute.org/index.cfm) performs research on the
construction industry including benchmarking or
project performance.

CMlGC

CMlGC stands for Construction
Manager/General Contractor. This method of
contracting results from a negotiated
procurement. The term CMlGC is also used to
denote the entity performing the work such as:
"the CMlGC on the project."
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Contractor

The tenn "Contractor" is generally used to denote the
entity that oversees the construction project, it can be
used when referring to either a DBB construction
contract or a CMJGC construction contract, but
generally when the tenn "contractor" is used it
implies a DBB project.

COR  Change Order Request

A Change Order usually begins with a Change Order
Request by the contractor and most CO's contain a
number of COR's packaged together in one contract
amendment.

DB

Design-Build is a method of contracting (a PDS) that
is used in the private sector and is gaining use in the
public sector, however DB is not directly evaluated in
this study.

DBB

Design-Bid-Build is the traditional fonn or
method of contracting that involves an owner
hiring an architect to design a project, then letting
the work out by competitive bidding among a
group of qualified contractors.

DCVR

Design Clarification Verification Request is another
tenn used synonymously with RFI by different finns.
DCVR is not used in the text of this research simply
by choice of the author.

DEA

Data Envelopment Analysis is the methodology used
in this study. See Tab 8 for explanation and detail.

DMU  Decision Making Unit

Decision Making Units are the fundamental entities
used in the DEA model as the basis for comparison.
In this research, projects are the DMUs.

Fast-track

Fast tracking is a process whereby a project starts
construction before the final plans and specifications
for the work is complete. This process is designed to
allow the beginning of certain work, like earthwork,
foundations and primary structure to start before
issues like tile, carpet and paint color have been
decided on.
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GMP

Guaranteed Maximum Price: it is typical in a CMlGC
project for the CMlGC or "Contractor" to give the
Owner a Maximum Price or GMP prior to starting
construction, or when they are in the early stages of
construction.

LD Liquidated Damages or
LD's

Liquidated damages are a common method in the
construction industry to allocate damages that result
from the inexcusable late delivery of a project to the
owner. These are typically per diem damages that
have a reasonable relationship to the actual damages
incurred by the owner for not having beneficial use of
the building. The relationship must be reasonable so
as not be a penalty, but also, actual damages must be
precisely incalculable.

LSBMethod

Lump Sum Bid Method is another term meaning the
same thing as DBB.

Original Budget or Bid

If the project is a CMlGC, the original Guaranteed
Maximum Price. If the project is a DBB job, it is the
original bid amount, including the accepted alternates,
if any.

PDS

Project Delivery System, the PDS is the method
of contracting for construction work, it is literally
the way in which the work or product is
delivered.

Profit

Profit is defined in this study as the Contractor's Fee,
this is all money not included in the direct work or
jobsite overheads. The Profit or Fee, includes the
portion of the payment made to the Contractor to pay
for home office overhead.

Project Manager

This is defined as the person generally in charge of
the project and responsible for the financial
performance, the quality of the work, and meeting the
Owner's schedule, safety, and other performance
requirements. Other titles used in some companies
may be: Superintendent, Operations Manager, Project
Engineer, Project Executive.

Punch List Item

List ofuncompleted or corrective items of work
to be done to complete the contract. These lists
are prepared by the architect after an inspection
of the project at substantial completion
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RFI's  Request for
Infonnation

An RFI is a Request for Infonnation or Design
Clarification from the Contractor to the Architect,
Engineer or Owner. It also may include an
Architect's Proposal Request, but generally only if the
Proposal Request is to correct some error or omission
on the plans made by the Architect or Engineer.
Some Contractors and some OWners or Architects
may not use RFI's, or they may be called something
else, or they may simply be included in project
correspondence. In your best judgment, how many
requests for design clarification were made by the
r.
to the Architect, Engineer or Owner.

RFP - Request for Proposal

In most CMlGC projects, the prospective vendors are
required to submit an RFP, which contains
infonnation about the finn and description of the
proposed project team, past history, and possibly
approach to the work. From these RFP's the owner
will either make a selection or narrow the field to a
smaller number of prospective vendors for personal
interviews prior to selection.

Schedule Control

The Schedule Control metric is calculates as the:
(Original project schedule or time allowed under the
contract)/(Actual amount of time expended at
substantial completion.)

Total Final Billings

This is the total amount of money paid by the Owner
to the Contractor, including change orders, contract
extensions, and so on.
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Appendix B: Expert Panel Members

Name

Title

Vice President, Hoffman Construction
Vice President, JE Dunn Construction
President, Pacific Coast Construction
President, Marion Construction
President, T. Gerding Construction Co.
Retired, AGC Staff Member, Lobbyist
Retired, VP Finance, Drake Construction
Owner, OTKM Construction
Counsel, Performance Contracting
Project Manager, Baugh Construction
Retired, VP, Andersen Construction
Attorney
Vice President Turner Construction
Retired, President, OMSI, Former Executive
Director, Portland Development Commission
Mike Burton
Retired, Executive Director of METRO
Lloyd Anderson
Retired, Executive Director, Port of Portland,
and Portland City Commissioner
John Lang
Retired, Director, BES, City of Portland
Robert "Bob" Balaski Retired, Director of Capital Projects, Port of
Portland
David Bunnell
Contracts Manager, OHSD
William Nealand
Consulting Project Manager
Luis Ornelas
Consulting Project Manager
Ron Jackson
Director of Operations, Portland Development
Commission; now Attorney in Private Practice
Todd Ainsworth
Attorney, Oregon Department of Justice
John Storrs
Architect. dec.
RaY!Jlond Boucher
Managing Partner, BML Architects
George "Bing"
Partner, SERA Architects
Sheldon
Dennis Cusack
Partner, SRG Partnership
Philip Beyl
Partner, GBD Architects
Kevin Johnson
Partner, BOOR!A Architects
Donald P. Reay
Emeritus Prof. Arch. DC Berkeley, dec.
George Crandall
FFA Architects, ret.
David Evans
Chairman, David Evans & Associates
Robert Wright
President, Thomas- Wright Engineers

Barton Eberwein
Jose:gh F. Bolkovatz
Jeffery V. Es~edal
R~ger Peterson
Tom Gerding
Jack Kalinoski
Donald B. Kane
Patrick O'Brien
Roger A. Lenneberg
: Philip Carter
I W. Lee Schroeder
Joseph A. Yazbeck
Alan Killian
Patrick L. LaCrosse

Group
. Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Contractors
Owners
Owners
Owners
Owners
Owners
Owners
Owners
Owners
Owners
Owners
Architects
Architects
Architects
Architects
Architects
Architects
Architects
Architect
Engineers
Engineers
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In addition to the Experts, several other people, agencies and finns played key
roles in supplying infonnation on projects, providing stakeholder survey responses,
and other support for this research these include the following:
Andersen Construction
Baugh Construction, Oregon
JE Dunn Construction
Hoffman Construction Company
Kirby Naglehout Construction
Lease Crutcher Lewis Construction
Ramsay-Gerding Construction Company
Slayden Construction
Swinerton Construction
Wildish Construction
Dull Olsen Weekes, AIA
BOORA Architects
Yost Grube Hall
SRG Partnership
Zimmer Gunsul Frasca Partnership
Soderstrom Architects
gLAs Architects
Malhum Architects
Barber Barrett Turner
Arbuckle Costic Architects
The Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce
The Portland Daily Journal of Commerce
Oregon Health & Science University
Oregon State University
Portland State University
Southern Oregon University
University of Oregon
Western Oregon University
Central Oregon Community College
Portland Community College
Clackamas Community College
Oregon Department of Administrative
Services
Oregon Department of Corrections
Oregon Department of Justice
Oregon Military Department
Oregon State Library
Oregon DAS Office of Economic Analysis
Oregon Secretary of State, Audit Division

Port of Portland
City of Portland
City of Salem
City of Beaverton
City of Gresham
City of Eugene
Multnomah County
Tillamook County
Washington County
Beaverton School District
Eugene Public School District
Portland Public School District
Gresham Barlow School District
Luis Ornelas
FranzRad
Jerry Milsted
Robert O'Halloran
Arnold Gray
Martha Hodgkinson
Gary Christensen
Michael Bloom
Thomas Spaulding
David Douthwaite
John Weekes
Todd Anderson
Roger Brown
Sharon Peterson
Greg Peterson
Gary Wills
Glen Taylor
James Lyman
Karl Shulz
Mike Courchaine
Walt Lemon
Bruce Van Hine
Kathy Shears
Dirk Fraily
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Appendix C: DRS Chapter 279.015

279.015 Competitive bidding; exceptions; exemptions. (1) Subject to the policies
and provisions ofORS 279.005 and 279.007, all public contracts shall be based upon
competitive bids or proposals except:
(a) Contracts made with other public agencies or the federal government.
(b) Contracts made with qualified nonprofit agencies providing employment
opportunities for disabled individuals.
(c) A public contract exempt under subsection (2) of this section.
(d) A contract for products, services or supplies if the value of the contract is less than
$5,000.
(e) Insurance and service contracts as provided for under ORS 414.115,414.125,
414.135 and 414.145.
(f) Contracts for repair, maintenance, improvement or protection of property obtained
by the Director of Veterans' Affairs under ORS 407.135 and 407.145 (1).
(g) Contracts between public agencies utilizing an existing solicitation or current
requirement contract of one ofthe public agencies that is party to the contract for
which:
(A) The original contract met the requirements of this chapter;
(B) The contract allows other public agency usage of the contract; and
(C) The original contracting public agency concurs.
(h) If a project is competitively bid and all responsive bids from responsible bidders
exceed the public agency's cost estimate, the public agency, in accordance with rules
adopted by the public agency, may negotiate with the lowest responsive, responsible
bidder, prior to awarding the contract, in order to solicit value engineering and other
options to attempt to bring the project within the agency's cost estimate. A negotiation
with the lowest responsive, responsible bidder pursuant to this paragraph shall not
result in the award of the contract to that bidder if the scope of the project is
significantly changed from the original bid proposaL Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the records of a bidder used in contract negotiation pursuant to this
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paragraph are not subject to public inspection until after the negotiated contract has
been awarded or the negotiation process has been tenninated.
(2) Subject to subsection (6)(b) ofthis section, the Director of the Oregon Department
of Administrative Services or a local contract review board may exempt certain public
contracts or classes of public contracts from the competitive bidding requirements of
subsection (1) of this section upon approval of the following findings submitted by the
public contracting agency seeking the exemption:
(a) It is unlikely that such exemption will encourage favoritism in the awarding of
public contracts or substantially diminish competition for public contracts; and
(b) The awarding of public contracts pursuant to the exemption will result in
substantial cost savings to the public contracting agency. In making such finding, the
director or board may consider the type, cost, amount of the contract, number of
persons available to bid and such other factors as may be deemed appropriate.
(3)(a) Before final adoption of the findings required by subsection (2) of this section
exempting a contract for a public improvement from the requirement of competitive
bidding, a public agency shall hold a public hearing.
(b) Notification of the public hearing shall be published in at least one trade
newspaper of general statewide circulation a minimum of 14 days prior to the hearing.
(c) The notice shall state that the public hearing is for the purpose of taking comments
on the agency's draft findings for an exemption from the competitive bidding
requirement. At the time of the notice, copies of the draft findings shall be made
available to the public. At the option of the public agency, the notice may describe the
process by which the findings are finally adopted and may indicate the opportunity for
any further public comment.
(d) At the public hearing, the public agency shall offer an opportunity for any
interested party to appear and present comment.
(e) If a public agency is required to act promptly due to circumstances beyond its
control that do not constitute an emergency, notification ofthe public hearing can be
published simultaneously with the agency's solicitation of contractors for the
alternative public contracting method, as long as responses to the solicitation are due
at least five days after the meeting and approval of the findings.
(4) A public contract also may be exempted from the requirements of subsection (1) of
this section if:
(a) Emergency conditions require prompt execution of the contract;
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(b) In case of sale of surplus property by a public agency, the number, value and
nature of the items to be sold make it probable that the cost of conducting a sale by
competitive bidding will be such that a liquidation sale will result in substantially
greater net revenue to the public agency; or
(c)(A) The public contract is made between regularly organized fire departments, as
defined in DRS 652.050, for fire protection equipment, as defined in DRS 476.005,
and:
(i) The recipient regularly organized fire department makes a written request for the
fire protection equipment to the transferor regularly organized fire department;
(ii) The fire protection equipment is surplus to or unusable by the transferor;
(iii) The total fair market value of fire protection equipment received by the recipient
does not exceed $50,000 per calendar year; and
(iv) The transferor holds a public hearing, with notice given as outlined in subsection
(3)(b) of this section, .and finds that the public contract is in the public's interest.
(B) As used in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, "public contract" includes a sale at
no cost.
(5) The director or board shall adopt rules allowing the governing body of a public
agency and the officer of a public agency for contracts under $50,000 to declare that
an emergency exists and establishing procedures for determining when the conditions
in subsection (4)(a) of this section are present. The rules shall prescribe that if an
emergency is declared, any contract awarded under this subsection and subsection
(4)(a) of this section must be awarded within 60 days following declaration of the
emergency, unless the director or board grants an extension.
(6) In granting exemptions pursuant to subsection (2)(a) and (b) of this section, the
director or board shall:
(a) Where appropriate, direct the use of alternate contracting and purchasing practices
that take account of market realities and modem or innovative contracting and
purchasing methods, which are also consistent with the public policy of encouraging
competition.
(b) Require and approve or disapprove written findings by the public contracting
agency that support the awarding of a particular public contract or a class ofpublic
contracts, without the competitive requirements of subsection (1) of this section. The
findings must show that the exemption of a contract or class of contracts complies
with the requirements of subsection (2)(a) and (b) of this section.
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Appendix D: Example of Mark-up Calculation

ill the discussion on winners curse and the broader discussion on competitive
bidding in building construction contracts, the contractor's fee is studied as a principal
strategic component of his bid. Many papers have been written regarding mark-up and
contractor's fee; however few if any actually document how contractors derive their mark
up or fee in practice. The following discussion was provided by an Expert Panel Member
and vice president ofestimating for a large commercial building contractor.
While there is some amount of discretion in choosing the exact fee on any project,
the contractor's choice is significantly constrained by business requirements and market
conditions. The contractor is faced with two primary concerns in setting the minimwn
fee 79:
1.
2.
3.

Income necessary to run the company, and
Risk
What the market will allow.

The income necessary to run the company has two components required return on
capital needed to acquire a bond and company overhead. The construction contractors,
bidding on public projects, are highly regulated by the insurance industry. ill order to bid
on a public project, the contractor must (in nearly all cases) obtain a performance and
payment bond also known as a "Miller Act" bond [20]. If a contractor is unable to obtain a
bond, there is no reason to even consider bidding on a project.
The illsurer or Surety will require a contractor to post liquid assets or equity of
between one tenth and one-twentieth the construction project volume. This is referred to as
"Volume to Equity ratio." Meaning that, any contractor must have between fifty and one
hundred thousand dollars in liquid assets in order to bid on a one million-dollar project.
The exact amount of assets required by the surety will depend on the contractors' past
perfonnance and other factors. A relatively new contractor will be required to post a
higher amount than a more established finn. The following is an example of how a
contractor would calculate the return on equity (ROE) component ofthe fee:
Example 1

Assume: 20:1 volume/equity (Le.: an established contractor)
Anticipating $2,000,000 in construction volume during the year
$100,000 equity required
Determine the ROE required by the contractor, this depends on the investor,
and other investments available such as stocks and bonds. Since there is a
In this discussion of "fee" and through out this paper, fee incorporates all of the non-direct work costs
required to run the company. These typically include main office overhead, salaries for executives and
estimators as well as company profit.
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lot of risk associated with an investment in a construction project, assume the
contractor chooses 40% after tax ROE.

ROE is then calculated to be: $40,000 or roughly, $60,000 before tax.

The second component of the contractor's fee is overhead and can be calculated as
in the following example:
Office Space:
Office Equipment:
Office Furniture:
Estimators/Executives:
Office Staff Salary:

$8,000
$5,000
$1,000
$60,000
$26.000

Total:

$100,000

Now, sum the two components:
ROE:
Overhead:

$60,000
$100.000

Total Fee Required:
Average Mark-up of:

$160,000
$160,000/$2,000,000

=8

0 80
/0

This calculation sets one low limit for the fee. Another low limit, which is also
influenced by the insurance industry is project risk. Project risk is evaluated in two ways,
the contractor's direct labor risk and the overall job risk.
Labor risk is the uncertainty of labor productivity. Contractors estimate the cost
of a given project by calculating the quantity ofmaterials in place, and the amount of labor
(and equipment) required to put the materials in place. From either the contractor's own
historical records or industry pricing guides, such as Means [212], the contractor will draw
an estimated labor productivity, expressed as either hours labor per unit ofmaterial or units
ofmaterial per hour oflabor. By applying the quantity ofmaterial to the labor productivity
the contractor calculates the total number ofhours, which in turn is converted to dollars by
applying the appropriate wage rates. However, these estimates have uncertainty, which is
reflected in the minimum mark-up. Typically, the labor uncertainty is on the order of 30%.
In keeping with the example above, let us assume that half of the contractor's total volume
is in labor. To calculate the minimum required labor risk fee:

Thanks to Joseph F. Bolkovatz, Vice President of Estimating, JE Dunn Construction Company,
Portland, Oregon, for providing this example.
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=

Labor
Labor risk

=

$1,000,000
$1,000,000 x 30%

Average Mark-up of:

= $300,000

$300,000/$2,000,000

= 15%

Labor risk is a significant consideration for subcontractors, and a to a lesser degree
general contractors. This is because general contractors typically self perfonn only a very
minor amount of the labor on a given building project. More often, the general contractor
has to assess the overall ''job risk", that is the risk presented to the contractor by
subcontracting 90 to 95% of the project to subcontractors. The assessment of this risk will
vary from contractor to contractor and job to job and will depend on a number of factors as
pointed out by Weitzman [217]. Again however, the insurance industry will set a
minimum fee based on their analysis of the project risks, major subcontractors and so
forth.81 This number will vary, however it is unlikely to ever be less than 2%. (This "fee
required" figure is not the same as the actual "bond rate" quoted by the Surety. That rate
will be substantially less for large contractors.)
Based on our analysis of ROE, costs and risks, we now have a set of three
minimum mark-up' s or fees to use: 8%, 15% and 2%. Since we are forced to cover all
risks we must choose the largest ofthe minimum's, in this case, 15%.
These market and business constraints set the minimum mark-up or fee the
contractor must bid, what is the maximum fee the contractor can bid? That depends solely
on the current competitive market conditions, or ''what the market will allow". Having set
the minimum fee, setting the maximum or actual fee becomes a game where all of the
bidders attempt to optimize their expected return based on probability of winning and
amount ofprofit generated at a given fee (or bid).

In fact, a Surety will not usually contact a contractor and prescribe a minimum fee, typically, the
Surety's Agent will only get involved after a bid is won and review the contractor's bid at that time to
determine if the fee is adequate, in order for them to issue a bond.

81
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Appendix E: Prior Industry Studies

The Construction Industry Institute
The Construction Industry Institute is headquartered at the University of Texas at
Austin and perfonns a substantial amount of research on construction industry, including
benchmarking of construction project perfonnance81 • TIlls research is supported by its
members numbering well more than one hundred, including some of the largest public and
private building organizations in the country, for example Bechtel and CH2M Hill
ConstructorslIDC; public and private Owners, including the Federal Government of the
United States of America; and academic institutions including Oregon State University.
The mission ofthe cn as stated on their website83 is:
"The mission of the Construction Industry Institute is to improve the business
effectiveness of the capital facilities life cycle, including safety, quality,
schedule, cost, security, reliability, and operability. Participation in CII provides
members the opportunity for a competitive advantage in the global
marketplace."

In the 1990's the cn undertook a "Benchmarking" project to evaluate "Best
Practices" in the Construction Industry resulting in a series ofreports including: [207]. The
most recent most recent version or update prefaces the report with the following
statements:
"The report presents the compilation of data analyses performed in early 2000
using the Construction Industry Institute (CII) Benchmarking and Metrics
(BM&M) database."
"Data included in the report were collected through February 4, 2000. The
purpose of the report is to establish an authoritative source of information
providing norms for project performance and practice use metrics.
Performance norms are provided for cost, schedule, safety, changes, and
rework. Practice use metrics are included for pre-project planning,
constructability, team building, zero accidents, change management, and
design/information technology best practices. In addition, norms for percent
design completion at authorization and construction start are included. Data
on each of these practices have been collected for at least 3 consecutive
years. Additional practices are being added in an on-going effort to establish
the level of use and value of a" CII recommended best practices."

This recent version of the Benchmarking Report is produced on Compact Digital
Disk or CD [51] and contains more than 3000 pages of description and analysis. The
82

83

See: http://construction-institute.orgfservicesicatalog/products!PI' pro.cfm#8.5 for specific products.
See: http://construction-institute.orgf
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current version includes $52.2 billion in construction on 989 projects reported by 33
Contractors and 39 Owners. However, the crr database is heavily weighted to "Industrial
Projects" as seen in Figure 33, with fewer than 100 domestic building project reported by
Owners and fewer than 50 reported by Contractors. Chemical Manufacturing (225) and
Oil Refining (158) make up the two single largest categories of project types in the crr
database. By contrast there are only two (2) prisons, four (4) parking garages, three (3)
housing projects and thirteen (13) schools represented in the crr database84 •
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Figure 33:

ell Benchmarking Report [51] Project Type Figure #3

One significant advantage the crr has in its research is the fact that its members
agree to supply the ClI research team with very sensitive information85 because all of the
data is kept strictly confidential86 • In addition to having access to a lot of data the
Institute's efforts are well ftmded, as each member pays annual dues of $36,000 per year
according to their website information on Membership.

84 The Oregon database of public projects includes a large number of school buildings, which are the
most commonly constructed public projects.
85 Safety and accident information, while required by OSHA is not "Public" information that can be
obtained without the consent of the contractor.
86 We made several attempts to obtain the ClI Benchmarking Database raw data in any fonn that would
have been acceptable to the ClI, but the ClI has not released that infonnation.
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Typical of the crr report are analysis of overall project cost and schedule growth
such as is presented in Figure 34 through Figure 37 for Domestic Project Cost and
Schedule Growth, reported by Owners and Contractor's.
Project Cost Growth
Location: DUlReltic
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On Domestic Building Projects, that include both private and public projects, the
cn study found that the Owner's experienced a mean cost reduction of 2.0%, and a Project
Schedule Growth of 7.6%, while Contractor's reported mean Cost Growth on Domestic
Building Projects to be 7.9% and mean Project Schedule Growth of 4.90/0. It should be
noted that the Owner's and Contractor's are actually reporting different things because the
Owner's "Project" is generally more broad than the Contractor's, including such things as
land acquisition, planning and design through construction and commissioning; whereas
the Contractor's involvement may be limited to just the "construction" portion of the job.
This is explained in the, ''Metrics Definitions" section ofthe report. The important thing to
note here is that the cn Study found both Cost and Schedule Growth in the Contractor's
reports and Schedule Growth in the Owner's reporting. The Contractor's reports ranged
from a Project Cost reduction of -12.0% to a Cost Growth of 33.0%, and a Project
Schedule reduction of-13.6% to a Project Schedule Growth of 32.4%.
The cn study [51] includes statistical analysis of Project Safety using Recordable
Incident Reports, Project "Rework" (which is a measure of quality) and various "Practice
Use's" including: Team Building, Pre-Project Planning, Design/Information Technology,
Project Change Management, Planning for Start-up, and Materials Management. These
latter metrics are generally measured using a 1 to 10 rating scale contained in surveys filled
out by different project personnel. It would be difficult to replicate the cn's effort here, in
that their member organizations had to agree up-front, to training project team members in
the proper way to fill out these rather extensive reports in a consistent manner.
Finally, this most recent Benchmarking Report [51] did not replicate the linear
regression benchmarking analysis performed in earlier versions (as noted in [207]) and the
reason the cn apparently abandoned that analysis is not known. In any case, the uni
variant statistical analysis contained in this benchmarking report will provide a good
independent check against our own findings from the Oregon database for similar metrics.

ell Project Delivery Systems Reports #133 & #133-1
In 1997 the cn published the first of two companion studies evaluating Project
Delivery Systems [75], which lists the Design-Build Research Team as author. The second
study [183], authored by Sanvido and Konchat'7 is in fact the basis for the former report,
which is listed as a "Research Summary" (the former is cn Report #133-1 and the latter is
#133, also the same study is published in [126].) The reports (and [126]) draw identical
conclusions although the earlier report [75] is more forthright in it's Executive Summary,
stating:
"The research shows that design-build systems have significantly less design
and construction cost growth when compared to design-bid-build; that design
bid-build systems have the greatest design and construction schedule growth;
and that quality measurement associated with design-build, often maligned by
many, is better than quality performance in design-bid-build.
It

Konchar also presented the results of this research at the Northwest Construction Consumers Fall
1999 Conference, "Advantage 2000" in a "Copyrighted" presentation [127]
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Although the report does add the caveat:
No one method can meet all owner, project, or individual critical success
factors. Any delivery system is dependent on the ever-changing dynamics of
our industry. Now, however, there are statistically analyzed results that will
improve the owners' ability for selection. Those results are the subject of this
report.

The second report [183], is a bit more cautious in its Executive Summary, however
the report concludes in its Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations:
"Design-build unit cost was at least 4.5 percent less than [eM/Gel and six
percent less than design-bid-build. In addition, construction management at
risk unit cost was at least 1.5 percent less than design-bid-build. This model
explained 99 percent of the variation in unit cost.
Design-build construction speed was at least seven percent faster than
[eM/Gel and 12 percent faster than design-bid-build. In addition, construction
management at risk construction speed was at least 6 percent faster than
design-bid-build. This model explained 89 percent of the variation in
construction speed.
Design-build delivery speed was at least 23 percent faster than construction
management at risk and 33 percent faster than design-bid-build. In addition,
[eM/Gel delivery speed was at least 13 percent faster than desig n-bid-build.
This model explained 88 percent of the variation in delivery speed.
This research has clearly shown that there are differences between these
systems. Design-build offers more speed and more certainty in cost and
schedule than does design-bid-build. However, design-build may not be suited
for every situation or each facility type. Likewise, construction management at
risk offers more speed than does design-bid-build. It is understood that
design-bid-build may be better suited for specific projects, yet it did not offer
superior performance on a repeatable basis in any area measured by this
research."

The author's conclusions are supported by the following summary of the
multivariate statistical analysis:
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Multivariate Model Analysis for:
Regression for Unit Cost

No. of Cases used:
Adjusted R2 of
the Model
No. with missing values
99.0%
203 : 144

Regression for Construction Speed

329: 20

88.1%

Regression for Delivery Speed

328: 22

86.4%)

Regression for Cost Growth

196 : 152

Regression for Schedule Growth

215 : 132

11.70/0
14.4%

Table 27: Summary of en Report #133 Data

The interesting fact is that the three models with very high adjusted R2 values: Unit
Cost, Construction Speed and Delivery Speed may not have much importance in the public
building sector and in fact these metrics and measures may be correlated with project type
and PDS. For example, Project Delivery Speed takes into account the total time from
beginning of design to commissioning ofthe project. However, the cn Project Database is
heavily weighted toward heavy industrial projects like chemical plants where design-build
PDS is quite common and where DBB PDS's may be very difficult to implement.
Furthermore, since the defmition of design-build (and CMlGC for that matter) is a project
where the construction starts before design in 100% complete, it should be a foregone
conclusion that they should be delivered faster. More troubling however is the fact that the
most important Models: Schedule and Cost Growth show the least significance. Another
important consideration, which is not addressed in the above analysis is whether these
"statistically significant" differences are really important differences [209], or whether they
are merely structural aberrations ofthe PDS's.
Sanvido and Konchar discuss ''Univariate Comparisons" in [183] in Section 4.5.1,
page 49, and state on page 50 that:

"Descriptive statistics offer ways to measure the central tendency of a large
data set. Measures such as the mean, median, variance and ranges of
several metrics calculated from project data were used as initial comparisons.
However, the common statistical assumption of normally distributed samples
was clearly inappropriate. The initial analysis of central tendency quickly
confirmed that mean, median and mode values were very different, thus
indicating the need for a battery of tests. Therefore, detailed hypothesis
testing was required to make conclusions about the significance of differences
between delivery system performance."
"Hypothesis testing measured the strength of evidence in the data for or
against precise statements about population characteristics. The first
hypothesis testing used two sample t-tests based on sample means. For
example, the tests used to compare delivery systems in terms of cost growth,
indicated the level of significance with which the researcher could claim one
delivery system was performing differently than another. Hypothesis testing for
sample medians was also chosen. Mood's median test was used because it
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effectively adjusts for outliers in data, and is particularly appropriate in the
preliminary stages of analysis (Minitab, 1995). Working together, two sample
t-tests and Mood's median tests allowed the researcher to test Significance
between a number of critical metrics."

These univariate results are presented in Chapter 6 of [183] and Chapter 2 of [75].
The report sunnnarizes this analysis in the following figures:

4.83
5

Median Cost Growt.h (%)

Figure 38:

cn Report #133 Figure 6.5 Median Cost Growth comparisons
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cn Report #133 Figure 6.6 Cost Growth Comparisons

.

crr interprets the results from Figure 38 and Figure 39 as:
"Here design-build projects, had less cost growth than either construction
management at risk or design-bid-build. However, results indicated that both
construction management at risk (0.029, 0.008) and design-build (0.007,
0.008) significantly outperformed design-bid-build in terms of sample cost
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growth. The maximum standard error for cost growth was plus or minus 2.2
percent."

And:
"The bottom and top of the each box indicates the upper and lower quartiles of
each sample. This reports that 25 percent of all design-bid-build and
construction management at risk projects experience cost growth over 10
percent. Conversely, 25 percent of design-build and construction management
at risk projects fall at or below zero cost growth, indicating that the likelihood
for cost growth using these systems is slightly less than that using design-bid
build."

However, an alternate, and perhaps more interesting observation of the data
presented above is the fact that 75% of both the CMR (or CMlGC) and DB projects and
9Q% of the DBB projects experienced "Cost Growth." Since the authors indicate that they
only address differences that are statistically significant at the 95% level, and they do not
discuss the difference between CMR and DB on the Cost Growth metric, we are left to
conclude that the two are not significantly different, in spite of the statement that, "DB
projects, had less cost growth than either CMR or DBB." Furthermore, the extreme
points, which represent the outside or maximum risk are not significantly different
according to these box-plots.

CM(~

0

DB

0

4.44

OBB

5
Median Schedule Growth (0/0)

Figure 40:

ell Report #133 Figure 6.8 Median Schedule Growth comparisons
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The cn interpretation ofFigure 40 and Figure 41 obsetVed that:
Both design-build (0.03, 0.0) and construction management at risk (0.008, 0.0)
significantly outperformed design-bid-build in terms of schedule growth. The
maximum standard error for schedule growth was plus or minus 1.7 percent.

And:
Figure 6.9 shows representative box-plots for schedule growth by delivery
system. The distribution of each sample shows, in greater detail, the
consistent schedule performance of construction management at risk and
design-build. Fifty percent of all construction management at risk and design
build projects fell below zero percent schedule growth. This represents an
area of signi'ficant difference over the performance of design.:.bid-build, where
50 percent of the projects were more than four percent late in completion.

Again, over 50% of both CMR and DB projects experienced schedule growth, and
75% ofDBB projects took longer than scheduled. And, while it appears that CMR does
better than DB on this metric overall, the difference was apparently not significant, whereas
both CMR and DB performed significantly better than DBB. The report does not give the
Mean of the data nor does it discuss the fact that the box-plot for CMR indicates that the
maximwn risk of project increase or decrease in schedule growth was less than both DB
and DBB. Furthermore, DB appears to fair worst of all in terms of maximum outside risk
of project both being finished ahead of schedule and late. The use ofthe ''Median'' instead
of the Mean here may tend to hide the fact that DB may riskier than both CMR and DBB
in terms of schedule growth.
The one thing missing from this analysis however is any mention ofthe fact that in
both the DB and CMR projects, the Contractor has significant input on the initial project
budget and schedule that is not available in the DBB case. In fact, it is not sutprising that
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DB projects do significantly better on schedule perfonnance because the DB Contractor
usually decides on or dictates to the Owner, the original project schedule. The fact that the
differences are so slight, as depicted in Figure 39 and Figure 41 is perhaps a reason for
caution.
One of the principle concerns about Design-Build projects has been "Project
Quality" because a fixed price Design-Build Contractor has an incentive to "design out"
expensive design components as the project nears completion and the budget nears
exhaustion; although, Project Quality is not one of the prominent criticisms of Design
Build PDS in [139]. In any case Project Quality is one ofthe three pillars that most people
think of when they think of construction measures: Time, Cost and Quality. Here the
authors acknowledge that:
"The nature of quality data was less objective than other principal metrics."

In spite of the fact that some objective, "Project Quality" measures like: number of
punch list items88, number or dollar amount of warranty work perfonned, could be
collected, the authors decided to have the Project Owner's rate the quality on a relative
scale. Unfortunately however, the relative rating scale included measuring the perceived
actual level of quality compared with the level expected. This type ofmeasure would tend
to bias in favor of low expectations. If an Owner expected the project to be pathetic and it
turned out only lousy, perhaps he rate it high relative to his initial very low expectations.
Conversely, if the initial expectations were extremely high, it is doubtful that a Contractor,
under any PDS could produce a very high rating relative to a very high expectation.

Exceeded 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
8
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Figure 2.13. Quality - System Performance
Expectations of Envelope, Roof, Structure and Foundation

Figure 42:

ell Report #133-1 Figur~ 2.1.3 Quality

Number of square feet constructed per punch list item was the measure of quality used in the research
on the Oregon projects DEA model discussed in Section 4.

88
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In addition to the bias toward low expectations, the difference between the different
PDS's as seen in Figure 42 are not terribly great in tenns of overall percentage difference,
and it's unclear if these different means were statistically significant. Nevertheless, the
authors point to these statistics and other similar analysis to conclude that DB out-performs
DBB and depending on the metric, CM@R (what we call CMlGC) stating:
"It is clear from these results that design-build projects achieved equal if not
better quality results than other projects studied. In particular, design-build
offered significantly better quality results than design-bid-build in all categories
except that of interior space and layout. Design-build significantly
outperformed construction management at risk in only one area, operation
and maintenance cost."

At least in part based on the following figure:

Em·tibpe., Ron r. Structuro,
Foundalii.1U

Interior Space &. Layout

Envirmmant

ProOi!5S Equipmmt &.
IJI}U1I:

Figure 43: ell Report #133.1 Figure 6.15

It should be noted that on three of the five system performance quality scores
shown in Figure 43, CM@R (or CMlGC) performs as well or better then DB, whereas,
DBB always performs worst. However, the difference between best and worst in most of
the comparisons appears to be very little, whether statistically significant or not, it does not
appear to have practical significance, particularly in light of the fact that these are measures

ofrelative subjective expectations as opposed to objective data measures.
Northwest Construction Consumer Council"Advantage 2000"
In September 1999 the Northwest Construction Consumer Council, an organization
made up of principally large public and private institutional facility and building owners
and large construction contractors held its fall conference on the topic of Project Delivery
Systems. Dr. Mark Koncharpresented the results of[183] in [127] and Mr. Jon C. Vanden
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Bosch presented a similar study [210], titled "Comparing Project Delivery Systems." His
study, which had its beginnings in 1996, used a survey questionnaire sent out to collect
data on over 7,600 projects, more than 400 were actually returned and 351 were used in the
analysis.
The Vanden Bosch paper [210] was lead· by some of the main Design-Build
Research Team members that produced [75], including Dr. Sanvido and Nonnan L. Strong
(an executive with Marshall Contractors and crr Research Team Chairman). This research
focused on Cost, Schedule and Quality metrics, acknowledging the difficult task of
defining and comparing project Quality.
Vanden Bosch reports exactly the same results as does [75] and [183], and uses the
same number, 351 projects in the analysis. However, there is no mention of the more than
7,600 surveys questionnaires in [183323] or any mention of Vanden Bosch. In any case it
is a reasonable conclusion that the [210], [75], and [183] studies are all using the same
underlying data and consequently each reached essentially the same result.
As a final note on the crr studies, [183] and [75]: the authors felt compelled to
include a section in their report: 4.6.3 Research Team Bias, wherein they state:
"The researcher exhibited no bias toward the delivery systems investigated in
this study primarily due to a lack of extensive experience using each method."

However one Expert Panel Member for this research, familiar with the crr studies
and a member of the Northwest Construction Consumer Council, anonymously
commented that "the Design-Build Institute paid for a study that showed that Design-Build
was the best Project Delivery System, and that's what they got." He added that both
principal authors of [183] were currently or recently employed by large Design-Build
Contractors or the Design-Build Institute. Whether this colored their analysis or not, the
fact is that the claims made that Design-Build is a significantly better PDS than CMlac
and DBB, and that CMlac is better than DBB, do not appear to be supported by their
research. And the only metrics that do support that conclusion are structurally biased to do
so.
One thing is clear however, [183] does an excellent job of defining the issues,
researching the literature (albeit heavily weighted to the Design-Build research) and
defining the systems, coming up with measurable metrics and defining terms.

Project Delivery System Selection Workbook CII Report #133-2
The crr produced a Workbook intended to help Owners determine which PDS is
appropriate for their project and propose the use of the following data collection sheet,
depicted in Figure 44:
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Score

Ra.k

(Slm)

(1-8)

Figure 44: CII Report #133-2 Figure 2 Critical Project Goals

However, the authors repeat the findings from Report #133 [75], as Summarized in
Table 27 above, but in Table 28 below, they include the average differences between the
PDS's based on [75], using the R2, as opposed to the Adjusted R2 values summarized
above.
DB ''i.
CMR

CMRvs..

DBvs.

DBB

DBB

Level of
Certainty

1%

%

%

%

Unit Cost

4 ..5 Jess

1.5151

6 less

99

Construction Speed

7.0 rnster

6.0 fitster

12 taster

89

Delivery Spee:l

23 faster

13 fuster

JJ faster

87

CostOrowth

BlelS

7.8 greater

5.2 less

24

Schedule Growth

2.2 less

9.2 less

11 less

24

Metric

Table 28: CII Report #133-2 Table 2, Summary of Average Performance Comparisons
ofPDS's
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It would appear from Table 28 that the only rational choice for an Owner would be
to use DB for their PDS, since DB is superior to both DBB and CMR on every category
measured, of course the Level of Certainty is extremely low on two important metrics of
Cost and Schedule Growth89• The same criticisms discussed in 0 regarding Table 27 and
its underlying analysis contained [75] are relevant here also. Specifically, that the DB
contractor has significantly more control over the all ofthe metrics since the DB contractor,
in most cases, has a significant decision making capacity relative to scope, cost, quality,
and schedule factors, which the DBB contractor has virtually no control over, and the
CMR contractor may have some but little impact on. Again, those aspects of the PDS
differences are omitted from the report.

See the discussion following Table 27 in Section 0 above, note that in Table 27 Adjusted R2 is
reported, here the unadjusted R2 is used, based on the same data - this is consistent with a similar table
in [75]. Devore [78] notes that "many statisticians use the Adjusted [R2]," "to balance against the cost
of using more parameters against the gain in R2. Why the authors chose to use the R2 instead is a
unknown since the adjusted R2 readily available from the statistical program output found in the report.

89
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Washington State Alternative Public Works Methods Oversight Committee
Study
This study published December 11, 2000, was required by the Washington State
Legislature when it enacted the legislation authorizing the use of non-lump sum bid PDS's
in the State of Washington. The legislation in Washington is different than that enacted in
Oregon, with more restrictions placed on public agencies than in Oregon. However, the
actual form of contract and PDS resulting from its application is essentially the same and
this review Report serves to add to the understanding of the benefits and drawbacks of the
CM/GC contracting.9o
The Report unfortunately falls short of a thorough evaluation of the processes used
in Washington because it fails to present any objective data analysis and appears to
discount any negative comments in the subjective analysis. The Report honestly concludes
in its Executive Summary that: "[CM/GC] project participants strongly endorse the
[CM/GC] process across all aspects and throughout all phases of their project." Honest,
because it tacitly acknowledges that it reflects only the voices of the supporters and not the
critics or those that were excluded from project participation, because as seen in the
"competitor comments" the disappointed contractors were not as enthusiastic about the
process as practiced in Washington state.
The Report, received about 10% response rate on the CM/GC portion and 7% on
the DB· portion, but fails to acknowledge that these responses may have been positively
biased. The Report focused solely on 49 CM/GC projects and made no effort to
objectively compare them against similar DBB projects and provides little objective data.
Only 30 of the 217 returned surveys (out of 2107 sent out) were from subcontractors who
actually performed the work. And "8 contractors that competed for [CM/GC] projects
returned 52 contractor competitor surveys" meaning that 8 contractor's accounted for
nearly one quarter of all responses. Left unsaid in the Report is whether or not these were
successful or disappointed proposer's, but indications from the survey comments is that
these were generally the successful CM/GC Contractors91 • The largest single group of
respondents, surprisingly enough were government employees, a 65% response rate, as
opposed to a 5% from subcontractors who actually performed the work. The problem here
is that the public agency Owner is the construction team member that actually got to decide
what PDS to use. It seems unlikely that the Owner's project manager would then criticize
his or her own decision to use CM/GC instead of DBB. Furthermore, it is generally
recognized that CM/GC contractual relationships are less confrontational and adversarial;
benefits that accrue directly to the Owner's project management team. But the real
question is not whether or not the process makes the Owner's project manager's task easier
or more palatable, but rather is it better for the taxpayers? Clearly ifreducing confrontation

In Washington it is referred to as GC/CM, which means: "General Contractor/Construction Manager"
or some times CMlGC which means: "Construction Manager" with a "Guaranteed Maximum Price,"
both are the same thing as CM/GC used in Oregon.
91 In fact more than one comment stated that the project was not yet complete, meaning that they were
obviously working on the job, therefore the successful Contractor.
.
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and the adversarial nature of DBB contracts were the ultimate goal, that could be achieved
by simply giving the Contractor every change order asked for without question.
One important piece ofinformation contained in the Report is the following graph:
Percent Complete at GMP
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Figure 45: Percentage of Design when Guaranteed Maximum Price is established

1bis information is valuable in comparing Washington state's experience against
those obtained from Oregon. Based on the Oregon database results, it appears that the
Washington projects were similarly distributed with very few projects priced while in
conceptual phases, more during schematic design, and still more during preliminary design
phases. The biggest difference is the number of projects that are at final design stage
(1 00% complete) prior to pricing. In Washington that proportion is about ten percent of
all CMlGC projects, the proportion of Oregon CMlGC projects priced at this stage is
significantly less.
Another bit ofobjective data is contained in the following figure:
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Figure 46: Washington Report 010 Change Orders

Figure 46 documents Change Order costs as a percentage of the total project cost
on the CMJGC projects in the Washington Report. Note that this includes only seventeen
(17) of the forty-one (41) projects reviewed, the inference being that the other projects did
not report financial metrics. In any case, the average CMJGC project had a cost increase of
7.2% and a standard deviation of 7.09%, which closely compares with the cn studies
discussed above (in particular see the results documented in Figure 36 of the
Benchmarking Study.
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Appendix F: ORS 279.103 Evaluation Reports and Project Audits
This appendix presents our complete discussion regarding the actual project reports
on CMJGC jobs in Oregon. These evaluation reports are required by statute (ORS
279.103) in Oregon for all projects exempted under Chapter 279. However, very few
public agencies have complied with the statute and few of the reports meet the objective
analysis standard intended by the legislature. Following the evaluation reports, there are
project audits from Oregon's Secretary of State of specific CMJGC projects. Many of
these audited projects are the same projects that the evaluation reports covered. In several
cases there are striking differences in how the projects were viewed by the different
authors.
.

ORS 279.103 Reports
The Oregon PCC Report [56] documents the requirements under ORS 279.103 and
gives recommendations on how to comply with the statute as follows:
The purpose of the ORS 279.103 evaluation is to determine whether it was
actually in the public's best interest to use an alternative contracting method. The
following elements are required by the statute to be included in the evaluation:
•
•
•
•

Financial Information conSisting of cost estimates, any guaranteed maximum
price, changes, and actual costs.
The number of project change orders issued by the public agency.
A narrative description of successes and failures during design, engineering,
and construction of the project.
An objective assessment of the use of the alternative contracting method as
compared to the exemption findings required by ORS 279.015.

An effective way to present the required report is to simply comment, point by
point, on each statement made in the original project exemption findings. In
addition, to the above requirements, evaluation reports are to be made available
for public inspection and must be completed within 30 days ofthe date that the
public agency accepts the public improvement project. The report is to be
delivered to the pirector of the Oregon Department of Administrative Services or
the local contract review board.

Unfortunately, to date, no one at the Department of Administrative Services is
directly responsible for collecting these reports nor is any person, including anyone in the
Director's office, aware of whether any such reports exist or are kept. An attempt was
made to collect as many 279.103 Reports as could be found by contacting agencies known
to have used CMlGC since the law went into effect. Only the Oregon Department of
Corrections has made a great effort to comply with the law, with other agencies like the
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Port of Portland, for all intents and purposes, ignoring the requirements all together2•
Others, like Central Oregon Community College have paid the requirement only lip
service by parroting their own findings reports with affirmative responses devoid of any
"objective analysis" or data.

Oregon Department of Corrections (DOC)
The Oregon DOC undertook a large building program in 1995, following the
passage of Ballot Measure 11 in November 1994, which required longer prison sentences
thus requiring more beds. wee new large prisons were constructed using the CMlGC
PDS, and consistent with the requirements of ORS 279.103, the DOC published reports
assessing the performance of the projects relative to the original exemption criteria, the
project successes and lessons learned during the projects.
Snake River Correctional Institution Phase II (SRCI)
According to the Department of Corrections [168], the SRCI at $175 million, was
''the single largest single public works project at that time in the history of the State of
Oregon." The project included 802,000 Gross Square Feet and had total construction costs
of $151 ,805,477 (on an original GMP of $144,036,000 after two Change Orders amended
the Contract price). The total amount spent by the State on the project, including all
design, project management, administrative and construction costs, was $174,954,384.
The total project budget is summarized in:

92 Mr. Tom Peterson, the Port's Director of Engineering has promised to have these reports up to date,
but that promise made in the fall of 2002 remains un kept, and as late as May 2003 he has not had the
staff available to do the work, in spite of the fact that at least two major CM/GC projects were finished
in 2002.

276

Original
Budget

Item
CM!GC GMP
Amendment 2 (Change Order 1)
Amendment 3 (Change Order 2)
Subtotal (Total GMP)
Miscellaneous Construction!
Support
ODOC Provided Projects!
Management

!

Consultants
HOK (Architect)
CRSSC (Project Management)
AGRA (Special Inspections)
Subtotal
Offsite Costs
Idaho Power (Electrical)
Irrigation
Domestic Water
Sanitary Sewer
City of Ontario Community Impact
Study

Final Cost

Variance

$144,036,000
$7,816,155
$1,696,322

$142,292,956
$7,816,155
$1,696,322

$1,743,044
$0
$0

$153,548,477

$151,805,433

$1,743,044

$5,443,260

$4,406,025

$1,037,235

$9,100,000
$0
$720,180

$9,681,000
<$581,000>
$2,499,227 <$2,499,227>
$1,083,655
<$363,475>

$9,820,180

$13,263,882 <$3,443,702>

$0
$0
$2,200,000
$3,942,467
$0

$28,078
$2,154
$1,070,594
$4,336,524
$6,288

<$28,078>
<$2,154>
$1,129,406
<$394,057>
<$6,288>

Subtotal

$6,142,467

$5,443,638

$698,829

PROJECT TOTAL

$174,954,384

$174,918,978

$35,406

Table 29: Project Summary from [168]

Note that the ''Final Cost" under the CMlGC GMP actually shows a savings of
$1,743,044. This takes into account the Change Orders in the G:MP; in short, the CMlGC
was actually paid about $142 million for the original $144 million scope ofwork under the
G:MP. (Guaranteed Maximum Price), an additional $9.5 million of project scope, not in the
original G:MP was added to the GMP, raising the final adjusted G:MP to $153,548,477.
The report describes the overall project experience and use of the CMlGC process
on the project as follows:
"The SRCI Phase II expansion project presented various unique and
complicated challenges requiring intense management review and effort. The
complicated logistics of staging a major construction project within an existing
secure facility and the pressing need for beds necessitated a delivery process
that allowed close collaboration between the architect/engineer and the
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contractor during design; a single point of responsible communication for
decision-making purposes between ODOC and construction operators; and
reduction of the financial risk for ODOC. As a result, the ODOCsubsequently
chose and managed the CM/GC process to successfully complete the project
within budget and within schedule"

Note again that the project was considered "within budget and within schedule."
Of course it is clear that the original GMP or construction estimate prepared by the CM/GC
and including an Owner controlled contingency, was not met. However, according to the
report, this was at least in part due to the fact that the project had undergone a scope
reduction during the early plamring and estimating stages. During the CM/GC process, the
scope ''was made whole again thorough the project team's value engineering and
constructability reviews."
The report listed a number of challenges faced by the project team in this project,
which in part justifies the use ofa CM/GC PDS on the project:
•
•
•
•
•

Infancy of the new prison construction program
Project Size
Schedule Requirements - Fast Track Construction
Security Requirements associated with inmate work program goals
Phased Construction at an existing institution

The report documents significant project successes, including the use of "fast
track" construction, value engineering, use of inmate labor, twenty-two months and
700,000 man-hours without a lost time accident, zero outstanding claims93, no breaches in
security, and successful involvement with the local business community. Under the
"Lessons Learnedn section ofthe report, the author notes the following:
"As is the case in all construction projects. lessons can be learned after
reviewing the successes and failures of the project. The CM/GC process was
selected for this project because of the advantages it offered for 'fast tracking'
construction and reducing risk to the Owner. By identifying instances where
cost of work was adjusted upward in the SRCI project, ODOC has obtained
invaluable information necessary to improve the way they utilize the CM/GC
process on future projects.

Dedicate adequate time and resources to design and constructability reviews
during the design development phase of the project and the subsequent
issuance of bid packages. Dedicating additional time and resources by all
Project Team members during this important phase will enhance both the
quality of the final design bid documents and quantity of work procured
Although there were substantial subcontractor claims on the project, these were negotiated to
settlement prior to the end of the project for a total of $1 ,060, 100, which was about 20% of the original
claim totaL

93
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through the Project's competitive bid process and fewer expensive change
orders. As a result of the "fast track" design and construction process
used on this Project, the typical design and review time of a Project this
size was substantially shortened. This reduction in design and review time
resulted in certain systems and components being issued for competitive
bid before they were fully designed and/or integrated with other work.
Insure that departmentaillend-users" are actively involved in the design
development review process. In reviewing the work secured after the
initial competitive bid packages were awarded, it appears that additional
efforts need to be made to insure "end-users" are more actively involved in
the design development review processes. With the likelihood that
operational personnel will not be experts on the design development
review process or details of overall systems, additional effort needs to be
made to explain these systems to them in plain language during regular
design reviews leading to a more complete understanding and support of
design by "enq-users." Resulting improved functionality and correctional
value will insure that the prisons and security systems being designed
align with operational needs and reduce the likelihood of subsequent
costly future field modifications or changes.
Expand commissioning efforts. During the proposal/selection stage of the
CM/GC, include all requirements for systems commissioning within the
request for proposal from the CM/GC. Require the CM/GC to demonstrate
in their proposal their commitment to systems commissioning and then
contractually obligate them to support the commissioning process.
Consideration should be given to place the Central Plant main equipment
(pumps, hydronic piping, etc.) in a single subcontract and pre-qualify the
sub-contract to ensure completion by a qualified contractor. Consideration
should also be given to select an independent commissioning firm for
building systems as well as security systems."

It is fair to say that the Oregon DOC staff and managers were pleased with the use
of CMlGC on this project and in fact would use it on at least two more major projects
undertaken during the same building program (accounting for $250 million more in public
spending). If the report can be faulted, it would be for glossing over any problems that
occurred on the project and being somewhat loose (if not out right deceptive) with the use
of the tenns ''under budget" and "ahead of schedule." All projects in Oregon are
technically "on budget" because ORS 294.100(2) requires that all contracts be adjusted by
change order to exactly fit or exceed the amount paid to the Contractor. The facts are that
the construction budget was initially adjusted to a reduced scope, then when either
additional funds or savings were realized the budget was increased to meet the added
scope. But, in the final analysis, the original GMP was $144 million and the final amount
paid was $152 million, which included approximately $8.5 million in scope adjustments.
Finally, the report failed to address any of the critical issues raised. in the Secretary of
State's Audit Division report on this project (see Section 0 below for details.)
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Two Rivers Correctional Institution (TRCI)

The TRCI, according to the ORS 279.103 report [170] is described as follows:
"The Project was built on a 280-acre site in Umatilla County. Groundbreaking
occurred on April 5, 1997 with substantial completion of the institution on
March 3, 2000. The Project's design is state of the art and includes such
innovative security features as biometric palm-readers and centralized
security control centers with a touch screen computer system capable of
operating the entire facility from a single room. The Project is made up of
several free-standing buildings that house administrative functions, a 96 bed
minimum housing unit, regional transport facility, a medium security facility
and several support structures including the on-site warehouse and radio
transmission tower. Within the medium security facility, inmates are housed in
one of fourteen general housing units, each unit capable of housing 96
inmates, or one of the two high custody units, capable of holding 88 additional
inmates each."

The project team from the Oregon DOC decided to use a CMlGC PDS for the
construction of the project, in part for the same reasons stated in the justification rationale
for the SRCI as well as the "state of the art" and other aspects of the job noted above. The
project had an original GMP of $120,668,503, which was adjusted by Change Order in
June 1998 to $128,255,948 then adjusted downward in Change Order #6 to the final GMP
amount of $125,266,646. The report lists the following project successes for the Design
and Construction phases due to use ofthe CMlGC Process:
"Design/Engineering Phases:
•

The CM/GC method allowed ODOC to capitalize on contractor's expertise
during the design phase;

•

early identification of GMP in the design phase allowed more effective use
of total program funds;

•

design was released in phases allowing a more aggressive construction
schedule;

•

prototype schematic design and final GMP were completed in less than
three (3) months;

•

following establishment of original GMP, savings were realized due to the
collaborative team-approach to value engineering which reduced the
square footage needed;

•

savings in original design costs enabled ODOC to build a complete inmate
workforce building that was reduced in scope to meet initial budget goals
of the Project.
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Construction Phase:
•

The flexibility of CM/GC process allowed maximum use of inmate labor
which directly reduced the cost of subcontracted work;

•

direct savings to the Cost of Work due to use of inmate labor totaled
nearly $1.5 million dollars;

•

procurement methods allowed ODOe 'flexibility to accept or reject credits
offered by bidders for use of inmate labor, thereby protecting OOOC from
claims for unavailability of OOOC provided labor; risks for subcontractor
performance remained with the subcontractor; only minor problems were
encountered with use of inmate labor;

•

direct purchases from local suppliers accounted for over $1.9 million
dollars, and together with regional subcontracted purchases exceeded $40
million dollars;

•

completion of various Project buildings was accomplished ahead of
schedule including early occupancy of the minimum custody building 14
months ahead of schedule;

•

early completion of Project warehouse provided cost-savings by
avoidance of OOOC's rental of off-site storage space,

•

overall Project was completed one month early of the originally planned
completion date;

•

site safety was extremely successful due to an aggressive safety program
established by the CM/GC-Project realized over 650,000 man-hours and
400 consecutive days without a reportable loss-time injury;

•

CM/GC returned $668,000 to OOOC as result of savings in a Contractor
Controlled Insurance Program (CCIP)."

fu short the benefits that accrued due to CM/OC on this project accrued through the
flexibility afforded the project in the CM/OC PDS. Flexibility that allowed better use of
inmate labor, a Contractor Controlled Insurance Program, and fast-tracking ofthe job. The
report does admit that competitively bidding the work may have resulted in "marginally
lower direct prices" but would have required "greater effort during design," reduced or
eliminated fast-tracking of the job and increased "he need for Change Orders." The
"Lessons Learned" section went on to point out these additional areas for improvement:
•

•
•

•

"The effort required for accounting of the CM/GC reimbursement were
time intensive and a fixed-fee for the CM/GC management and general
condition services could be negotiated, then paid on a schedule of values;
the Project team's roles and responsibilities need to be made as clear as
possible-formal partnering sessions at the start of a project can help;
an Owner-controlled contingency could be established in the GMP after
reconciliation of the buyout status of the Cost of Work for Owner use to
recover program reduced to meet initial budget goals;
allowances could be established within the GMP without CM/GC fee until
released by Owner when needed;
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•

pre-construction services fee should be competitively bid as part of the
CM/GC procurement process. For this Project the CM/GC was paid $1 for
pre-construction services. Other projects might leverage savings to the
State through a competitive fee process."

The actual accounting summary of the project given in Appendix D of the report is
a bit confusing:
Description

Budget

Actual

Balance

Guaranteed Maximum Price of
Construction (GMP)
$114, 155, 186

$108,858,052

$5,297,134

CM/GC Fee

$3,208,336

$3,208,336

$0

Owner Contingency within the
GMP

$7,903,124

$1,501,334

$6,401,790

$125,266,646 . $113,567,722

$11,698,924

Final Cost of Work

Total GMP

Table 30: Partial Summary of Project Accounting in TRCI 279.103 Report [170]

The implication of this sunnnary is that the CMlGC actually received a higher
percentage fee than originally contracted for since the Budget Final Cost of Work GMP
was $114 million and the Actual was $108 million with the same CMlGC fee. This would
mean an increase from 2.80/0 to 2.95%, a 4.73% increase in fee percentage. In fact, what
the "Budget" reflects is the amount of money dedicated to these cost categories at the end
of the job, and the total amount paid is found under the "Actual" column. The proper
comparison appears to be between the $120,668,503 and the amount finally paid of
$113,567,772, which represents a cost reduction of 5.88%, the CMlGC on the project
actually reported payments of$115,280,000 on an original GMP of$120,668,503 94 •
It should be noted that the CMlGC received letters of commendation and
recommendation from this project as well as repeat work from the DOC. They reported no
complaints from neighbors and that their project team received high marks and promotions
from the company's review of their management of the job. The project was generally .
completed on time with only minor outstanding subcontractor claims (apparently unlike the
SRCI discussed above). Finally, the CMlGC prepared the original GMP on the project
when the plans and specifications were only 25% complete.
There appears to be no doubt that both the CMlGC and the DOC were pleased with
the outcome ofthis project and their decision to use the CMlGC PDS on this job.

Coffee Creek Correctional Facility & Women's Intake Center
The Coffee Creed Correctional Institution (CCCF) & Women's Intake Center, the
project is described in the ORS279.103 report [169] as follows:
94

The CM/GC's reported figures were used in our DEA analysis.
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"CCCF was constructed on a 108-acre site in Wilsonville, Oregon.
Groundbreaking occurred on April 21, 2000, with substantial completion of
Phase 1 portion of the facility on July 6, 2001 and Phase 2 portion of the
facility on March 14, 2002. The CCCF design is state-of-the-art with such
security features as a perimeter microwave alarm systems, a card access
system to expedite internal movement of staff and centralized security control
centers with touch screen computer systems capable of operating the entire
facility from a single control room. The intake processing facility was
developed to allow the processing and housing of both male and female
inmates while maintaining gender separation. CCCF consisted of two phases
of construction: Phase 1 - Women's Minimum Security Facility and Phase 2
Women Medium Security Facility and Co-Gender Intake Center."

The report documents the following "project successes" and "trials" during the
"Design, Engineering and Construction Phases" as follows:
"Design/Engineering Phase:
•

Refinement of the 1997 prototypical design allowed for increased
efficiency in layout and function.

•

The resulting site plan and layout included efficiencies in fenCing systems,
site usage, and shaping of the landscape for visual screening.

•

The design process utilized a collaborative effort with Building Codes
Division (BCD) to apply and implement accepted alternatives and
maximize to the fullest degree possible the cost-savings potential inherent
in the State Building Codes.

•

The design process fostered over $20,000,000 in cost saving initiatives.

•

DeSign Team Workshops, collaboratively consolidating the perspectives of
Architect/Engineer, CM/GC, Project Management Consultant, and Owner
were scheduled regularly and were central to achieving Project success.

Construction Phase:
•

Phase 1 of the Project was completed nearly three (3) months ahead of
schedule. The support buildings (Warehouse and Physical Plant) made
use of existing on-site structures and were completed six (6) months
ahead of schedule. The Gatehouse was completed two (2) months early
and the remaining parts of the Project were completed three (3) weeks
early. Cooperation with BCD and City of Wilsonville throughout the
Project and the coordination of ODOC, AlE, CM/GC and Project
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Management Consultant during design and construction contributed to the
early completion dates.
•

Contractors from the Northwest region performed 96%> of the work.
Contractors from outside the Northwest performed 4% of the work. Oregon
and local contractors performed 78% of the work.

•

Site safety was outstanding with only one lost time accident, a tendon cut
in a worker's little finger, in nearly 750,000 manhours worked. The Project
received an award from Oregon OSHA for these excellent safety results.

•

The use of Inside Oregon Enterprises, the inmate industries program for
ODOC, for detention hollow metal products. detention plumbing fixtures,
and detention furnishings resulted in nearly $4 million of work for State of
Oregon inmates.

•

The Project was awarded Portland General Electric's "Earth Advantage
Certification" for its innovative approaches to energy efficiency measures.
The CCCF Project was the first public improvement project to receive this
award.

•

Reconfiguration of the site plan allowed for more cornpact site
development and reduction in length of security perimeter.

•

By designing stormwater to be sheet run-off to site swales, construction
and maintenance costs were reduced by eliminating area drain manholes,
sediment basins, buried stormwater piping, and outflows.

•

Utilizing on-site soils for perimeter landscape berms saved export costs
and reduced the amount of plant material and irrigation investment while
satisfying the screening and buffering requirements.

•

To create a foundation pad, the site cut-and-fill design was over-excavated
to the depth of foundations and utilities. Then the over-excavated portion
was replaced with compacted fill within which controlled trenching could
take place in a homogeneous crushed rock matrix. This built-up pad also
replicated the foundation pad conditions in the filled (built-up) areas of the
foundation for optimum structural continuity.

•

Having the operable skylights double as potential gas canister dumps
allowed for lowering of the entire roof plane which saved on the cost of
wall heights, building finishes, and diminished the heated and cooled
volume of the building.

•

With dayroom skylights included, day lighting is provided in areas away
from the window wall.
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•

By using a radial feed power medium voltage concept instead of the
original loop feed concept, the Project saved hundreds of feet of medium
voltage cable, conduit, and switching. The new design reduced the
number of power substations from six (6) to three (3) substations which
reduces both initial costs as well as life cycle costs due to increased ease
of maintenance.

•

The interior dayroom illumination was designed to incorporate 'uplighf and
'down light' for low brightness and contrast - light bounces off the ceiling
giving the entire volume of the dayroom a more even brightness. Utilizing
daylight sensors and dimming ballast with the skylights reduces artificial
illumination during the day. Using this same fixture in the corridors for the
housing units, results in a substantial energy saving and related costs."

As in the earlier SRCI and TRCI projects some of these "successes" can be
attributed to the flexibility afforded by the CMlGC PDS, however others noted above
appear to be normal design and engineering issues. Engineers fundamentally exist solely
to save their clients money on building materials through design, while protecting the
public by implementing sound design solutions. In absence of engineers, all buildings
would be one or two story buildings of less than 2,000 square-feet floor area95. It certainly
should not be necessary to involve a CMlGC PDS in order for the design engineer to
decide on the type of storm water that is most cost efficient. The same comment is true for
the "Lessons Learned" regarding "Landscaping" design, engineered excavations and fills,
including operable skylights, energy efficiency measures, and site plan layout. The fact
that "Contractors from the Northwest region performed 96% of the work" and that
"Oregon and local Contractors performed 78% of the work" is neither important nor a
product of the CMlGC PDS unless the CMlGC discriminated against "out-of-region
subcontractor's" which would probably be illegal. The project is located in the mid
Willamette valley of Oregon, south of Oregon's major city, Portland, and north of its state
capitol, Salem; in the city of Wilsonville. It would seem highly unlikely that any project
located in Oregon's most heavily populated conidor, would not have had these results
regardless ofPDS employed.
The report notes that on September 29th 1997 the CMlGC established an original
GMP of$110,000.000 and the final amount paid to the CMlGC was just over $92,242,000,
an approximately 16% savings96• The report credits the savings to the use of the CMlGC
PDS in justification of the statutory requirement that the use of CMlGC ''will result in
substantial cost-savings to the public contracting agency." They further concluded that:

The State of Oregon allows building less than 2,000 square feet to be designed by non-engineers and
non-architects. The final design still must meet the most current requirements of the applicable
Building Code, however.
96 The report states that "the final reconciled GMP of $1 00,000,000 was established in Amendment No.
3dated April 18, 2000.

95
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"While the original scope was reduced to fit within the targeted GMP, efficient
value optimization efforts by the Project Team resulted in all such reductions
being reinstated."

And again herein lies a question about the accuracy and value of the G:MP figures
reported in [169]: how much ofthe savings from the original $110 million G:MP was scope
reduction? The report states that the G:MP was reduced to $100 million in Amendment #3,
after the scope was better defined. So, what should the comparison budget performance
actually be based on? For example, could they have decided to cut the project in halfto say
a $55 million project then claim 50% cost reduction due to their management skills and the
use of the CMlGC PDS? This issue is not addressed, but it seems clear that reporting the
16% and $17 million figures are probably disingenuous if not a deception. Probably at
most the CMIGC PDS could be credited with the reduction of$7 million in costs from the
revised $100 million G:MP to the final payment, and that would be no small
accomplishment itself. Most public projects in Oregon are smaller than $7 million in total
cost to begin with! Also, it is important to note that from 1997 to 2000, the time between
the original and reconciled G:MP's the project location was a hot political debate in Oregon
and it is not known whether the original G:MP was for the original location: a former state
mental hospital campus; the second site: some industrial land in Wilsonville; or, the final
"actual" building site? This is not addressed in the report. Although neither is the benefit
the state received from having a CMlGC on board during the site controversy and
evaluation process. Something it certainly would not have been able to do if the state had
relied on DBB as their PDS for the project.

Oregon State Library (OSL)
The Department of Administrative Services (DAS) published their ORS279.1 03
"Post Project Evaluation" report [90] on December 7th , 2001 following the OSL job. The
report consists of the following:
1. "Project background giving a brief description of the project.
2. Financial information consisting of cost estimates, the Guaranteed Maximum
Price (GMP), changes and the actual cost.
3. A narrative description of successes and failures in the design, engineering
and construction of the project.
.
4. An objective assessment of the use of the CM/GC contracting method as
compared to the Findings required by ORS 279.015.

The "single dominating constraint factor in this project's design and construction
was the requirement that it remain open and occupied during the entire process, from
concept to completion." And the report notes that requirement was met, to a large part
because they chose to use the CMlGC PDS. The project did have an increase in cost from
an initial G:MP of$5,478,554 to a final cost of $5,840,537, a 6.6% increase.
As in the CCCF project, many of the project "successes" that are noted in the
report, such as the "Seismic Improvements," the use of "plate steel" sheets instead of cast
in-place concrete, and "historic materials" searches were as much design issues as
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construction issues where the value did not accrue due to the use of the CMlGC PDS, or
rather that it most likely could have accrued to the project had the designer spent more time
to develop the job specifications.
This report does address one issue that had not been discussed in any detail in the
DOC reports above, the competitively bid subcontracts:
"One of the Project goals was to have 85%)-900/0 of the scope of work be
performed by subcontractors through a competitive bid process. While the
actual percentage of GMP expenditures associated with subcontracted work is
only 78% of the total, this does not take into consideration the fact that 13% of
the GMP is CM/GC management fee, general conditions, performance bond
fees and insurance. With those issues out of the equation the actual
percentage of construction dollars paid to subcontractors is 910/0."

The issue not discussed is the fact that if the project had used DBB all of the work
would have been competitively bid, including the contractor's fee and General Conditions
(another terms for on-site management) costs. The fact is that when multiple general
contractors bid a job in a market with a large number of subcontractor's to choose from,
there is a higher likelihood that a bidder will realize the lowest combination of all
subcontract bidders and thus the lowest possible total project bid, than if there is only one
(l) general contractor bidder. This effect may not be very large, but a study by the Audit
Division for the Oregon Department of Transportation [135], showed that as the number of
bidders on highway projects was positively correlated with a reduction in lowest bid as
compared to the engineers estimate, which illustrates this principle precisely. It is
questionable whether or not the results from [135] are comparable to the building sector
since the proportion of "self performed work" in ODOT road construction con~cts is
significantly higher than in the building sector (and in particular CMlGC PDS where self
performed work is normally kept to a minimum). But, it is important to point out that
[135] actually shows greater than a 25% reduction in low bid compared to engineers
estimate, when going from one bidder to more than five (5) bidders (from -.02% to 
25.9%). Furthermore, the report shows that after all change orders, the low bidders on
highway contracts remained significantly below the average bid at bid time, which
indicates in general that low bidders do not systematically under bid work and then "make
it up" on change orders, as some have thought. The reduction is cost is principally due to
increased competition and in the CMlGC PDS, the competition at the CMlGC level is
reduced to one.

COCC Cascade Hall Project Evaluation Report
In March 1999 the Central Oregon Community College (COCC) Board exempted
the Cascade Hall project from the competitive bidding requirement of ORS Chapter 279
for its Cascade Hall project. In an undated two-page report with a one-page attachment
described as the project cost accounting [115], COCC staff documented the project as
required by ORS 279.103. Of the reports obtained for this research, this report was the
least detailed and least well reasoned. The project was initially intended to be a classroom
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building for COCC, but mid-project the scope of the job changed to accommodate the fact
that the Oregon State University had won approval to open a branch campus in central
Oregon, noting that: "the OSU-Cascades Campus essentially stopped the design process
mid-stream." Unlike a lot of CMlGC PDS jobs, this project was started, then delayed mid
plan for fifteen (15) months, while the parties decided what the impact of the OSU's
presence in Central Oregon. In fact, the original exemption order was justified, in part on
the determination that the campus building had to be delivered in an expedited manner, "to
accommodate projected enrollment growth in COCC and University Center programs by
fall 2000." At the time 9f the exemption order this was only six months away, but by the
time the project actually broke ground that urgency no longer mattered.
The report does not allege, as required in the statute that the public agency will
realize significant cost savings instead it concludes that it will achieve "greater cost
reliability" than if it used DBB PDS. This conclusion probably made sense when the
original project was intended to be six-months, but once the project was delayed, this
justification became dubious. In fact, the report states that the project incurred a cost
increase of"approximately $500,000 over the original" G:MP, although the majority ofthis
was scope additions, presumably due to the changed mission after OSU arrived. However
surprisingly enough, the report concludes that the use of CMlGC PDS would reduce cost
increases and delays, but the project that was intended to be occupied in the fall of 2000,
was not occupied until July 2002 and would not be fully utilized until fall 2002, two years
after it was originally planned.
The report claims that the cost impacts were mitigated in part by the fact that the
CMlGC for the project used "$120,000.00 of its contingency and some material savings to
cover other changes to the building thereby reducing the cost impact to the college by
$120,000." But the "contingency" is just that, money that is set aside to pay for undefined
or unforeseen work that is required in the project. For example ifthere was no time to do a
complete soils analysis, the Owner and CMlGC may set aside in a "contingency account"
some amount ofmoney to cover cost ofunknown conditions. However, ifthe costs exceed
the contingency amount, the Owner still has to pay for them, and if the costs never
materialize the Owner doesn't pay them. To say that the college received savings because
the CMlGC used contingency funds to pay for changes saved the college money is simply
not true. If the changes had not occurred, the college would have realized the total benefit
ofthe contingency funds in the form ofa cost reduction to the Contract. The fact is that the
college did not receive any benefit from the CMlGC's use of contingency funds to cover
change orders unless for some reason the college was going to allow the CMlGC to keep
the contingency funds without earning that money.
It appears from the cost accounting that is attached to the report that the original
G:MP for the project was $4,996,410 and the total amount actually paid to the CMlGC after
six change orders was $5,671,839 (which is about $175,000 more than the report claimed
$500,000 Contract overage). These figures hardly· support the report's claims of cost
reliability and cost control, and in fact represent a relatively poor performance for a
construction project, with cost increases exceeding 10% of the original budget. Granted,
the project underwent significant scope changes due to the changing mission, but at the
point that the project changed significantly, it is questionable whether or not the original
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exemption, based in part on the requirement to occupy a building in six months, reflected
the changed reality of the project and whether COCC should have revisited the exemption
issue and the selection ofthe CMlGC.

Other 279.103 Report Considerations and Comments
One problem with the 279.103 reports is that agencies do not have the time or money
at the end of a project to adequately devote to making the proper evaluation as
required by statute. The fact is that while the legislature made this a requirement, they
put no penalties or incentives into the law to make sure these reports actually got done.
Furthermore, the legislature exempted the Oregon University System, its member
Colleges and Universities, and the Oregon Health and Science University from
complying with this law. The end effect is that there are very few agencies that
actually have to comply with the law, and fewer still that have the time and money to
do so. Even the Port ofPortland, one of Oregon's largest public agencies, in terms of
total revenues and expenditures, has failed to produce even one single report in spite
of the fact that the Port had used CMlGC one some ofthe largest building projects in
recent years at the Portland International Airport97. In fact the probable reason that
the Oregon DOC has done such a "stand-out" job in their three reports is the fact that
they were so harshly criticized by the Secretary of State's Audit Division for, what the
Auditors felt was mishandling of several million dollars in the process of using
CMlGC PDS on one of their early prison projects. No matter, the fact is that the
Oregon DOC and DAS have done the best job in completing and documenting their
projects as required by ORS 279.103.
In an interview with the officials at the Department of Administrative Services, the
agency that the statute requires reports to be submitted to, it was learned that there is no
formal process for collecting the 279.103 reports, no specific person responsible for
collecting them, and no specific location where they are kept. The states Architect, Mr.
Bill Foster had possession of only one report, the report that he wrote for the Oregon State
Library project [90].
Finally, Oregon statute ORS 294.100 states:
294.100 Public official expending money in excess of amount or for
different purpose than provided by law unlawful; civil liability. (1) It is
unlawful for any public official to expend any moneys in excess of the amounts
provided by law, or for any other or different purpose than provided by law.
(2) Any public official who expends any public moneys in excess of the
amounts or for any other or different purpose than authorized by law shall be
civilly liable for the return of the money by suit of the district attorney of the
district in which the offense is committed, or at the suit of any taxpayer of such
district, if the expenditure constitutes malfeasance in office or willful or wanton
neglect of duty.
These include the Tenninal Expansion North, the Terminal Roadway Expansion, the Parking Garage
Expansion and the new Terminal Access and Cover projects, which in total exceed $500,000,000.00.
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TIus provision is quite onerous for public officials and is perhaps one reason the
DOC reports do not explore the expenditures oftheir CMlGC Contractor as in depth as did
the Secretary of State's Audits Division. In fact, both this law and state policy requiring
that work be accomplished for the least cost would tend to make any public employee shy
away from second guessing their decision to use one PDS over another. For this reason,
and the fact that the public agencies have failed to comply with the intent of the statute, it
seems reasonable to conclude that if the legislature actually wants these reports honestly
completed, that work needs to be delegated either to the Audits Division or to an outside

party.
Audit Reports
In 1999, following the inception of one of the largest state funded building
programs in history, the $1 billion prison building and renovation projects, the Oregon
Secretary of State Audits Division undertook an audit to detennine if the money was being
properly spent. The Auditor started by the auditing the Snake River Correctional
Institution in far off Eastern Oregon, near the Idaho border, eventually three projects were
audited: the SRCI, the TRCI and the CCCF (however the last ofthese three, the CCCF, had
just begun at the time of the audit and little was addressed). The reason the Auditor
undertook this mission was in part because the alternative fonn of contracting, CMlGC
was still relatively new on these major projects and the state has an interest in knowing if
the projects were being administered properly.
The Audit Division also audited the Change Order Management and Subcontractor
Procurement practices on all three prison projects and made an abbreviated audit of the
Valley Library expansion project on the Oregon State University campus. Multnomah
County's Auditor also audited the perfonpance of their Capitol Construction Process, but
that work was motivated by concerns fue county had about their own administrative
procedures and was not concerned with th¢ PDS used on the jobs.
I

Prison Construction Oversight
March 18, 1999 the Audits Division of the Oregon Secretary of State's office
published their Audit of the prison building program [134] discussed in Section 0 above.
In the cover letter, the Director of the Audits Division, John N. LattiIner stated:
"This report contains the results of our audit of the Department of Corrections'
prison construction program, specifically the department's oversight of the
Snake River project. The expansion of the Snake River Correctional Institution
is the first project completed on the department's current prison construction
plan. Because this $1 billion construction program is the largest prison
construction program in state history, the Oregon Audits Division has been
reviewing this program through a series of audits. This audit of the
department's construction oversight is the fourth such review. It is our
intention that, by reviewing the department's construction program as it
progresses, we will provide the state with meaningful recommendations for
improvements.
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This audit found that the department can improve its oversight of contractor
payments, better monitor contract requirements, and strengthen contract
terms. The department has already made some changes from the experience
it gained from the Snake River project, and it should continue to make
necessary improvements in its management and oversight practices to benefit
both current and future construction projects. The department's response to
our audit has been inserted throughout the report.

In the audit report itself, the authors admonished the DOC for inappropriate
expenditures and advised that the DOC "should seek the recovery of $465,000 and review
an additional $3.7 million in other payments for possible collection" from the CMlGC on
the job.
The report is highly critical of the DOC's management of the SRCI and
expenditures on the project and concluded in its Executive Summary that:
"The Department Should Improve Its Oversight of
Contractor Payments.
A critical area in which the department has opportunities for oversight
improvement involves payments made to contractors. Ensuring that progress
payment expenditures are reasonable and appropriate is essential to project
cost control. We reviewed project expenditures incurred by the construction
manager/general contractor (CM/GC), project management, and materials
testing firms for the Snake River project. For all contractors reviewed, we
found that the department paid for inappropriate expenditures, including the
following for the CM/GC: more than $170,000 in unallowed overhead and
purchasing markups, $23,000 for catered luncheons, and almost $107,000 for
excessive travel and living expenses. We recommend that the department
conduct a thorough review of contractor payments, and for any payments
found in error, seek monetary recovery from the responsible firm. In total, we
identified $465,000 in recoverable expenditures that
the department should collect; $1,700,000 in expenditures which were not in
compliance with contract requirements; and an additional $2,000,000 in
payments that need further review by the department."

"The Department Should Improve Its Monitoring of
Contract Requirements.
Each contract specifies certain requirements for deliverables and expertise
that contractors are to provide the department. We found several instances in
which the department did not receive all promised deliverables from its
contractors. When the department does not receive reports, schedules, and
other project performance documents, its ability to monitor and control the
project is limited. This also constitutes a form of overpayment as the
department paid for services it did not receive. The CM/Ge, project
management, architect, and materials testing firms all failed to provide the
department with certain required documents. For example, the CM/GC
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contractor promised a thoroughly documented and controlled project. One of
the documents the CM/GC prepares is a monthly progress report, which it
provides to the department. Our review found, however, that as of September
1998, the last monthly report the department received was for April 1997. In
addition to deliverables, contractors promised specific experts to the Snake
River project. We found that the CM/GC and project management firms did
not comply with their contractual agreements on the use of these experts. For
example, the project management firm committed 25 percent of the project
director's time to the Snake River project. Our review of time billed during a
four-month period found that the project director spent only four hours (less
than % of 1 percent of his time) on the Snake River project. We recommend
that the department closely monitor its construction contracts to ensure that all
requirements, including promised deliverables and expertise, are fulfilled."

"The Department Should Strengthen Its Contract Terms.
Contract formulation is critical to a construction project's success because the
acceptance of imprudent terms and conditions impacts both project cost and
quality. To ensure thatthe best interests of all parties are well protected, it is
important that contracts be clear and enforceable. Our review of project
expenditures noted opportunities for the department to improve its contract
development practices. Two specific areas for improvement include ensuring
that contract fees are clearly defined and that reimbursable costs are specific
and limited. For example, the department agreed to reimburse the CM/GC firm
for the cost of its safety program. The contract did not specify allowable safety
program costs or establish a limit for these expenditures. As part of the
contractor's safety program, we found that the department paid for safety
awards, which included $5,000 for items like baseball caps and jackets, and
more than $10,000 in monetary awards. To preclude overcharges and
increase the ease of managing project expenditures, we recommend that the
department improve its definition of and establish limits for reimbursable
expenses and fees."

It is clear that the Auditors felt that at its core, the problem was one ofpoor contract
language and poor understanding of the state's obligations and policies on the part of the
project team. The audit did not allege any specific illegal activities or unlawful profiteering
by any of the parties involved. But the report did find some glaring excessive charges as
swnmarized in their Figure 1, our Table 31 below.
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Item Rented
Fax machines

Copier

All-terrain
vehicles

Flatbed truck

Description
The CM/GC rented six fax machines to the
department at a rate of $165 per month. We
estimate that. as of January 1998, the
department paid more than $14,000 for fax
machine rentals. Several fax machines are
available through state purchasing; the most
expensive model costs $500.
Estimated Excessive Charge: $11,000
The department paid the CM/GC $27,390 for a
copier which could have been obtained through
state purchasing for $11,310.
Estimated Excessive Charge: $16,080
The department paid $24,913 for the rental of
four aI/-terrain vehicles; or $6,228 per vehicle.
The department could have purchased each
vehicle for approximately $3,260.
Estimated Excessive Charge: $11,873
The CM/GC rented a 1978-flatbed truck to the
department for $1,620 per month over a period
of six and a half months for a total cost of
$10,530. According to a local heavy-equipment
rental company, it is unusual for a vehicle of
that age to be rented out, and in fact, any
vehicle made before the year 1990 is difficult to
rent. Depending on the condition of this 1978
truck, the estimated market value ranges
between $3,500 and $6,500.
Estimated Excessive Charge: $4,030 - $7,030

Table 31 Summary of Excessive Rental Charges, Figure 1 from 1134)

One ofthe areas the Audit focused on was a $959,000.00 charge for "survey work"
perfonned by the CMlGC and paid for by the DOC. The DOC defends the expenditure as
appropriate noting that the work was actually done, however the audit points out that state
policy requires all work to be bid if the total amount exceeds the statutory limit. The
interesting omission is any analysis ofthe costs themselves. $959,000 for surveying is a lot
ofmoney to be spent on surveyors. According to a local survey firm, their 2003 rates are
$110 per hour for a survey crew, which translates to 8,718 crew hours or about 4.2 crew
years in 2003 dollars (note of course that the project broke ground in September 1995 and
was completed four years later, September 1999). What this means is that the CMlGC
could have hired a survey crew full-time for the entire project construction period. Of
course, once the buildings are laid out, the earthwork and utilities staked, there is little for a
survey crew to do on, what is principally a building project. It is likely that a lot of work
that was not specifically "survey" was charged as survey work. These items may include
things like interior partition and anchor bolt layout, which is usually considered "carpenter"
work under the union collective bargaining agreement.
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Some other project costs that raised Auditor's concerns included: $16,800 for
computer equipment ofthe DOC project manager; $23,739 in catered lunches; $107,000 in
travel related expenses; $5,586 for business lunches; and, approximately $2,000,000 in
subcontractor payment that were made to the CMlGC but apparently not passed on to the
subcontractors.
The audit provides for "Agency Responses" to each of the findings of the Audit
Division, but allows the Audit Division the last word in the audit, as evidenced in the
following exchange between the Audits Division and the Agency. Of course since it is the
Audits Division's Audit, they do get the last word.
"Subcontractor Payments.
The CM/GC contract allowed reimbursement for payments made to
subcontractors. Of the 55 subcontractors who worked on the project through
September 1998, we judgmentally selected payments made to 11
subcontractors, representing almost 50 percent of subcontractor payments, for
review. For seven subcontractors who appeared to have finished work on the
project, we found that the CM/GC billed $38,480 more than actually paid to
five of them. The four remaining subcontractors were still working on the
project and were owed more than $2 million. The department should enhance
its review of all subcontractor payments to ensure that it paid the CM/GC no
more than the amount paid to the subcontractors.

Agency Response:
There is no mention in the report that these payments relate to contractor
retainage, which is held pending completion of the work. The releasing of
subcontractor retainage is a decision of the CMlGC. The department only has
contractual relationship with the CMIGC. The department is also relying on the
contractor's certification in accordance with section K 3 of the Standard
General Conditions requiring disclosure that all subcontractors and suppliers
have been paid in full and no claims are outstanding on the project.

Audits Division Comment:
The department has the responsibility to ensure that it pays the CM/GC
no more than the amount the CM/GC paid to the subcontractors. Relying
on the CM/GC's certification that the subcontractors were paid in full is
not adequate assurance."

The Audit concludes with a set of recommendations to help the DOC avoid some
of the problems identified in the Audit. Most importantly, the Auditors focused on the
Contract tenns and stressed that the reimbursable expenses and fees need to be better
defined in the Contract. In a later compliance memo from the Audits Division, it appears
that the majority oftheir recommendations had been adopted.
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Department of Corrections, Change Order Management and Subcontractor
Bidding

November 15, 1999 the Audits Division of the Oregon Secretary of State's office
published their Audit of the prison building program [136] discussed in Section 0 above.
In the cover letter, the Director of the Audits Division, John N. Lattimer summarized the
audit finding:
Contracting Practices
While the prison construction contracts generally complied with laws
and standards, the contracts were not clear. For example, the contract
did not clearly identify which changes that occur during construction
would fall under the general scope and cost of the original contract and
which changes would warrant construction cost adjustments.
Change Order Management
The department's independent review of project change orders was
insufficient to ensure that the state's interests were protected. The
department paid additional markup for costs not explicitly allowed by
the contract, and allowed substantial increases to many subcontractors.
Project change orders can be substantial (e.g. one increase of 3,000
percent), making a rigorous review process essential.
Subcontractor Bidding
The department's contractor did not obtain bids at one prison
construction site in compliance with the contract's "sealed bidding"
requirements. Further, the department has made little effort to review
bids awarded by its contractor. These practices do not protect against
the possibility of preferential treatment of some bidders.

This audit reviewed subcontracting practices on both the SRCI and the TRCI. The
report did mention the CCCF, but that project was not complete at the time of the audit.
This audit generally found that both the SRCI and TRCI projects were "in compliance with
ORS and OAR regulations as well as industry practices." But did go on again to criticize
the Contract language, stating:
"[w]e find that the applicable standard general conditions do not clearly identify
the standards or factors under which changes warrant guaranteed maximum
price adjustment. In fact, there were many SRCI changes performed within the
guaranteed maximum price that fit the standard general conditions criteria.
The TRCI contract provisions better satisfy the requirement to identify factors
under which changes fall outside of work scope.
However, the audit team found the TRCI provision to be too broad. We believe
that if the CM/GC is unclear as to what is and what is not to be included in the
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guaranteed maximum price, the CM/GC is more likely to include considerable
contingency in its estimates."

Then went on to praise the CMlGC's for their project management, stating:
In our professional judgment, the TRCI CM/GC has exercised good oversight
and review of proposed changes and subcontractor cost proposals. However,
the Department should not rely solely on the contractor to protect the owner's
interests in this regard. SRCl's change order records did not provide as clear
evidence of change order management. However, the project management
firm applied proven change management techniques to carefully track and
review changes, and our review found that at times, the SRCI CM/GC reduced
subcontractors' prices.

While generally chastising the DOC for relying too heavily on the CMlGC to guard
the Owner's interests and questioned the large amount of change orders in the two projects,
as follows:
"To date, the percentage of change order amounts has not exceeded
allowable amounts. However, with allowable amounts (set by Oregon law)
ranging as high as 20 percent, SRCI changes equaled 20 percent of the
original guaranteed maximum price contract, and TRCI changes stand at 14
percent of the original guaranteed maximum price (at approximately 73
percent project completion)."
"Many individual subcontracts experienced increases well over 20 percent of
their original value. On SRCI alone, twenty-seven subcontractors had their
contracts amended by more than 20 percent, including the major
subcontractors for electrical, mechanical, concrete, and site utilities. In one
case at SRCI, a subcontractor had an original scope of $22,920 increase by
over 3000 percent (to $525,148) through change orders."

But, the last example given by the Auditor really requires more in-depth analysis,
because it is simply not plausible that ''work'' would be increased 3000% as noted. More
likely is the possibility that this particular subcontractor took over some other
subcontractor's responsibilities or scope of work. If that is the case, then there would be a
similar reduction found in another subcontractor's Contract amount to offset the increase.
The Audit did evaluate the Change Orders by type or Cause and presented the
following figures:
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SRCI
Changes by Cause
$7,936,165
Owner Requested
Change
27%

$3,853,328
Sequencingf
Schedule
14%

$4,012,199
Buyout
14%

...-{~MI(,.{~

$473,191
Other (permitting
requirements, etc.)
2%

$5.329,959
'-(;omiolete Design
18%

$7,338.022
Design
Coordination
25%

Figure 47: Change Orders by Cause fr'om (136)

TRCI
Changes by Cause
$1,186,407.00

$1,117,880.00

Other

Design
Coordination

1%

10/0

$121,883.00

$1,575,472.00
CM/GC Buyout
9%

$12,073,511.00
Owner Requested
Change

72%

$737,027.00
Sequencingl
Schedule
4%

Figure 48: Change Orders by Cause from (136)

The Audit concluded with the following statements about CMlGC PDS and the

DOC:
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The department is embarking upon an ambitious new prison construction
program. The audit team specifically invested time at the beginning of the
audit to meet with department management in order to understand the
program, as well as the issues and trends impacting it. Resultant findings and
recommendations were intended to answer specific audit questions, and, as
possible, assist the department in successfully meeting its construction
program objectives.
However, the tenor of the department's reaction to the audit, as illustrated in
their response, indicates a high level of frustration with the audit - which
concerns the audit team. The audit team concludes that a major theme
underlying this frustration, according to the number of the department's
response comments related to it, is the CM/GC project management
approach.
CM/GC is a newer project management approach that has not had
widespread application in many sectors of the construction industry. Because
of this, it provides wide latitude for defining its parameters and its application
to prison construction within Oregon law. The audit team believes that, in
some cases, the department has used the undefined nature of the approach
to its advantage when defending management decisions and project
performance. Some key occurrences in the department response included:
•

The department maintains that change order management best
practices differ radically between contract delivery methods, and
therefore the CM/GC approach cannot be compared to other
approaches, such as the more traditional "hard bid. However, change
order management incorporates scope definition and control, project
cost and schedule controls, and quality construction documents 
factors that affect all approaches, including hard-bid contracts. If the
department does not exercise good change order management
practices, as outlined in audit recommendations, the result will be
increa.sed costs, schedule and cost impacts, and diminished return.
The view that change order management best practices do not apply
to department projects explains why the department's response views
the addition of the Workforce Addition, the Laundry Transfer Building,
the Regional Transport Building, the Vehicle Maintenance Building,
and the Industrial Laundry as adjustments and not scope increases.

•

In response to any findings or recommendations that the department
increase its oversight of the subcontractor bidding process, the
department response maintained that it was the role and responsibility
of the CM/GC to manage lower tier relationships. This is defended
based upon "minimizing project overhead and overlap of contractual
responsibilities". The audit team pointed out that while it is true that the
CM/GC process does give control over management of lower tier
relationships to the CM/GC, it does not negate the responsibility for
oversight to reduce risk to the department.
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•

The basis for analysis of the subcontractor bidding practices at SRCI
and TRCI was a comparison against ORS 279 and industry best
practices. The contract documents for both projects specify that the
CM/GC support ORS 279, while the department response asserts that
they are not legally bound to it since the CM/GC process falls outside
of the standard public project process. However, since it is the intent of
the contract documents that the CM/GC support ORS 279, the audit
team determined that evaluation against ORS 279 was appropriate for
benchmarking. The department should reconsider its approach in light
of the contract documents taken, not the flexibility of the CM/GC
approach.

It is important to note that review of the CM/GC approach was not a specific
audit question the audit team was asked to answer. However, the issues it
raised in light of the department's response to the audit findings and
recommendations make it an issue worthy of consideration. It is the opinion of
the audit team that while the department may be able to have good flexibility
and fast-track ability with the CM/GC approach, the newness of CM/GC as a
project management approach that is not fully defined may not necessarily be
a good match with an organization establishing itself in the field of project
management. "

Again, in its Conclusion, the Audits Division does not criticize the PDS so much as
it criticizes the DOC's management of the projects using CMlGC, in part due to the
"newness" ofthe application and their relative lack of familiarity in using the PDS.

Department of Corrections, Prison Construction Procurement and Contract
Development
On July 29, 1998the Audits Division of the Oregon Secretary of State's office
published their second Audit on the prison building program [133] discussed also in
Section 0 above, this audit focusing on the Procurement and Contract development systems
used by the DOC. In the cover letter, the Director of the Audits Division, John N. Lattimer
introduces this audit, stating:
"This report contains the results of our audit of the Department of Corrections
(department). It is the second in a series of reviews of the department's prison
construction program. Following a July 1998 report on infrastructure planning
and development, this audit focuses on the selection methodology used by the
department to procure the services of construction contractors and the
department's contract development practices.
With an estimated total cost of over $1 billion, the department's prison
construction program is the largest such program in Oregon history. By 2008,
the department plans to increase prison capacity to accommodate an
expected inmate population of more than 14,000, which is 79 percent over
current population levels. At the time of our review, the department had two
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projects under construction with a third project planned to begin in spring of

1999.
While the department faces a significant challenge in managing a program of
this size and complexity, we believe that by implementing our
recommendations for contract procurement and development, the department
can better protect and maximize the state's investment in prison construction."

This audit dealt with the three prisons discussed in Section 0 above, the SRCI, the
TRCI and the CCCF (although again the CCCF was just undelWay as this audit was being
perfonned). The audit contained three major findings and the DOC "generally agreed with
the conclusions and recommendations" ofthe Audits Division. These were:
"Construction Contract Procurement
We found opportunities for improvement in the department's processes for
contractor selection, decision documentation, and determination of contract
cost. For the three construction projects referenced above, we found that
selection panel composition, training, and appearance of fairness can be
improved. Improvements can also be made in documenting the selection
process and award decisions; we found incomplete and conflicting
documentation for existing projects. Finally, we noted that the department
should place more emphasis on contract price for CM/GC firms. This includes
ensuring that the department has a clear understanding of cost proposals
made by firms and conducting the analytical review necessary to determine if
the proposed fees are reasonable. To improve construction contract
procurement, we recommend that the department develop processes to
ensure that selection panels are experienced and objective, ensure that the
selection process and award decisions are fully documented, and assess
whether contract cost and amounts proposed by CM/GC firms are reasonable.
Construction Contract Procurement
We found opportunities for improvement in the department's processes for
contractor selection, decision documentation, and determination of contract
cost. For the three construction projects referenced above, we found that
selection panel composition, training, and appearance of fairness can be
improved. Improvements can also be made in documenting the selection
process and award decisions; we found incomplete and conflicting
documentation for existing projects. Finally, we noted that the department
should place more emphasis on contract price for CM/GC firms. This includes
ensuring that the department has a clear understanding of cost proposals
made by firms and conducting the analytical review necessary to determine if
the proposed fees are reasonable. To improve construction contract
procurement, we recommend that the department develop processes to
ensure that selection panels are experienced and objective, ensure that the
selection process and award decisions are fully documented, and assess
whether contract cost and amounts proposed by CM/GC firms are reasonable.
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Contract Development
We found that the department can improve its establishment of cost limits and
its control over contract amendments. For the Snake River-II project, we noted
opportunities for the department to specify cost limits and improve the
timeliness of contract amendments. For example, the department did not
establish an initial total contract cost with the materials testing firm and
allowed the amount paid to grow 86 percent over the original amount
proposed by the firm. To improve its contract development practices, we
recommend that the department establish contract cost limits as we" as a
process for improving its control over contract amendments."

This Audit focused more on the implementation of the management processes and
PDS and CMlGC selection rather than the actual project, CMlGC or PDS performance.
One of the early common complaints of the CMlGC process was the appearance that the
selections were not "fair." This was particularly true when the first several projects were
awarded to a very small select group of contractors and a large proportion of the selection
criteria involved past experience in CMlGC projects, which effectively locked out may
would-be competitors.
Oregon State University Review of the Valley Library Expansion Project
"During the course of other Audit work at Oregon State University," state Auditors
received information regarding the settlement of a claim on the Library project totaling
$421,000 and decided to make a preliminary investigation. On December 17th, 2001, the
Audits Division published their findings and recommendation from this Audit.
"As a state agency governed by state laws and rules, the university is required
to document its contracting activities. The university did not adequately
document its procedures in selecting either the project contractor or the
architect. The state and university designed and negotiated a contract that
lacked clear provisions for guiding key contracting decisions. In particular, the
contract did not clearly describe which costs incurred by the contractor and
subcontractors as part of the project would be considered reimbursable.
Lacking clear contract language, the university, the contractor, and certain
subcontractors took disputed actions that resulted in increased costs to the
state.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We recommend that for construction projects the university:

•
•

Document its selection and hiring of contractors as required by state
laws and rules.
Consider increasing the number or portion of external, independent,
and knowledgeable parties serving on selection committees.
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•

Continue to work with the attorney general's office in creating and
negotiating clear and supportable construction contracts that
adequately protect the state's interests."

Here again the Audits Division focused on unclear Contract provisions and
documentation but did not fault the University's use of the CMlGC PDS as the reason for
the problems and cost increases incurred on the project.

Multnomah County, Capital Construction Process - Early Planning will Reduce
Costs
Multnomah County Auditor, Suzanne Flynn published an Audit of four specific
county building projects: the Multnomah Building, the East County Building, the Wapato
Correctional Facility, and the Hillsdale Library and concluded that the county construction
project management had significant weaknesses that resulted in increased costs.
Specifically, the Auditor found:
•

Upfront planning to define projects, establish responsibilities, identify
financing options, and plan project activities did not occur in most of
the projects stUdied. Time and resources were often committed without
fully understanding what was needed, what problems might occur, or
what alternatives were available. As a result, the County spent more
than necessary in aI/ four projects.

•

Decision-making authority was not clear, leading to a poor
understanding of roles and responsibilities. This meant that projects
were often conducted in an environment of confusion and/or
disagreement over control.

•

The County did not have the skills and tools necessary to manage
large capital construction projects. Limited administrative capacity and
knowledge of project management practices led to inconsistent
tracking and oversight of projects.

These deficiencies were the result of several factors, including the rapid
growth in the number and size of capital construction projects. Responsibility
for problems did not rest with one individual, department, or official, but
weaknesses existed throughout the County. The net effect was financial loss
due to major changes in scope, multiple project delays, and competing project
goals. Departments and staff also did not always have the support, guidance,
or training necessary to manage projects and properly do their jobs.

The .Wapato Jail is the only one of these projects that was performed using the
CMlGC PDS and no mention is made whether or not that had any impact on the Auditor's
findings and recommendations. As in the Audits Division reports above, the County
Auditor faulted the people, and county management not the PDS for these problems.
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Appendix G - Oregon Public Contracting Coalition Guide to CM/GC
Contracting
This appendix reviews recent reports and publications in Oregon and Washington
that purport to evaluate Project Delivery Systems (PDS) and when alternate procurement
methods should be used.
When the Washington state legislature allowed negotiated procurements by statute,
they attached a condition that an assessment of the process had to be done after a certain
amount of time had passed. Based on that report, the legislature would either allow the
authorizing legislation to "sunset" or lapse, or would reauthorize it. At roughly the same
time, as controversy over CMlGC procurements persisted, a group of construction
professionals organized through the Associated General Contractor's (AGC) formed under
the name Oregon Public Contracting Coalition and published a report assessing the proper
use ofCMlGC. This Section is a review ofthose reports.

Oregon Public Contracting Coalition Guide to CM/GC Contracting

OWNER

CMlGC

AlE

Figure 49: Cover Figure on Oregon Public Contracting Coalition Report

In February 2002 a group of construction industry professionals, several of whom
served on our Expert Panel, with the aid of students and faculty from the Construction
Engineering Management Program at Oregon State University, published a CMlGC
Contracting Guide. This publication explains in simple and straight fOlWard terms what
CMlGC is, what the benefits are and, in the opitllon of the author's what types of projects
and Owners should consider using CMlGC [56]. This is a truly excellent overview ofboth
the construction industry Project Delivery Systems, and an explanation of what CMlGC is
and how it can benefit the Contraction Team. The Executive Summary ofthis docwnent is
as follows:
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"Since the early 19S0's, the Construction Manager/General Contractor
(CM/GC) project delivery method has been utilized to successfully deliver
construction projects in the State of Oregon. Public agencies that have
traditionally employed the design-bid-build method of project delivery
increasingly select CM/GC. CM/GC offers opportunities for success that are
not necessarily available through traditional contracting methods. Greater use
of the CM/GC contracting method has provided the construction community
with insight regarding the benefits and limitations of its use along with
knowledge of the best practices for implementing it on public construction
projects. Drawing on the knowledge gained from past projects, the Oregon
Public Contracting Coalition (PCC) has developed this guide to assist owners'
with the implementation of the CM/GC contracting method on construction
projects in Oregon."

The report goes on to advise prospective users of this process on: Legal
Requirements (under existing state of Oregon law,) Selecting CM/GC for a project (what
should be considered and how to get the best results,) The Solicitation Process, and The
CM/GC Contract, The Guaranteed Maximum Price. The Executive Sununary section
honestly concludes with the following cautionary statement:
"No set formula or framework exists which prescribes how the CM/GC
contracting method is to be implemented. A public agency can modify the
general process to suit its particular capabilities and needs. However,
agencies should be cautioned that developing new practices that are too far
removed from common practice may attract additional audit scrutiny. This
document addresses significant practices and issues that are important to the
process and should be considered by public agencies when employing the
CM/GC process. It is recommended that legal counsel be sought as well to
help provide guidance throughout the process. The Oregon PCC along with
other industry organizations can also provide additional information and
guidance."

The report expends considerable effort to define the roles and relationships of the
different partners in the CM/GC process, along with their second tier partners as
demonstrated in Figure 50:
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Figure 1. CM/GC Contracting Method

Figure 50: Oregon pee Report Figure #1
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Figure 51: Oregon pee Report, Figure #2
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And, recommending a time frame for engaging the CMlGC to capture maximwn
benefit.

Ability to
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Project
Cost and
Quality

Construction

Operation &
Maintenance
Law
Con struct ion
complete

Project
start
Project Tlmellne

Figure 52: Oregon PCC Report, Figure #3

Figure 52 is used in the Oregon PCC Report to help visualize the impact a CMlOC
can have on a project during the different stages of the project timeline. The stages
depicted above do not exactly confonn to those generally recommended by Architects in
our Expert Panel (which included also: Conceptual and Schematic Design) but is helpful in
understanding the different phases of a project and the impact a CMlOC can have on the
outcome. This figure or those strikingly similar have been used in numerous presentations
including one by Oregon PCC member and Expert Panel Member Bart Eberwein [85].
In answering the question: who should use a CMlOC the PCC authors respond in
the following cautionary fashion that is consistent throughout the report:
"Use of CM/GC is not restricted to any particular type of public agency. The
method can be employed by all public agencies. However, gaining approval
for exemption from competitive bidding requirements, and thus the use
of CM/GC, does not necessarily suggest that a public agency should use
CM/GC for a project. The public agency should consider other factors,
especially its own capabilities and resources and the requirements that
CM/GC places on the owner, when weighing whether to use CM/GC for a
project. The consideration of owner capabilities is reflected in ORS
279.011 (5)(d), which states that the findings must include information
regarding the "specialized expertise required" for the project. The findings
need to show that the agency has the capacity, through staff or contract, to
bring the needed owner's representative resources to the project."
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The report points out that the types of project most likely to benefit from CMlqc
include those with "Technical Complexity" where the CMlGC can help to "incorporate the
technical knowledge of a construction contracting firm into the development of the
project's design." And ''The use of CMlGC may be justified when the public agency finds
that the project presents significant technical complexities which are best addressed by a
team approach, with the CMlGC firm helping the public agency and designer solve
specific project challenges." The report goes on to list these issues as follows:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Operations (e.g., keeping the facility functioning during construction).
Tenant occupancy (e.g., maintaining tenant safety and efficiency
throughout construction).
Public safety (e.g., developing a comprehensive project safety plan
early in the project in concert with the owner and architect).
Delivery of an early budget and/or GMP. This enables the public
agency to provide the public, taxpayers, and other stakeholders with
greater cost reliability and more effective management of the budget
process.
Fundraising (e.g., the contractor's involvement facilitates in-kind
giving).
Historic preservation (e.g., seismic upgrades while maintaining historic
facades).
Difficult remodel projects with many unknown factors.
Projects requiring complex phasing or highly coordinated scheduling.

This report provides an excellent point of departure for any discussion on the issue
of CMlGC and DBB PDS, because it provides a thorough but concise explanation of the
different PDS's and an evaluation of their appropriate uses. The Oregon PCC's members
include Contractor's, Consultants and Owners, but are admittedly dominated by those who
support the use of alternative PDS's, specifically CMlGC in Oregon and elsewhere. In
spite of that bias, the Report is remarkably evenhanded and is really intended more as a
''How-to'' guide than a justification or promotional publication. From conversations with
Expert Panel members who also serve on the Oregon PCC, this Report was intended as a
guide to public Owners on how to best decide on a PDS and how to get the most out ofthat
decision.
Table 32 below is copied from the Oregon PCC report [56], and provides a
comparison of the different PDS' s with respect to different project characteristics as well as
other considerations.
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CMCC
(Altsmativs}

Crttaria

Doslgn·Bid·Bulid

(TraditionaQ

Doign-Bulld
(AitsmativB)

Project Charadariatica

Complexity

Probably high; may have
multiple bid packagas.

Mooerate to low.

Schedule

Aggressive; fast-tacking
possible.
High priaity; likely fixed;
usually GMP.
Not a driving factor.

Reasonable; not a key factor.
Normal importance

May be driving factor; usually
either high or low, but not inbetween.
Aggressive; fast-tracking
possible.
Ukelyfixed

Well resowed

Not a driving factor

Complexity may driw higher

Not a driving fack:r

Not a driving factor

Not a driving fack:r

Not a driving factor

Lump sum  aU participants

Lump su m to consofidaf9d
team.
Single-Plint contract with
Design-Builder.

Budget
Program
resolution
Design quality

qualily~

Construction
quality

CompleJdty implies higher
quality.

Contractual Structura

Compensation
Contact
arrangeme nt

Standard fees to dasign
19am' GMPto CM/GC.
AlA contract form or variant
for design; bid a negotiate
for construction.

Agency  Design professional
Agency - Contractor

Doltvory .TGaIft.StructuI1I

Disciplinas
required
Experience
needed
Communications
LtilaI~

Standard design team plus
Typical project design and
CMIGC.
construction teams.
Complex project - high
Moderate
degl'99 of ellPBriencs
required for all participan1s.
Desig n professional as agent; Traditional design
CM is contrada" *'open book" ttrofBssional as agent

Contracting and design
consolidated.
Experience in design-build
needed.
Consolidal9d

lIardIg-.t
Uability

CMtGC "'at risk"', but design
19am further exposed.
Dispute resol ution Standard, but in pannering
atmcsphere.
Confliet of interest Potential to CUIGC  dual
roles during pre-eonstruction
and OO'lStructiO'l.

Standard
Standard ADR. mediation,
RUgation.
None

Single point of msponse with
design-build firm.
Standard ADR. mediation,
litigatial.
PoI9ntial professional con'fllet
fa design team.

Proja,t Control
Schedule CCJltol

Cost oontol

By CMIGC

By CM/GC wth design team
CXI18ultation.
Quafily contol By CM/GC wth design team
CD'lSuttation.
Ownerstalf Must be able to meet owner's
obligations in p1"9
construction services and
contact administration.

By Contractor

Contractor/Design
professional
IAsign professionslf
C'AJntactDr
Standard

Agency looks to D-B 19am for
guidance. DistibutiO'l of
I"9sponsibilities within [)'B
team is internaf issue.
D9sign-Builder
Design-Builder
Depends upon degree of
owner control over the design
and construction.

Table 32: Oregon PCC Report PDS Comparisons Table 1 from [56)
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Appendix H - Oregon Database

309

....

-

0

Q

(§

I..,t..)

o

27
25
19
30
106
4
57
62
63
64
91
93
94
105
111
307
312
65
67
89
151
338
361
7
14
31
47
48
66
263
12
45
28
88
8
10
11
61

tCD

;u

iia.

(I)

~

~

100'%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC

Q.

:cU)

1i

u

CD III

C

u

CD

C

CD

1l1G
C CD

~c

"5

~

~~

~:

:1,:

(I)

<C

2
a.

Q.

School
Remodel
Corrections
Parking
Corrections
Remodel
Remodel
Other
Other
Institutional
Institutional
Remodel
Remodel
Corrections
School
School
Remodel
Institutional
Remodel
Remodel
Corrections
Sports Facilities
School
Remodel
Institutional
Corrections
Remodel
Remodel
Office
Library
Remodel
Other
Corrections
Remodel
Remodel
Remodel
Remodel
Corrections

III"C

0.890
0.890
0.96e
1.000
0.850
0.980
0.900
1.000
1.000
1.020
1.070
0.990
0.980
0.950
1.000
0.930
0.950
1.060
0.820
1.000
1.080
0.940
0.910
1.050
1.000
0.86C
0.940
0.960
1.090
0.940
0.860
0.990
1.000
0.880
0.970
1.000
1.010
1.040

lilt

0.000
0.560
1.0OC
1.000
O.OOC
0.970
O.OOC

1.000
0.900
1.000
1.000
1.080
1.060

1.000
0.000
1.060
1.080
1.000
1.000
1.420
0.910
1.000
1.06C
0.86C
1.000
0.000
1.000
0.970
1.000
1.010

e

1~

1.000
1.000
0.890
1.000
0.900
1.030
1.000
0.950
0.940
1.040
0.470
0.630
0.980
1.000
0.910
0.760
1.050
1.000
1.000
0.820
1.000
1.060
1.000
0.670
1.00C
1.000
1.010
0.67C
1.000
0.950
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.910
1.000
1.000

III

a-e
=.a:
III ...

5~

830.000
450.000
0.000
42.000
19.000
65.000
0.000
80.000
250.000
554.000
0.000
37.000
13.000
0.000
0.000
28.000
370.000
250.000
150.000
50.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
430.000
221.000
110.000
3.000
25.000
120.000
0.000
30.000
0.000
190.000
50.000
105.000
100.000
50.000
1UO.000

Slacks

Virtual DMU Weights

Project Data and DEA Input/Outputs
e
0

U)

U)
C

.U)

';I.
U)"C

; iii
ir .ii
15%
20%
25%
40%
40%
SO%
50%
50%
SO%
SO%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
SO%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
75%
80%
80%
80%
80%
80%
80%
80%
90%
90%
95%
95%
98%
98%
98%
98%

u::
0:
'0

-=

1300.000
SOO.OOO
3960.000
0.000
1350.000
250.000
850.000
977.000
618.000
432.000
34.000
100.000
96.000
0.000
0.000
12.000
'83.000
671.000
130.000
115.000
0.000
1750.000
0.000
643.000
404.000
315.000
200.000
50.000
540.000
1000.000
71.000
150.000
410.000
200.000
456.000
69.000
90.000
250.000

III

U)

c

D.:
ii

0::

III

5

1.000
1.000
0.797
1.000
0.561
0.759
0.843
0.723
0.675
0.966
0.892
0.830
0.952
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.983
0.936
0.763
0.848
1.000
0.955
1.000
1.000
0.976
0.980
0.190
0.467
0.977
0.699
0.000
1.000
0.988
0.572
0.961
1.000
0.000
0.979

0.000
0.000
0.203
0.000
0.439
0.241
0.157
0.277
0.325
0.034
0.108
0.170
0.048
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.017
0.064
0.237
0.152
0.000
0.045
0.000
0.000
0.024
0.020
0.810
0.533
0.023
0.301
1.000
0.000
0.012
0.428
0.039
0.000
1.000
0.021

U.

!!?
'Iii

"5
0
ii

8

5

0.018
0.024
0.000
0.391
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.173
0.011
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.454
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.023
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.538
0.000
0.035
0.969
0.000
0.074
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.006
0.130
0.316
0.015
0.000
0.005

0.703
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.075
0.078
0.000
0.377
0.000
0.000
0.S02
0.000
0.015
0.000
0.459
0.570
0.013
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.009
0.000
0.549
0.021
0.771
0.000
0.996
0.000
0.522
0.000
0.000
0.105
0.000

c

CD

1GCD

til

;:
0
;;

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.545
0.414
0.848
0.810
0.594
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.833
0.000
0.000
0.987
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.901
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.905
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.543
0.000
0.000
0.595
0.384
0.995

0.000
0.316
1.000
0.609
0.000
0.238
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.190
0.030
0.440
0.522
0.000
0.813
0.985
0.000
0.000
0.113
0.000
0.173
0.046
0.462
0.099
0.930
0.031
0.451
0.000
0.229
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.348
0.684
0.390
0.511
0.000

"C

III

"5

"C
CD
.t:.

:1,
0.279
0.661
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.762
1.000
0.282
0.500
0.074
0.000
0.000
0.106
0.478
0.498
0.187
0.000
0.164
0.541
0.294
0.000
0.827
0.953
0.000
0.000
0.026
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.452
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

U)
C

III

~

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

D.:
ii

5
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

U.

!!?
'Iii

"5
0

1G

8

d

ii

"C

~

;:
0
0:.

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

CD

.!!
::s

i.t:.

:1,
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Project Data and DEA Input/Outputs
a.
~
:c1/1 E0
3C
0

Slacks

Virtual DMU Weights

Q.

-

U)

CD

<

--

77
43
335
55
60
56
76
313
136
328
2
51
59
6
326
75
49
38
41
241
9
5
87
256
255
70
159
165
71
149
423
167
286
22
266
42
157
197

•

u

0

~

I..;.)

•a

't:

U)

~

f

100%
100%
100%
100%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
98%
98%
98%
96%
96%
95%
95%
95%
95%
93%
93%
93%
93%
93%
92%
92%
92%
92%
92%
92%
92%
92%
91%
91%
91%
91%
89%
89%

CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC

!

~
Institutional
School
Library
Remodel
Corrections
Institutional
Remodel
Library
Other
Institutional
School
Remodel
Remodel
School
Remodel
Hospital
Remodel
Remodel
Office
School
Remodel
School
Sports Facilities
School
School
Other
Parking
School
Remodel
Corrections
Institutional
School
School
Office
School
Remodel
School
School

iiO'G ~
c CD

1)

f~

~:

C'II"O

0.900
1.050
0.890
1.000
1.000
1.030
0.900
0.960
0.910
0.960
0.890
1.020
0.990
1.000
0.920
0.970
0.970
1.020
0.900
1.000
0.950
0.890
0.920
1.030
1.000
0.940
0.000
1.000
0.900
0.000
0.000
0.980
0.980
1.010
0.950
0.740
0.930
0.930

ii
C

C'II't:

0.000
0.800
1.100
1.00c
O.OOC
1.040
1.000
1.030
0.870
0.980
1.000
1.000
0.980
0.880
1.000
0.000
0.9SC
0.80C
O.OOC
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.010
0.000
0.000

•

C'II

'S E

1~
:/,:

C

C'II

~!
C'II ...

6~

80.000
1.000
1.170 100.000
0.000
0.950
25.00c
1.00c
53.000
1.070
0.000
1.000
0.670 400.000
0.000
0.630
1.000
0.000
0.900 249.000
0.900 278.000
50.000
0.980
1.000
75.000
1.000
0.780 148.000
1.000
0.000
0.950
1.000
0.000
50.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
1.070 120.000
1.000 460.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.830 2872.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
40.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
68.00c
1.000
0.000
0.000
75.000
0.860
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000

0

fI!.
1/1"0

5iD

ii:'7a

99%
100%
100%
100%
99%
75%
75%
75%
100%
75%
95%
80%
95%
85%
75%
75%
100%
80%
80%
100%
90%
100%
98%
100%
100%
75%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
100%
100%
80%
100%
100%
100%
100O/C

1/1

C

.1/1
1/1

'II:

ii'

'0

1976.000
0.000
300.000
30.000
155.000
350.000
1000.000
156.000
161.000
95.000
1004.000
75.000
500.000
675.000
313.000
1000.000
150.000
100.000
0.000
0.000
226.00c
865.000
0.000
O.OOC
O.OOC
450.000
0.000
0.000
67.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
126.000
0.000
50.000
0.000
0.000

a::

LI..

6

S

1.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.014
0.000
0.136
0.000
0.517
0.000
0.000
0.072
0.000
0.034
0.000
0.000
0.009
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.013
0.006
0.011
0.000
0.000
0.115
0.000
0.000
0.051
0.000
0.014
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.382
0.002
0.000
0.030
0.013
0.000
0.005
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.009
0.009
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.019
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.012
0.000
0.026
0.000
0.000

C'II

u:
«

c

C'II

0.000
1.000
1.000
0.999
0.986
1.000
0.664
1.000
0.483
1.000
1.000
0.928
1.000
0.966
1.000
1.000
0.991
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.987
0.994
0.989

1.000
1.000
0.885
1.000
1.000
0.949
1.000
0.986
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

ii

...

~

1/1

"50

~

ii

"0

6
0.000
0.000
0.656
0.000
0.000
0.029
0.000
0.000
0.582
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.Q11
0.048
0.000
0.000
0.073
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.082
0.053
0.051
0.190
0.051
0.089
0.000
0.000
0.055
0.054
O.O~

0.058
0.072
0.050
0.050

CD

~

~

~

0.616
0.246
0.000
0.481
0.501
0.971
0.995
0.612
0.000
0.615
0.235
0.842
0.468
0.830
0.609
0.000
0.818
0.952
0.351
0.375
0.000
0.165
0.462
0.388
0.390
0.949
0.000
0.391
0.551
1.000
0.469
0.383
0.384
0.962
0.377
0.000
0.376
0.374

•
•
.c:

1/1

C

C'II

'S

0

0.000
0.072
0.342
0.447
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.388
0.418
0.385
0.093
0.094
0.000
0.097
0.382
0.000
0.133
0.046
0.047
0.000
0.055
0.102
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.902
0.000
0.000

"0

1/1

:/,

ii'

0.000
0.678
0.000
0.041
0.486
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.668
0.063
0.532
0.065
0.000
0.989
0.000
0.000
0.583
0.553
0.944
0.734
0.538
0.529
0.557
0.000
0.810
0.558
0.360
0.000
0.531
0.561
0.561
0.000
0.565
0.000
0.575
0.576

c

C'II

a::

ii

6

LI..

~

iii

8

"5
0

~

ii

"0

6

CD

~

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.093 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.277 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.539 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.252 0.000
0.000
0.205 0.826 1.147 0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000 0.756 0.000 0.019
0.549 0.409 1.149 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.241 0.682 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.043 0.117 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.628 0.000
0.000
0.033 0.000 1.539 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.406 0.000 0.038
0.000
0.000 0.180 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.759 0.067 0.000
0.000
0.000 107.773 0.000 0.491 0.000
0.000 65.888 0.046 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.310 0.073
0.000
0.000 0.261 0.370 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.233 0.446 0.000
0.000
0.000 16.179 0.042 0.000 0.000
0.000 42.691 0.213 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.306 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 165.117 0.364 0.000 0.810
0.000 34.015 0.252 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 79.120 0.000 0.687 0.000
0.000 0.277 0.137 0.000
0.000
0.000 83.930 0.161 0.000 0.000
0.000 53.741 0.185 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 90.833 0.099 0.000 0.000
0.148 0.000 0.000 0.059
0.000
0.000 43.698 0.224 0.000 0.000
0.000 32.814 0.211 0.000 0.000

•

'S

~
0

~

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.320
0.341
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.019
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.220
0.000
0.205
0.248
0.000
0.253
0.295
0.000
0.281
0.136
0.165
0.369
0.055
0.000
0.199
0.180

'2
.c:

:/,
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.027
0.334
0.352
0.035
0.080
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.159
0.000
0.010
0.019
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.114
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.917
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.044
0.000
0.0001

1

iE
tn

0

~

40
172
213
331
1
161
103
424

89%
89%
89%
89%
89%
89%
88%
88%
87%
86%
85%
85%
85%
84%
84%
84%
83%
83%
83%
82%
82%
81%
81%
81%
81%
81%
79%
78%
78%
73%
73%
72%
69%
68%
67%
100%
100%
100%

44

-

V...)

N

46
104
280
74
53
195
52
193
68
3
290
180
319
82
72
69
32
310
15
83
39
315
81
204
214
18
34
21
26

CII

ftjQ.

u

c

-g

1:

e0
t(

x

tn

~

?:

CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC
CMGC

Remodel
Corrections
Institutional
Housing
Remodel
School
Remodel
Institutional
Other
Office
Institutional
School
School
Remodel
Corrections
Parking
Corrections
Other
Institutional
Remodel
School
Sports Facilities
Remodel
Other
Remodel
Office
Parking
Office
School
Remodel
Remodel
Library
Corrections
Office

DBB
DBB
DBa

Hospital
Corrections
Remodel

School

uti
c at
III"

if~

1.000
0.940
1.010
1.080
0.980
0.960
0.910
O.OOC
1.040
1.020
0.970
0.950
0.900
0.970
0.970
0.820
0.790
0.910
0.940
0.880
0.950
1.010
0.890
0.930
0.950
0.980
0.870
0.940
0.870
0.860
0.780
0.950
0.790
0.000
0.930
0.900
1.000
0.960

e

Q.

1c

lilt

CII

u

c

CII III

:; E

j~

Q.

:c11\
C
III

l'E
:.¥
III ...

a~
~:
1.030
25.000
1.000
0.000
0.060
0.000
0.920
0.000
O.OOC
0.870 405.00c
0.94C
20.000
0.980
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
1.100
0.830
0.000
O.OOC
1.010
25.00c
1.00c
40.000
0.970
1.000
1.000 300.000
1.000
0.000
0.620 1300.000
1.000 1200.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.530
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.640 150.000
1.000
0.000
O'OOC
8000.000
0.930 120.000
0.950
0.820
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.880 1361.000
1.0OC
O.OOC
0.690
0.000
1.000 1011.000
0.920 500.000
1.000 115.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.510
0.930 532.000
0.940
0.700
38.000
O.OOC
0.000
0.910
0.870
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.900 206.000
0.900
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000 430.000
1.33(J
0.420 316.000
0.920 190.000
0.950
90.000
1.000
0.730

if:

Slacks

Virtual DMU Weights

Project Data and DEA Input/Outputs
Q.

E

.
0

0
::::I!

11\
C

.11\

~:2

0::.m
111

90%
75%
100%
90%
90%
100%
90%
0%
90%
90%
90%
85%
90%
100%
100%
100%
100%
80%
90%
100%
100%
60%
70%
90%
70%
90%
80~

90%
70%
90%
100%
70%
100%
100%
30%
93%
95%
95%

ii:

a::
....
0
:It;

50:000
0.000
O.OOC
1.00c
140.00c
O.OOC
60.00c
0.000
50.000
100.000
1900.000
1246.000
1250.000
500.000
2.000
400.000
11.000
800.000
500.000
2500.000
0.000
266.000
600.00c
5OO.00C
370.000
270.0OC
126.00c
311.000
746.000
300.000
154.000
1121.000
0.000
0.000
1150.000
150.000
90.000
41.000

III

11\

c

0::
ftj

11\

..

LI.

'50

11\

a "~

~

0::

III

a

8

0.998
0.998
1.000
1.000
0.963
1.000
0.885
1.000
1.000
0.960
0.984
0.913
0.951
1.000
1.000
0.903
0.992
0.845
0.940
0.889
1.000
0.987
0.784
0.969
0.759
0.950
1.000
0.908
0.738
1.000
0.975
0.756
1.000
1.000
0.239
0.933
0.999
0.994

0.002
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.037
0.000
0.115
0.000
0.000
0.040
0.016
0.087
0.049
0.000
0.000
0.097
0.008
0.155
0.060
0.111
0.000
0.013
0.216
0.031
0.241
0.050
0.000
0.092
0.262
0.000
0.025
0.244
0.000
0.000
0.761
0.067
0.001
0.006

0.049
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.019
0.054
0.031
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.022
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.011
0.000
0.000
0.061
0.000
0.000
0.032
0.000
0.000
0.026
0.000
0.006
0.056

ftj

0.000
0.017
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.058
0.000
0.000
0.053
0.000
0.000
0.054
0.009
0.000
0.000
0.168
0.000
0.090
0.000
0.133
0.000
0.000
0.359
0.034
0.290
0.032
0.038
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.361
0.000
0.000
0.374
0.000
0.037
0.000

ti
at

0.000
0.983
0.637
0.938
0.830
0.390
0.000
1.000
0.928
0.898
0.000
0.946
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.810
0.412
0.910
0.831
0.675
1.000
0.000
0.565
0.000
0.442
0.000
0.962
0.668
0.352
0.618
1.000
0.471
1.000
1.000
0.601
0.000
0.824
0.436

c

.!!

tg
~

0.040
0.000
0.000
0.062
0.096
0.000
0.861
0.000
0.000
0.048
0.146
0.000
0.059
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.098
0.000
0.000
0.797
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.285
0.000
0.382
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.133
0.003

"

CII

i

0.911
0.000
0.363
0.000
0.066
0.551
0.139
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.823
0.000
0.930
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.588
0.000
0.064
0.192
0.000
0.203
0.077
0.966
0.268
0.957
0.000
0.047
0.587
0.000
0.000
0.135
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.505

0::

~

'50

~

~

d

III

:::I

LI.

CII

ti
at

:;

"

CII
iE0
ftj
c
~
III
~
~
~
ii
0.000 0.000 0.812 0.061 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.902
0.000
0.000 213.020 0.134 0.818 0.000 0.143 0.000
7.767 0.426 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.174
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.737 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 49.226 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.000
0.000 0.319 0.292 0.019 0.000 0.000
0.000
2.334 0.000 0.719 0.000 0.000 0.048
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.024
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.050
0.000
0.000 0.000 1.166 0.002 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.426 0.347
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.249 0.000 0.433 0.000 0.000 0.842
0.000
0.000 16.329 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.309
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.166
0.000
0.000 0.209 0.218 0.000 0.136 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.441 0.000 0.000 0.381 0.905
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.582 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000
0.000
0.000 86.391 0.000 0.284 0.000 0.000 0.819
0.000 2.858 0.432 0.092 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.555 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.249 0.000 0.015 0.072 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.121 0.000 0.000 0.211 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.194 0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000 0.507 0.000 0.000 0.407 0.353
0.000 0.510 0.736 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.639 0.000
0.000
0.533 0.724 0.212 0.000 0.000 0.005
0.000
0.000 0.170 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.742
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000
0.000
0.000 44.306 0.000 0.564 0.000 0.000 0.687
0.000 682.296 0.000 0.927 0.000 0.000 0.683
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.020
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
11\

"

i5
t:
lID
iio..

f

8
tn

e
d ~
CD

w
w

29
37
79
80
85
86
146
189
225
327
329
390
84
400
130
95
333
58
332
101
258
353
419
340
160
257
298
109
396
228
171
116
13
97
137
127
123
288

100%
100%
1000/0
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
99%
98%
98%
98%
97%
97%
96%
96%
96%
95%
95%
95%
94%
94%
94%
94%
94%
93%
93%
93%
93%
93%
93%
93%
92%
92%

tn

~

DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB

e

0..

ii

lID

lID
u
C
ca

e

lID

13'5
C CD

13
C

'S

~

~~

~:

;X:

Q.

Office
Parking
Remodel
Remodel
Remodel
School
School
School
Library
Remodel
Institutional
Institutional
Sports Facilities
Institutional
School
Institutional
Library
Parking
Remodel
Institutional
School
Remodel
Corrections
Remodel
School
School
School
School
School
School
School
School
Remodel
School
School
School
School
School

ca"O

0.82C
O.96C
0.85C
0,84C
0.83C
0,93C
0.42C
1,000
0.920
0,930
0.880
1.09C
0.970
0.990
0'97C
0.950
0.930
0.960
0.910
0.990
0.920
0.820
0,91C
0.92C
0,95C
1.00c
0.94(
0.950
0.000
0.970
1.000
0.960
0.900
0.88C
0.990
1.000
1.020
0.970

cat:
1.100
0,74C
1.0OC
O,OOC
O.OOC
0.000
0.000
O.OOC
O.OOC
0.000
0.000
1.000
1.020
0.950
0.000
0.800
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
1.050
0.500

O.t5c
0.000
O.OOC
O.OOC
0.000
0,000
O.OOC
0.000
1.00c
O.OOC
O.OOC
O.OOC
0.000

~~

Q.

:c0
C

ca

a-e
:;-f
d~

1.000 180.000
0,000
82.000
1.000
4.000
1.180 146,000
0.970 170.000
0.830
15.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.900
79.000
0.960 114.000
0.000
1.000
0.900
28.000
0.000
1.050
0,000
0.000
1.050 111.000
0.870 1414.000
1.080 150.000
0,920
0.000
0.790
0.000
0,000
O.OOC
O,OOC
1,000
0,000
1.100
0.000
1.050
0,000
0.000
O.OOC
0.000
O,OOC
0,000
O.OOC
0.000
1.00(
O.OOC
1.000
0.000
1.00(
0.000
0.000
0.8OC
0.000
1.090
0.000
O.OOC
0.000
O.OOC
0.000
0.000
0.000

Slacks

Virtual DMU Weights

Project Data and DEA Input/Outputs

I

Q.

e
0

.,.

.0

0"0

0::

it;;

:II:

0

ccaCD

95%
95%
95%
95%
95%
98%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
98%
0%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

1/1

0

cca

r;:

'0
480.000
38.000
60.000
169,000
58.000
220.000
0.000
0.000
117.000
157.000
622.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
55.000
303.0OC
350.0OC
176.000
0.000
O.OOC
0.000
O,OOC
0.000
0.000
0.000
O.OOC
O.OOC
0.000
94.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
57.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

1.1.

~
't;i

:;
0

'5

ii

"0

0

ii:

a:ca

d

8

d

0.987
1.000
0,212
0.937
0.999
0.325
1.000
1.000
0.998
0,736
0.247
1.000
0.994
0.999
1.000
0.995
0.990
0.999
0.940
1.000
1.000
1.000
0,988
0.984
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.957
1.000
1.000
0.984
0.989
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.013
0,000
0,788
0.063
0.001
0.675
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.264
0.753
0.000
0.006
0.001
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.001
0.060
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,012
0,016
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.043
0.000
0.000
0.016
0.011
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.537
0.599
0,000
0.028
0.968
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.058
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.014
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.005
0.000
0,000
0,036
0.972
0.032
1,000
0,018
0.082
0.942
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.125
0.000
0.329
0.000
0.239
0.267
0,070
0,061
0.055
0.000
0.100
0.082
0.101
0.096
0.101
0.052
0.061
0.050
0.000
0.000
0.072
0.058
0.000
0.071

c

ii

c
ca

.!
CD

~

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.366
0.918
0.000
0.000
0.911
0.422
0.287
0.346
0.167
0.671
0.441
0.333
0.733
0.335
0,000
0.333
0.216
0.353
0.371
0.350
0.353
0.347
0.577
0.386
0.370
0.505
0.483
0.372
0.388
0.620
0.369

i50

~
0.995
0.463
0.401
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.597
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.089
0.575
0.270
0.000
0.097
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.248
0,021
0.082
0,000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.495
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

'S

lID

:;

ca

8

-

d

"0

n:

d

ii

~

~

~

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.964
0.000
0.000
0,000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.443
0.528
0.736
0.000
0.545
0.428
0.000
0.594
0,691
0,591
0.702
0,547
0.547
0.5;49
0.551
0.552
0.371
0.552
0.580
0,000
0.517
0.556
0.554
0.380
0.561

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0,000
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
127.560
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
2.403
40,768
114.306
0,000
0.000
35.811
41.015
60.502
160.587
85.411
0,000
61.249
42.015
0.000
0.000
107.245
49.248
64.962
26.951

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.395
0.270
0.210
0.219
0.000
0.663
0.203
0.132
0,639
0.388
0.528
0.173
0.082
0.183
0.161
0.187
0.259
0.072
0.213
0.002
0.179
0.050
0.140
0.334
0.054

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.012
0.068
0.000
0.417
0.000
0.025
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.345
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.801
0.230
0.000
0.000
0.836
0.000

0.000
0.000
0,000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.033
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.060
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.000
0.000
0,000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.037
0,174
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.119
0.357
0.000

::s

i.s::.

0

C

ii:
ii

1.1.

~
0

0

'5

CD

i5

i

.s::.
~
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.066
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.088
0.000
0.000
0.175!
0,000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.0001
0.000
0.0001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0,000
0.130
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

1

1

1

IE
't:
CJ

!

c

u
tn

Q

5 m

VJ

~

325
261
254
153
398
144
154
128
173
199
118
145
248
174
192
304
99
115
260
267
250
143
305
98
175
112
100
297
147
295
401
352
317
78
318
121
24
120

';0

0

92%
92%
92%
91%
91%
91%
91%
91%
91%
91%
91%
91%
91%
91%
91%
90%
90%
90%
90%
90%
90%
90%
90%
90%
90%
89%
89%
89%
89%
89%
89%
89%
88%
88%
87%
87%
87%
87%

13 a;
I»

rn

a.

~

eBB
eBB
eBB
eBB
eBB
DBB
DBB
eBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
eBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
eBB
DBB
DBB
eBB
eBB
DBB
eBB
eBB
eBB
DBB
DBB
eBB
DBB
DBB
eBB
eBB
DBB

~

School
School
School
School
Institutional
School
School
School
School
School
School
School
School
School
School
School
Library
School
School
School
School
School
School
School
School
Remodel
Remodel
School
School
School
School
Institutional
Institutional
Sports Facilities

Office
School
Institutional
School

C Q
N"O

~lJ

0.910
0.990
0.970
0.960
0.000
0.990
0.970
1.000
0.950
0.000
0.960
0.930
0.960
0.960
0.950
0.950
0.960
0.950
0.960
0.960
0.97C
0.970
0.960
0.950
0.93(J
0.920
0.970
0.920
0.950
0.93(J
0.000
1.000
0.890
0.900
0.960
0.990
0.990
0.980

e

0

';

13
C

N't:

~:

0.950
0.000
O.OO(J
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
O.OOC
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.970

a.

Q.

C

0

1/1

~

ii:

8C

:c1/1

:; E

N

CJ N

"0 ...

1-@

:;,:

~E

=JII:
N ..

d~

0.960 1000.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
O'OOC
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
O.OOC
0.000
0.000
0.000
O.OOC
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.660 442.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
88.00C
0.770
0.000
0.000
0.97C
o.ooe
0.840
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
O.OOC
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.930
90.000
0.800
0.910
0.000
0.000
1.000 130.000
0.000

Slacks

Virtual DMU Weights

Project Data and DEA Input/Outputs
E

0

1/1"0

iiii

ii''5

1/1

1/1

0:

'0
:at:

C

1/1

~

C

';

ii'

d

N

L\..

~
~

8

:;
0

';

d

C

CJ

a;

Q
"0

lJ

:;

IE

£

'i
.c
~

N

1/1

6:

C

';

ii'

d

N

L\..

~
~

8

'S
0
7i

d

CJ

a;
Q
"0

lJ

:;

IE
0
1£

'i
.c

:;,

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
80% 1700.000 0.958 0.042 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.059 0.930 0.000
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.386 0.000 0.559 0.000 85.314 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.164 0.000
100%
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.381 0.000 0.561 0.000 55.919 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.378 0.000 0.562 0.000 38.503 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000
0%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.393 0.000 0.562 0.000 18.269 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.388 0.000
0.000 0.270 0.180 0.000 0.270 0.000
0.000 0.986 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.533 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.383 0.000 0.563 0.000 36.259 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.146 0.000
100%
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.615 0.000 0.385 0.000 30.321 0.388 0.190 0.000 0.414 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.376 0.000 0.564 0.000 56.633 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.376 0.000 0.566 0.000 81.101 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.378 0.000 0.566 0.000 78.347 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.360 0.000 0.569 0.000 141.037 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.380 0.000 0.567 0.000 37.705 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.000
100%
0.000 0.235 0.191 0.000 0.220 0.000
100%
0.000 0.989 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.461 0.000 0.539 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.378 0.000 0.568 0.000 40.211 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.133 0.000
0.000 0.175 0.073 0.000 0.146 0.000
100%
0.000 0.992 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.542 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.204
95% 158.00(J 0.931 0.069 0.004 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.180 0.317 0.000 0.151 0.000
100%
0.000 0.992 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.542 0.000
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.383 0.000 0.568 0.000 66.681 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.000
100%
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.384 0.000 0.569 0.000 163.613 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.276 0.000
100%
o.ooe 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.386 0.000 0.569 0.000 58.203 0.334 0.000 0.000 0.340 0.000
0.000 0.369 0.007 0.000 0.383 0.000
0.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.463 0.000 0.537 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.384 0.000 0.570 0.000 61.548 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.302 0.000
100%
0.000 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.084
9O.00c 0.927 0.073 0.013 0.000 0.987 0.000 0.000 0.000
95%
100%
O.OOC 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.372 0.000 0.571 0.000 34.964 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.000
0.000 0.251 0.215 0.000 0.000 0.000
100% 211.00C 0.987 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.523 0.000 0.477 0.000
1.299 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.239 0.761 0.000 0.000 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.372 0.000 0.577 0.000 215.343 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.142 0.000
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.375 0.000 0.552 0.000 34.784 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.378 0.000 0.579 0.000 57.041 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.336 0.000
100%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.349 0.000 0.582 0.000 68.843 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 43.821 0.000 0.503 0.000 0.000 0.886
100%
0.000 0.162 0.111 0.000 0.642 0.000
100% 108.000 0.981 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.531 0.000 0.469 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064
99% 270.000 0.935 0.065 0.022 0.090 0.888 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.034 0.381 0.000 0.014 0.000
30.000 0.999 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.485 0.000 0.515 0.000
100%
3.772 0.133 0.319 0.000 0.141 0.0001
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.637 0.000 0.363 0.000
100%
0.000 0.048 0.727 0.000 0.000 0.000
87.000 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.838 0.096 0.066 0.000
93%
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.364 0.000 40.815 0.147 0.028 0.000 0.157 0.000
100%

0

OJ

5

314
90
394
386
155
323
3JO
33
124
181
182
347
102
226
185
339
114
392
371
35
23
92
320
. 36
362

-

w

Vl

0

C,)

(/)

<
~
86%
85%
85%
85%
85%
84%
83%
83%
83%
83%
83%
83%
82%
62%
82%
82%
81%
80%
80%
79%
78%
77%
77%
76%
67%

.,
iio..
t

!

(/)

~
088
088
088
088
088
088
088
DBB
DBB
DB8
088
DB8
DBB
DBB
DBB
DBB
DB8
DBB
DB8
088
088
088
DB8
088
088

.,

Q.

~
School
Remodel
School
School
Par1<ing
Remodel
School
Institutional
Remodel
Institutional
Corrections
Institutional
School
School
Institutional
School
School
School
School
Library
Hospital
Remodel
School
Hospital
Remodel

4:
E
0..

'0 ..

!u

111'0

lilt

CQ

~rif

0.95(J
0.85(J
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.880
0.91C
0.92<
0.920
0.96C
0.000
0.8SC
0.63C
0.950
0.000
0.000
0.970
0.000
0.000
0.950
0.980
0.81C
0.000
0.96C
O.OOC

C

~:

0.000
0.100
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.670
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.860
0.480
0.000
0.000
0.400
O.OOC

Q.

8C

~e

1~

3,:

:cIII
C
III

~j

III ..

d~

Slacks

Virtual DMU Weights

Project Data and DEA Input/Outputs
'is.
E
0

0

~
111'0

:am

ii'1;i
100%
0.900
0.000
0.75(J
95%
5O.00C
100%
1.000 947.000
100%
0.000
0.000
0.000 100%
1.000
0.000 100%
0.000
100%
0.67C 122.00(
62.00(
93%
1.000
0.000 100%
O.OO(
100%
O.50C
O.OO(
100%
0.000
O.OOC
100%
0.70C
0.660
0.000 100%
0.770
0.000 100%
0.000
0.000 100%
0.000
0.000 100%
0.000 100%
90%
1.000
0.000
0%
0.000
0.000
93%
0.000 420.000
92%
0.920 1200.000
95%
48.000
0.580
0.660
0.000 100%
93%
0.700 650.000
0.000 100%
0.83C

III
C
III

.111

u:::

a:
'0
:It!

133.000
151.000
155.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
188.00<
68.00C
O.OOC
O.OOC
O.OOC
0.000
JOO.OOC
77.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
80.000
1.000
600.000
700.000
60.000
0.000
900.000
0.000

III
C

III

ii'
1.000
0.942
0.941
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.828
0.958
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.941
0.781
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.956
1.000
0.933
1.000
0.959
1.000

~

S

-

d

0.000
0.058
0.059
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.172
0.042
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.059
0.219
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.044
0.000
0.067
0.000
0.041
0.000

0.000
0.016
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.023
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.021
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.080
0.231
0.215
0.116
0.255
0.149
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.188
0.112
0.057
0.000
0.000
0.084
0.000
0.020
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

a::

1.1.

.

~
III

ti

'0

~

0.484
0.903
0.000
0.785
0.000
0.745
0.827
0.000
0.621
1.000
0.812
0.888
0.943
1.000
1.000
0.000
0.242
0.000
1.000
0.920
0.972
0.979
1.000
0.961
0.000

Q

rif

III
C
III

.!

'50

::s

.,
.c

&:

3,

III
C
III

0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.080
0.028
0.000
0.000
0.039
0.000

0.516
0.000
0.769
0.000
0.884
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.379
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.916
0.758
0.980
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000

ii'
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

'0

a::
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d

0.000
0.000
0.000
33.391
143.333
270.729
0.000
0.000
1.597
36.974
99.086
0.000
0.000
0.475
464.075
78.117
1.989
0.000
13.192
0.000
0.000
0.000
203.099
0.000
15.966
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0.023
0.000
0.173
0.069
0.201
0.154
0.000
0.052
0.298
0.000
0.012
0.157
0.496
0.000
0.000
0.138
0.206
0.475
0.000
0.130
0.417
0.000
0.000
0.110
0.096
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0.367
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.422
0.216
0.440
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.475
0.603
0.000
0.149
0.000
0.456
0.224
0.490
0.703
0.254
0.050
0.061

0.000
0.000
0.751
0.000
0.744
0.000
0.000
0.041
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.719
0.000
0.033
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.589

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.105
0.318
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.227
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.117
0.232
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.066
0.000
0.852
0.000
0.847
0.139
0.000
0.000
0.332
0.830
0.128
0.150
0.051
0.816
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.802
0.790
0.060
0.152
0.107
0.160
0.000
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